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ABSTRACT 
 The present project focuses on some of the similarities between social 
cognition, transcendental phenomenology, literary theory, and epistemological 
hermeneutics.  I argue that developments in hermeneutic theory call into 
question the view that interpretation is a cognitive process residing within the 
minds of individuals. Drawing on Heidegger’s project for a fundamental 
ontology, I suggest that hermeneutic phenomenology provides a radical critique 
of social cognition’s view of the nature of social reality. I also introduce the 
concept of practice as an alternative to psychology’s focus on subjectivity. 
 These theoretical explorations provide a foundation for investigating the 
practices that embody an interpretation of political reality. Using open-ended 
qualitative interviews, I ask participants to describe in as much detail as possible, 
salient political situations. I categorize these situations into three broad areas: (1) 
media (2) conventional political activities and (3) political socialization. Within 
each of these categories, I discuss variations in the way people understand 
political life. 
 Finally, I explore the implications of these practices for our understanding 
of democracy.  I discuss how the movement from epistemology to ontology calls 
into question the role of subjectivity in contemporary democratic societies.  
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PREFACE 
 The purpose of this dissertation is to explore the concept of practice as it 
relates to politics. The two broad research questions it seeks to answer are (1) 
how is the concept of practice relevant to the theoretical foundations of 
phenomenology and social cognition and (2) how do everyday political practices 
embody an interpretation of social and political reality? 
 Chapter 1 explores the possibility that phenomenology may be able to do 
more than provide contemporary psychology with rigorous descriptions of 
human experience. In fact, I argue that when phenomenology is fused with 
ontology, a radical revision of the concept of interpretation is in order. I 
demonstrate this by focusing on social cognition’s view of the nature of the 
relationship between the individual and his or her context. This chapter is 
relatively long as I endeavor to clarify the philosophical foundations that guide 
the present project.  
 Chapter 2 begins with a review of the literature in political psychology. 
Here I explore the differences between psychological and sociological approaches 
to political research. I also discuss the implications of these approaches for 
phenomenological investigations of political practice.  
 Chapter 3 focuses on methodological issues. Here I discuss the stages of a 
qualitative research study including thematizing, designing, interviewing, 
transcribing, analyzing, verifying, and reporting. I also explore some of the 
theoretical issues that emerge in qualitative research. 
 Chapter 4 looks at the interviews with a particular emphasis on the 
practices that people discuss in the context of concrete political experiences. I 
focus on three broad categories: (1) media (2) conventional political activities and 
(3) political socialization.  
Chapter 5 summarizes the implications of this investigation for research in 
social and political psychology.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION  
 The present project focuses on two interrelated issues: (1) to what extent 
can a revised understanding of phenomenology call traditional views of social 
reality into question and (2) what can the transition from epistemology to 
ontology tell us about the everyday practices that embody an interpretation of 
political reality? While this chapter is one of the longest in the present project, it 
is important to provide a thorough introduction to the theoretical foundations of 
this investigation. We will begin by exploring what has become one of the 
dominant approaches within contemporary social psychology. 
  
Social Cognition 
Although a number of texts deal specifically with social cognition (Bless, 
Fiedler & Strack, 2004; Kunda, 1999; Moskowitz, 2005), the present analysis 
draws on the work of several primary texts (Fiske & Taylor, 1984, 1991; Wyer & 
Skrull, 1984, 1994) that focus on the theoretical foundations of social cognition. 
Fiske and Taylor (1991) define social cognition as the, “study of how people make 
sense of other people and themselves. It focuses on how ordinary people think 
about people and how they think they think about people” (p.1). In other words, 
social cognition focuses on the way people interpret social reality in everyday 
interactions. 
Although social cognition is a relatively new area of social psychology, it 
has become a significant force in social psychological research. In the forward to 
the second edition of the Handbook of Social Cognition, Ostrom (1994) 
proclaims that the sovereignty of social cognition as a field of study is beyond 
question while predicting, “the ultimate destiny of social cognition as monarch of 
social psychology” (p.xi). Moreover, he suggests that it is, “easy to envision a 
future in which there is no longer a need for a separate Handbook of Social 
Cognition. The Handbook of Social Cognition will become the Handbook of 
Social Psychology” (p. xii). Though this characterization of social cognition is not 
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shared by all, it demonstrates the extent to which some researchers view social 
cognition as a radical and dominant movement in social psychology. 
 
Origins 
Fiske and Taylor (1991) suggest that the origins of social cognition can be 
found in the everyday experiences of people navigating social reality. Much of our 
lives are spent trying to understand why people think and act in particular ways. 
We try to make sense of the world around us as well as of the people who inhabit 
it and, for the most part, these interactions occur with minimal difficulty. For 
social cognition researchers, this suggests that the thoughts and behaviors of 
individuals in concrete social situations are guided by an often implicit 
understanding of the nature of social relationships – what Heider (1958) refers to 
as a “naïve psychology”—and that social psychology must ultimately begin with a 
thorough understanding of the way individuals experience these everyday 
encounters. 
This focus on experience is often referred to as phenomenology or “the 
study of human experience.” For Fiske and Taylor (1991), the purpose of 
phenomenology is to, “describe systematically how ordinary people say they 
experience their world” (p.1). At a phenomenological level of analysis, the aim is 
not to establish the veracity of these experiences but to develop a rigorous and 
detailed description of the way people experience themselves and others in a 
variety of situations. That an understanding of our everyday experiences is an 
important component of social cognition research is reflected in Fiske and 
Taylor’s (1991) suggestion that phenomenology remains, “one of the major 
foundations of social cognition research” (p.4). Yet, it is also clear that in order to 
identify factors that are causally related to specific interpretations of social 
reality, it is necessary to move beyond “mere” phenomenological description. 
From this perspective, phenomenology is a means for developing a description of 
human experience while social cognition researchers attempt to identify cognitive  
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 Figure 1. Rubin Figure 
 
mechanisms and environmental factors that cause individuals to interpret social 
reality in specific ways. 
At the phenomenological level, it is clear that in our everyday experiences 
we do not encounter a, “blooming, buzzing confusion” (James, 1890) but instead 
find various aspects of our surroundings coming into focus while other aspects 
remain in the background. For example, I can attend to my pencil as it stands out 
against the background of my paper. It is also possible to alter my focus so that 
the desk provides a ground against which I can delineate the contours of the 
paper that was only moments ago in the background. Within psychology, this 
figure/ground relationship is often demonstrated through the use of the Rubin 
Figure (see Figure 1) where it is possible to see either a vase against a dark 
background or two silhouettes facing one another against a light background.  
This demonstration is meant to draw attention to the way perception involves a 
relationship between a salient figure and a background. Moreover, it is clear that 
when I look at a collection of objects, I perceive certain items as belonging 
together: the stack of books on my desk form a group while the various stacks can 
be distinguished from one another. For Gestalt psychologists, examples such as 
these drawn from our everyday experiences indicate that our perceptions, far 
from being chaotic and unintelligible, exhibit significant organization that can be 
described in lawful ways. 
Within social cognition, the Gestalt approach to human experience serves 
as a valuable alternative to the elemental and atomistic framework that 
 3
dominated psychology in the early part of the twentieth century. During that 
time, it was believed that in order to develop a scientific understanding of a 
particular phenomenon, it was necessary to reduce what was viewed as complex 
into its constituent parts. For Gestalt psychologists, such atomism fails to 
recognize that the whole is different from the sum of its parts. For example, 
although the individual elements of a water molecule are combustible, water as a 
whole exhibits a conflicting property, namely, the ability to extinguish fire. This 
suggests that to understand the nature of water is not equivalent to reducing it to 
its individual parts. As Fiske and Taylor (1991) observe, “Gestalt psychologists 
saw the mental chemistry metaphor of the elementalists as misguided because a 
chemical compound has properties not predictable from its isolated elements” 
(p.4). For Gestalt and social psychologists, this suggests that people not only 
perceive individual elements from the “bottom-up” but that stimuli are also 
organized from the “top-down” based on specific rules of organization.  
Commonly regarded as the father of social psychology, Kurt Lewin applied 
these insights to the realm of social reality. Instead of viewing the individual as 
an isolated part of a casual chain or as a collection of basic elements, Lewin (1951) 
developed what he referred to as a “field theory” of psychology whereby “behavior 
(B) is a function of the person (P) and the environment (E), B = F (P, E), and that 
P and E in this formula are interdependent variables” (p.25). Lewin’s formulation 
of what has become a fundamental principle of contemporary social psychology 
reflects his interest in applying phenomenological insights to the study of social 
reality. It is not the environment, as some behaviorists maintain, that is the basic 
unit of analysis, nor is it the person in isolation. Instead, it is the interdependent 
relationship between the person and her environment that provides a foundation 
for social psychology. Much as the paper I am writing on provides a background 
from which my pencil stands out for what it is, the individual must always be 
understood within a particular context or environment.  
For researchers in social cognition, this means that it is necessary to pay 
attention to the “total psychological field” (Fiske & Taylor, 1991, p.5) whereby a 
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complete description of human behavior is only possible by paying attention to 
the person in the situation.  Fiske and Taylor (1991) claim that, “ever since Lewin, 
social psychologists have seen both the person and the situation as essential to 
predicting behavior. The study of social cognition focuses on perceiving, thinking, 
and remembering as a function of who and where one is” (p.5). 
As the name indicates, social cognition is particularly interested in the way 
cognitive mechanisms function in particular circumstances. Researchers want to 
understand the mental processes that lead people to interpret social reality in 
particular ways. Fiske and Taylor (1991) have even gone so far as to suggest that 
social cognition has an “unabashed commitment to mentalism (cognition)” 
(p.14). Indeed, nearly all social cognition researchers are united by a desire to 
understand how mental processes produce particular interpretations of social 
reality (Bless, Fielder & Strack, 2004; Bodenhausen & Lambert, 2003; Devine, 
Hamilton & Ostrom, 1994; Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Kunda, 1999; Moskowitz, 2005; 
Ostrom, 1984, 1994; Smith, 1998).  
 
Information-Processing Theory 
 Social Cognition shares with cognitive psychology the aim of 
understanding human behavior in terms of cognitive processes. Within cognitive 
psychology, mental activity is largely viewed as analogous to the way computers 
process information. Researchers refer to this computational metaphor as 
information-processing theory.  
 In many ways, social cognition can be viewed as a hybrid discipline 
integrating social psychology’s interest in the situated nature of human behavior 
with information-processing theory’s focus on the cognitive processes that people 
use to interpret reality. Holyoak and Gordon (1974), for example, claim that “the 
mutual influence of social psychology and the information-processing paradigm 
of cognitive psychology has intensified dramatically over the past decade. The 
resulting new subdiscipline – social cognition – now has its own distinct identity” 
(p.39-40). Likewise, Ostrom (1994), suggests that, 
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at the heart of social cognition is the conceptual orientation that has emerged from the 
information-processing perspective in cognitive psychology, a perspective that recently 
has expanded to include cognitive science … Social cognition researchers share this 
theoretical perspective, differing solely in the phenomenon to be understood (p.ix). 
Indeed, the importance of the computer for social cognition research is also 
reflected in Fiske and Taylor’s (1991) suggestion that the computer, 
has become a methodological tool as well as a theoretical metaphor. It serves as a tool in 
that cognitive scientists actually use computers to simulate human cognitive processes; 
they write complex programs that play chess, learn geometry, and summarize the news… 
The computer is also a metaphor in that it provides a framework and a jargon for 
characterizing mental processes; psychologists talk about input-output operations or 
memory storage and retrieval, with respect to human cognition. More important, most 
current theory builds on the idea that human cognition resembles computer information 
processing in important ways (p.9; italics mine).  
In other words, the computer is both a tool for exploring various aspects of the 
mind and a common discourse for discussing mental activity. Indeed, this 
“discourse” has come to dominate the way researchers describe and understand 
social phenomena. 
 The computational view of mind has also led social cognition researchers 
to embrace a framework that understands mental processes as fundamentally 
rule-governed. Much as a computer program contains rules for processing input 
and displaying the resulting output, social cognition researchers view mental 
processes as governed by rules that determine how individuals behave in specific 
situations. That social cognition researchers view mental activity as rule-
governed is evident from Ostrom’s (1984) list of concurrent tasks that an 
individual may need to perform in the midst of a social exchange: 
1. The perceiver must observe the instigating action. This involves selective attention to the 
stimulus field and the sensory modalities. 
2. Observations are entered into the cognitive system. 
3. Past observations of the same stimulus person are retrieved to provide a context for 
interpreting the instigating act. 
4. Inferences, judgments, and attributions are implicitly made, evaluated, and revised. 
5. Since the perceiver must respond to other person’s instigating act, a review of possible 
response alternatives is made. 
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6. Short- and long-term consequences of each alternative must be evaluated. 
7. The perspective of the other toward each alternative is reviewed. Will the other veridically 
interpret it and make the desired response? 
8. One response alternative is selected and enacted. 
9. The partner’s response is observed and interpreted in light of the behavior enacted by the 
self. 
10. Based on feedback from the partner, the adequacy of the self-enacted behavior is 
evaluated according to whether it produced the intended consequences. It is compared in 
effectiveness to alternative response that could have been selected for enactment. 
11. Affective processes that may have been aroused are dealt with. 
12. The significant observations and thoughts that resulted from this brief interaction 
segment are recorded in memory for future use. (p.15) 
Ostrom’s (1984) list is by no means exhaustive, as a myriad of simpler tasks may 
need to occur between each of these general procedures. Nonetheless, this list 
demonstrates how adoption of a computational view of the mind suggests that 
human cognition is ultimately the result of applying determinate rules in, and to, 
specific situations.  
 For social cognition researchers, the fact that an individual’s behavior is 
the result of applying a rule in a specific situation does not require the individual 
to recognize that her behavior is rule governed. By and large, people navigate 
social reality without being aware that their interpretations are the result of 
determinate laws of mental organization. Nonetheless, a computational view of 
the mind ultimately requires that human cognition be viewed as governed by 
determinate rules. That people are largely unaware of these rules has become a 
central theme in research on automaticity and implicit psychology (Bargh, 1997; 
Chen & Bargh, 1997; Dovidio, Kawakami, Johnson, Johnson & Howard, 1997; 
Fazio & Dunton, 1997; Greenwald, McGhee & Schwartz, 1998; Wegner & Bargh, 
1998; Wittenbrink, Judd & Park, 1997). 
 
Mental Representation 
 Another central theme in social cognition research is the belief that our 
experiences, beliefs, thoughts, and emotions are represented within the mind—
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what psychologists and philosophers of mind refer to as mental representation. 
For Smith (1998) psychologists, 
generally define a representation as an encoding of some information, which an 
individual can construct, retain in memory, access, and use in various ways. Thus your 
impression of your Uncle Harry—your body of interrelated feelings about him and beliefs 
about what kind of person he is—is a mental representation on which you might draw to 
describe, evaluate, or make behavioral decisions about him (p.391). 
Just how these experiences are represented has become a source of contention in 
contemporary social cognition research. Smith (1998) identifies four “theoretical 
mechanism” used by researchers to explain particular interpretations of social 
reality. These include associative networks (Carlston & Smith, 1996; Fiske & 
Taylor, 1991), schematic mechanisms (Brewer & Nakamura, 1984; Holyoak & 
Gordon, 1984), exemplars (Lewicki, 1985; Linville, Fisher, & Salovey, 1989) and 
parallel-distributed processing (Read & Miller, 1998; Rumelhart & McClelland, 
1986; Smith, 1996). The relationship between social cognition and parallel-
distributed processing (or connectionism) is especially difficult to grasp. First, it 
is also not entirely clear whether connectionism should be viewed as a competing 
perspective with more traditional approaches to information-processing such as 
associative networks and schema driven theories (Bechtel & Abrahamsen, 1991) 
or if connectionism can be viewed as an evolutionary development within an 
information-processing approach (Grainger & Jacobs, 1998; Massaro & Cowan, 
1993). Moreover, although connectionistic models generally adhere to a 
representational model of the mind (Grainger & Jacobs, 1998; Smith, 1998), 
there are some who advocate an eliminativist approach to connectionism in 
which case the latter is viewed as a neurophysiological alternative to social 
cognition’s conception of “mind” (Ramsey, Stich & Rumelhart, 1991). In any 
event, it is clear that, “schematic models have been the most popular 
conceptualization of mental representation within social psychology over the last 
two decades (Smith, 1998, p.410).  Indeed, Holyoak and Gordon (1984) have 
suggested that, “if there is any current theme that serves as an integrative 
framework, it is the concept of knowledge structures or schemas” (p44-45). 
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A schema is a mental representation that stores information from 
experience and uses this information to make sense of novel situations. 
Rumehart (1980) has even suggested that schemas be understood as “the 
building blocks of cognition.” Brewer and Nakamura (1984) define schemata as, 
the unconscious mental structures and processes that underlie the molar aspects of 
human knowledge and skill. They contain abstract generic knowledge that has been 
organized to form qualitative new structures… The unconscious operation of the schema 
gives rise to the specific conscious contents of the mind. At output, generic production 
schemas interact with new incoming information to allow appropriate response to an 
indefinite number of new situations (p.141) 
Sometimes schemas are viewed as intervening variables such that while 
they may not be linked to any physical structure (like the brain) they are able to 
account for measurable differences in observable behavior (MacCorqudale & 
Meehl, 1948; Ostrom, 1984). In other cases, schemas are viewed as hypothetical 
constructs that have the possibility of being instantiated in neurophysiology. This 
view is held by Neisser (1976) who claims that, 
from the biological point of view, a schema is a part of the nervous system. It is some 
active array of physiological structures and processes: not a center in the brain, but an 
entire system that includes receptors and afferents and feed-forward units and efferents 
(p.54). 
This is congruent with Brewer and Nakamura’s (1984) suggestion that schemas 
are, “ mental entities [that] have a physiological base, but that in the ultimate 
scientific account of things it will always be necessary to provide a scientific 
explanation at the level of mental entities” (p.136). 
 
Social Reality 
Social cognition views the psychological subject as a collection of mental 
representations and processes.  This has led to a variety of different theories 
regarding the way individuals interpret social reality. One approach claims that 
individuals are motivated to maintain existing beliefs and that this consideration 
influences the interpretation of social reality. When the perception of a new event 
is incongruent with a previously held belief, the individual experiences cognitive 
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discomfort. Within this perspective, people strive to reduce discomfort by 
engaging in activities that are designed to establish consistency between 
incongruent cognitions (Festinger, 1957). Theorists from this perspective claim 
that, “people change their attitudes and beliefs for motivational reasons, because 
of unmet needs for consistency” (Fiske & Taylor, 1991, p.11). Unfortunately, the 
individual motivated by a desire to be consistent may not always develop an 
accurate representation of reality. This has led to a tremendous amount of 
research into how cognitive biases distort people’s interpretation of social reality 
(Bless, Fiedler & Strack, 2004; Fiske & Taylor, 1991). 
Another approach within social cognition suggests that while the 
individual may seek to establish consistency between her beliefs and what she 
experiences in the social world, the navigation of social reality often requires 
more than the mere securing of harmony. Individuals encounter a variety of 
situations that are best dealt with by developing an accurate perception of reality. 
Within this approach, individuals take on the features of a lay scientist 
attempting to collect and analyze information that can help them understand the 
causes of particular social events. Much of this research seeks to understand 
those factors that contribute to the attributions people make regarding the causes 
of a variety of circumstances (Bless, Fiedler & Strack, 2003; Fiske & Taylor, 1991; 
Kelly, 1972, Kunda, 1999). 
While people may strive to develop an accurate perception of reality, there 
are numerous factors that prevent such a project from succeeding. Individuals 
are often called upon to make a variety of decisions with only a limited amount of 
information and resources. Social cognitive research often focuses on the mental 
shortcuts, or heuristics, that people use to draw conclusions with only a limited 
number of resources. From this perspective, individuals are viewed as cognitive 
misers attempting to develop appropriate tools for drawing conclusions while 
using a minimum of cognitive resources. Research here has attempted to identify 
the mental rules people use for making economical decisions in everyday 
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interactions (Bless, Fiedler & Strack, 2003; Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1973; Kunda, 1999; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) 
Up to this point, we have explored some of the fundamental assumptions 
guiding social cognition research. At the most basic level, social cognition 
researchers are interested in understanding why individuals interpret social 
reality in specific ways. We have also explored Gestalt Psychology’s influence on 
modern social psychology. Especially with the work of Kurt Lewin (1951), the 
relationship between people and their environment remains a central focus for 
social psychology. For social psychologists attempting to apply insights from 
cognitive psychology, the figure/ground relationship is transformed so that, “the 
central issues of both elemental and Gestalt theories are how to understand 
structures and processes occurring inside the mind” (Fiske & Taylor, 1991, p.6). 
With the advent of the computer, mental activity is integrated into an 
information-processing model of cognition in which stimuli enter an individual’s 
mind where processes occur that result in specific behaviors. These behaviors are 
governed by determinate rules that dictate how an individual will interpret social 
reality. For social cognition researchers, interpretation is located within the 
minds of individuals and it is these cognitive process that ultimately lead to 
specific behaviors. Finally, social cognition generally relies on the concept of a 
“schema” to explain how knowledge is represented in the mind. 
 This view of interpretation is not unique to social cognition. In fact, there 
are a number of similarities between this view and what I will refer to as 
epistemological hermeneutics. At this point, I would like to explore some of these 
similarities in order to understand how such an approach to interpretation has a 
number of implications for the way we view social reality. 
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Epistemological Hermeneutics 
   
Origins 
Hermeneutics emerged as an area of study concerned with developing 
procedures for interpreting legal texts and scripture. Such texts were created to 
convey a particular message and it was the job of the interpreter to uncover the 
text’s one true meaning. Because words are polysemic, it becomes necessary for 
an interpreter to distinguish the true meaning from imposters. As Ricoeur (1991) 
observes, 
this activity of discernment is properly called interpretation; it consists in recognizing 
which relatively univocal message the speaker has constructed on the polysemic basis of 
the common lexicon. To produce a relatively univocal discourse with polysemic words, 
and to identify this intention of univocity in the reception of messages: such is the first 
and most elementary work of interpretation. (p.55) 
Early hermeneutics focused on the task of developing procedures for 
dealing with any ambiguity that might emerge during the interpretation of a text. 
By using proper procedures, the interpreter could apprehend a text’s true 
meaning. The development of techniques and procedures to arrive at an 
objectively valid interpretation of a text is often referred to as epistemological or 
methodological hermeneutics. This approach views the interpreter as a knowing 
subject trying to understand the meaning of a particular object, in this case a text. 
The text is an expression of an author and it is the aim of epistemological 
hermeneutics to accurately recreate the author’s intention in the present. 
Especially in the work of the historian Wilhelm Dilthey, hermeneutics becomes a 
way to develop a rigorous science of subjectivity capable of developing objectively 
valid knowledge comparable to the natural sciences.  
Dilthey and his predecessor, the theologian Friedrich Schleiermacher, 
view textual interpretation as an inherently reconstructive process. To know what 
an author intends in a particular passage, it is necessary to recreate the author’s 
world. Palmer (1969), discussing Schleiermacher’s approach to hermeneutics, 
suggests that he views understanding as: 
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the reexperiencing of the mental processes of the text’s author. It is the reverse of 
composition, for it starts with the fixed and finished expression and goes back to the 
mental life from which it arose. The speaker or author constructed a sentence; the hearer 
penetrates into the structures of the sentence and the thought (p.86). 
In textual interpretation, the words on a page are a medium used by authors to 
express their subjectivity and it is the job of the interpreter to use such 
expressions to reconstruct the author’s original intention. The passages in a text 
are viewed as an exteriorization of the inner life of the author. In epistemological 
hermeneutics, words are signs pointing back to the subjectivity of an author. The 
text, by manifesting the inner life of an author, serves as a point of departure for 
reconstructing his or her unique perspective.   
Within hermeneutics, the interpretation of a text is best viewed as a 
dialectical processes rather than as a linear progression towards some final 
meaning. As we read, more and more comes into focus so that what we are 
reading at present may illuminate previous interpretations even as these 
interpretations may modify our understanding of the text as a whole. Indeed, as 
Palmer (1969) has observed, 
in order to read, it is necessary to understand in advance what will be said, and yet this 
understanding must come from the reading. What begins to emerge here is the complex 
dialectical process involved in all understanding as it grasps the meaning of a sentence, 
and somehow in a reverse direction supplies the attitude and emphasis which alone can 
make the written word meaningful” (p.16) 
Our sense of the meaning of the text as a whole allows us to make sense of 
the individual parts while it is these individual parts that give us a sense of the 
whole. This is what is commonly referred to as the hermeneutic circle. For 
Dilthey, the relationship between the whole and its parts could be extended 
beyond the interpretation of texts disclosing the circular process inherent in life 
itself: 
An event or experience can so alter our lives that what was formerly meaningful becomes 
meaningless and an apparently unimportant past experience may take on meaning in 
retrospect. The sense of the whole determines the function and the meaning of the parts 
(Palmer, 1969) 
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The hermeneutic circle suggests that when we understand something, this 
involves drawing on knowledge that we already possess, while remaining open to 
the possibility of modifying this knowledge in the light of new information. 
As we will recall from our discussion of social cognition, the way people 
experience everyday interactions is important for understanding why people 
interpret social reality in specific ways. While I only touched on phenomenology 
at that point, I would now like to explore a type of phenomenology that shares a 
number of similarities with epistemological hermeneutics and social cognition. 
 
Transcendental Phenomenology 
 For its founder, Edmund Husserl, transcendental phenomenology was 
meant to provide a means for surpassing numerous philosophical problems that 
have left contemporary scientific inquiry in a state of crisis. Although much of 
Husserl’s philosophy focuses on the way phenomenology can cure this crisis, it is 
in his last major work that this task is given its most systematic attention. In The 
Crisis of European Science and Transcendental Phenomenology (1970), Husserl 
argues that the crisis of the sciences can be understood as a crisis of foundations 
resulting from modern science’s failure to recognize both its philosophical origins 
and its grounding in human subjectivity (Buckely, 1990). For Husserl, 
contemporary science’s rejection of its roots in philosophy and subjectivity 
constitute an impediment to rational inquiry and lead to a crisis in its 
foundations.  This rift between human experience and scientific knowledge leads 
to what Buckley (1990) views as: 
the positivistic tendency of the sciences to resign themselves to the knowledge and 
manipulation of brute facts without ever raising questions of value and meaning. Ever 
more content to live in its world of abstractions and ideal objects, science becomes ever 
more oblivious to the actual world of human life (p.25). 
Indeed, the distinction between facts and values that serves as a foundation for 
traditional objectivist science is for Husserl an obstacle to restoring reason to 
scientific inquiry – what he regards as a necessary condition for establishing a 
truly unified (scientific) world-view. In Husserl’s view, any attempt to establish a 
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unified science beyond the reach of human subjectivity is irrational and 
ultimately doomed to failure. The only way such a crisis can be averted is through 
developing a rigorous science capable of disclosing this neglected realm of human 
experience.  
For Husserl, if scientific discoveries gain their legitimacy by being 
supported by empirical research, such discoveries remain tentative so long as 
researchers fail to grasp the essential features of human experience. Moreover, it 
would be absurd to explore the structure of human experience using 
psychological theories and constructs since their validity stems from empirical 
research that has heretofore failed to critically examine the nature of human 
experience. For Husserl, phenomenology must be a presuppositionless science 
disclosing the structure of experience itself. Through careful observation of the 
way entities are immediately available to consciousness, the phenomenologist is 
able to produce a rigorous description of human experience, one that provides a 
foundation for empirical findings in the special sciences. Indeed, phenomenology 
is to be, “an a priori transcendental science of pure consciousness as such” 
(Moran, 2000, p.2). To understand the radical nature of phenomenological 
inquiry, it is important to explore several of its key concepts.  
 
Natural Attitude & Lifeworld. The natural attitude or natural standpoint 
refers to the fact that when we encounter things in our everyday activities, we 
typically accept them as they are experienced. For Husserl, the existence of that 
which we encounter in our ordinary lives is indubitable. There is a public world 
out there and a private set of experiences in my mind. In my ordinary activities, 
this fact is beyond question. To even begin to reflect on the ontological status of 
the entities I encounter is to have move beyond the natural attitude. As Husserl 
(1976) observes, 
this ‘fact-world’, as the word already tells us, I find to be out there, and also take it just as 
it gives itself to me as something that exists out there. All doubting and rejecting of the 
data of the natural world leaves standing the general thesis of the natural standpoint. 
‘The’ world is as fact-world always there; at the most it is at odd points ‘other’ than I 
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supposed, this or that under such names as ‘illusion’, or ‘hallucination’, and the like, must 
be struck out of it, so to speak; but the ‘it’ remains ever, in these sense of the general 
thesis, a world that has its being out there (p.106) 
The general thesis of the natural attitude remains intact so long as I am 
immersed in my ordinary activities. That the world exists as it exists remains on 
the periphery of my attention though this knowledge always provides a 
background for my everyday practical activities.  
In his later work, Husserl focuses specifically on the world that exists for 
us prior to theoretical concepts and scientific reflection.  The region where the 
natural attitude is given free reign is what Husserl refers to as the Lebenswelt or 
‘lifeworld’. The lifeworld is the realm of our everyday practical engagements 
where we participate in activities, encounter other people, and generally go about 
our everyday lives. For the sociologist Alfred Schutz (1973), 
the everyday life-world is to be understood as that province of reality which the wide-
awake and normal adult simply takes for granted in the attitude of common sense. By this 
taken-for-grantedness, we designate everything which we experience as unquestionable; 
every state of affairs is for us unproblematic until further notice” (p.3-4). 
When I go about my normal activities, I do not reflect on whether this building 
exists or how it is possible that other people exist. Instead, all of these things are 
taken for granted. It is the fact that the world is indubitable that enables me to 
navigate the social world with minimal difficulty. I interact with others and find 
my way home without for a moment reflecting on the ontological status of my 
friend or of my house. In fact, in my everyday activities, it is quite clear that I 
know what is going on and that with this knowledge, I am able to act in a variety 
of socially appropriate ways.  
 Even though the lifeworld is necessarily restricted in focus, it remains our 
point of entry into all other spheres of inquiry. For Husserl, the lifeworld is the 
foundation of all our understanding whether this emerges in everyday practical 
activities or scientific theories. As he observes, 
when science poses and answers questions, these are from the start, and hence from then 
on, questions resting upon the ground of, and addressed to, the elements of this pregiven 
world in which science and every other life-praxis is engaged (Husserl, 1970, p.121). 
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Exploring this region requires the development of a rigorous science capable of 
disclosing the invariant features of our taken for granted everyday experiences. 
Indeed, Husserl (1970) views phenomenology as, “a pure theory of essence of the 
life-world” (p.141). Yet in order to grasp the essence of the lifeworld, it is 
necessary for the phenomenologist to relinquish some of the concerns that 
provide a background for her everyday activities.  
 
Reduction. In the phenomenological reduction, “we put out of action the 
general thesis which belongs to the essence of the natural standpoint” (Husserl, 
1976, p.110). In other words, the existence of our taken for granted world is no 
longer assumed to be given. This is not to say that we follow Descartes in 
negating the existence of the world to arrive at certainty; instead, I reach no final 
verdict regarding the existence of what, in the natural attitude, I have taken for 
granted. My everyday activities indicate that I take the ontological status of the 
entities with which I interact as indubitable. In the phenomenological reduction, 
I neither accept nor reject this thesis. Indeed, I refuse to allow this concern to 
influence me in any way. To do this, I must also refuse to make use of all of the 
knowledge accumulated through the practice of the special sciences. Once again, 
the reduction does not mean that I reject scientific knowledge, only that I 
suspend judgment regarding its validity (Husserl, 1976). 
The phenomenological standpoint, as achieved through a reduction or 
bracketing, consists of a radical alteration of the natural attitude. As Moran 
(2000) observes, this reduction enables Husserl to,  
detach from all forms of conventional opinion, including our commonsense psychology, 
or accrued scientific consensus on issues, and all philosophical and metaphysical 
theorising regarding the nature of the intentional… [moreover] it allowed him to return to 
and isolate the central structures of subjectivity (p.146). 
The reduction allows me to transcend what I uncritically accept in my everyday 
surroundings in order to explore how this understanding is structured. Thus, in 
the reduction, “I turn toward that traditional ‘ordinariness’ and in egological 
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terms, look to its organization” (Natanson, 1973, p.130). An example should help 
clarify the meaning of this approach.  
 If I look at the pencil lying on my paper, I may begin to notice that what I 
actually see is not a single pencil but instead a multiplicity of presentations. 
Standing in my present position, I see one side of the pencil. As I move to the left 
or right, I notice that I still see the same pencil even though I am seeing a 
different side of the pencil at this moment. In other words, although I am only 
seeing part of the pencil in each of these presentations, I still perceive it as a 
unitary phenomenon. Moreover, I encounter the pencil not just by looking at it – 
I can also grasp it and feel its resistance; I can smell the wood from which it was 
carved; I can gnaw on it leaving indentions in its various sides. As Husserl (1970) 
observes: 
there are various individual things of experience at any given time; I focus on one of 
them. To perceive it, even if it is perceived as remaining completely unchanged, is 
something very complex: it is to see it, to touch it, to smell it, to hear it, etc.; and in each 
case I have something different. What is seen in seeing is in and for itself other than what 
is touched in touching. But in spite of this I say: it is the same thing; it is only the 
manners of its sensible exhibition, of course, that are different (p.157; italics mine) 
From a detached scientific perspective, I may encounter ‘sensory stimuli’ that 
coallese to form my perception of a single object, yet within the lifeworld, I see a 
pencil rather than its various sides. Phenomenologically speaking, I do not 
encounter discrete sensations but a unitary phenomenon; in this case, the pencil 
in front of me. For Husserl, the phenomenological reduction allows the 
researcher to grasp the organization of what we take for granted in our everyday 
practical experiences.   
 
Intentionality. As I continue to explore my experience through the 
phenomenological reduction, I come to notice that an essential feature of all of 
my experiences is that I am always directed towards something. When I think, I 
think about something; when I love, I love something and so on. The directedness 
of consciousness is what Husserl refers to as intentionality. 
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All perceptual acts, according to Husserl, have one dominant characteristic; they point 
toward, or intend, some object. Thus, all thinking is thinking of something; all willing is 
willing of something. Perception is not a state but a mobile activity. In its essential 
dynamic, perception (which we are taking in the widest possible sense) projects itself 
toward its intended object, but that object is not to be understood as a thing but rather as 
the correlate of its accompanying act or acts (Natanson, 1973, p.85). 
Moreover, the same intentional act can accompany different objects as when I 
think about Canada or I think about marriage. Indeed, different intentional acts 
can correlate with the same intentional object so that I may anticipate, desire, 
scorn, or remember eating ice cream. The relationship between intentional acts 
and their objects also does not depend on whether the object actually exists. I 
may think about an actually existing chair or a non-existent unicorn. For Husserl, 
the point is that consciousness is always directed and the presence of an 
intentional act always requires its correlated intentional object. 
 Intentionality can be viewed as that which unites the intentional object 
and the intentional act. In Ideas (1976), Husserl refers to the intentional object as 
the noema and the intentional act as the noesis. This distinction is meant to 
emphasize that, “noesis and noema are correlative parts of the structure of the 
mental process” (Moran, 2000, p.155). In every experience, it is possible to 
discern the two poles of noema and noesis. At the same time, it is important to 
note that, 
the noema is not the object towards which the object is directed, but rather provides the 
vehicle which connects my occurent thought to the intended object. The noema is that 
through which the object is grasped; it is the route to the object. Husserl always 
emphasizes that we are at first naïve realists in perception; we see the tree out there, we 
do not see the noema. But we see a tree because our perceptual act has a noetic-noematic 
constitution, because our act has a noema (Moran, 2000, p.157).  
Indeed, it is the noema that makes it possible to perceive the same thing when we 
encounter a multiplicity of presentations.  
 It is clear that when hermeneutics is viewed as an attempt to establish a 
secure foundation for valid interpretation, it shares a number of similarities with 
Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology. Both stress the need to establish 
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foundations for exploring human subjectivity. Moreover, both approaches 
advocate the development of specific procedures for exploring this region. At this 
point, I would like to introduce an additional domain where hermeneutics and 
phenomenology converge. From there, we can explore the implications these 
approaches hold for the theoretical foundations of social cognition. 
 
Literary Theory 
 As we have seen, the concept of consciousness plays a significant role in 
the development of methods for exploring human subjectivity. Within 
epistemological hermeneutics, the text is viewed as the expression of 
consciousness – a representation of the subjectivity of an author. For the 
transcendental phenomenologist, we are able to grasp the essential features of 
consciousness when we “bracket” what are usually taken to be indubitable 
aspects of our existence. By assuming a position free from prejudice, the 
transcendental phenomenologist is able to establish a secure foundation for 
attaining certain knowledge in the special sciences. 
 It is clear that literary theory shares a number of similarities with the field 
of hermeneutics. Both are interested in exploring relationships between elements 
such as author, text, and reader. Indeed, the concept of interpretation plays a 
central role in both domains. Literary theorists also drawn upon 
phenomenological insights to explore human experience within the context of 
literature. For Culler (1982),  
since literature takes as its subject all human experience, and particularly the ordering, 
interpreting, and articulating of experience, it is no accident that the most varied 
theoretical projects find instruction in literature and that their results are relevant to 
thinking about literature. Since literature analyzes the relations between men and 
women, or the most puzzling manifestations of the human psyche, or the effects of 
material conditions on individual experience, the theories that most powerfully and 
insightfully explore such matters will be of interest to literary critics and theorists (Culler, 
1982, p.10-11). 
Indeed, literary theorists explore issues directly relevant to social scientists, from 
the nature of “mind” to the role “interpretive communities” play in the 
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interpretation of a variety of phenomena (Fish, 1980; Knapp & Michaels 1985; 
Rorty, 1979). Moreover, social scientists interested in challenging the 
assumptions of their own discipline will find some of the most interesting debates 
regarding “interpretation” being explored within the realm of literary theory.  
E.D. Hirsch’s approach to literary interpretation is particularly useful as it 
demonstrates some of the most important components of an epistemological 
approach to hermeneutics. In the preface to Validity in Interpretation (1967), 
Hirsch clearly aligns his projects with the work of such writers as Schleiermacher, 
Dilthey, and Husserl. For Hirsch, the meaning of a text is identical with the 
intention of the author. Indeed, he believes that a valid interpretation of a text is 
ultimately a reproduction of the author’s original intention.  
Hirsch suggests that his interest in establishing validity in interpretation is 
a reaction against prevailing forms of literary criticism. He specifically focuses on 
the New Critics, who held that the intention of the author, including the author’s 
biography, and the social context of the piece, are largely irrelevant in 
understanding a particular text. To understand a text, one need not go outside of 
the text. The work itself is an entity independent of the author that is, as Wimsatt 
and Beardsley (2001) note, “neither available nor desirable as a standard for 
judging the success of a work of literary art” (p.1374-1375).  
Hirsch views the New Critics’ approach to textual interpretation as inviting 
a relativism that makes it impossible to compare competing interpretations. In 
order to establish objectively valid interpretation, it is necessary to have one true 
interpretation. He views contemporary literary criticism as “banishing the 
author”, only to replace her with an untenable notion of “semantic autonomy”. 
Such a position, in Hirsch’s view, can never provide literary theory with the 
necessary means for establishing validity in interpretation. Validity requires a 
determinate subject matter and, as Hirsch (1967) observes, “the only compelling 
normative principle that has ever been brought forward is the old-fashioned ideal 
of rightly understanding what the author meant” (p.26).  
 21
Hirsch begins by identifying several conditions he believes are necessary 
for establishing a valid interpretation of a text. The first condition is that the 
meaning itself must remain the same. This is necessary because if the meaning of 
a text were to change over time, it isn’t clear what an objectively valid 
interpretation would look like or how such an interpretation could prevail over 
rival interpretations.  It is the unchanging meaning of a text that provides a 
foundation for adjudicating between competing interpretations. For Hirsch, such 
a determinate meaning is necessary for establishing validity in interpretation. 
Were he to allow the meaning of a text to change, it would introduce an element 
of uncertainty lethal to his quest for validity.  
A further requirement for establishing validity in interpretation is that 
meaning be understood as an affair of consciousness rather than of words. 
Although words are used to convey the meaning of a text, they ultimately refer 
back to the immutable intention of an author. As Hirsch observes, “a word 
sequence means nothing in particular until somebody either means something by 
it or understands something from it. There is no magic land of meanings outside 
human consciousness” (p.4). Words, standing in for the author, make his or her 
intentions publicly available. This makes the role of words in Hirsch’s theory 
similar to Dilthey’s use of ‘expressions’; both serve as an exteriorization of the 
inner life of a subject.  
To maintain the immutability of the text and to establish meaning as an 
affair of consciousness, Hirsch introduces a distinction between a text’s meaning 
and it’s significance. For Hirsch (1967), 
meaning is that which is represented by a text; it is what the author meant by his use of a 
particular sign sequence; it is what the signs represent. Significance, on the other hand, 
names a relationship between that meaning and a person, or a conception, or a situation, 
or indeed anything imaginable… Significance always implies a relationship, and one 
constant, unchanging pole of that relationship is what the text means. Failure to consider 
this simple and essential distinction has been the source of enormous confusion in 
hermeneutic theory. (p.8) 
To understand the unchanging meaning of a text, it is necessary to draw a 
distinction between a text’s meaning and its historically contingent significance. 
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While a text may assume various roles in different time periods, Hirsch believes 
that a texts true meaning is to be identified with the original intention of the 
author. 
Hirsch draws on the phenomenological concept of intentionality to 
illustrate his distinction between meaning and significance. As we have seen from 
our discussion of transcendental phenomenology, the noetic correlates, or 
intentional acts can diverge while intending the same intentional object, or 
noema. In other words, it is possible for our intentional acts (noesis) to vary while 
the intentional object (noema) remains the same. The cup in front of me exhibits 
different sides when I move around it, looking at it from above and below, from 
the left and now the right. I notice different qualities when I touch it rather than 
when I am looking at it. Yet in all these various aspects, it  remains the same cup.   
Hirsch views the understanding of a text as exhibiting similar 
characteristics. The author’s meaning, what Hirsch (1967) refers to as verbal 
meaning, remains the same while the text’s significance can vary in any of a 
number of ways. He claims that, “an unlimited number of different intentional 
acts can intend the same verbal meaning” (p.38). The stability of verbal meaning 
ensures that it can be reproduced, one of the requirements for valid 
interpretation. Indeed, if verbal meaning changes, it would be impossible to 
reproduce it in any consistent way.  Failing to appreciate the distinction between 
meaning and significance leads one to the erroneous conclusion that the text 
itself is changing. For Hirsch, the distinction between meaning and significance is 
crucial for establishing validity in textual interpretation.  
This distinction allows divergent interpretations to be compared using a 
similar criteria, in Hirsch’s case, the extent to which they reproduce the original 
intention of the author. Indeed, because the author’s meaning is unchanging, it 
can be reproduced. While the verbal meaning of the author is identical with the 
text, the text alone cannot serve as a foundation for adjudicating between 
competing interpretations. For Hirsch, objectively valid textual interpretation is 
only possible by securing a determinate region impervious to historical 
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contingencies and interpretive fancies. Establishing the validity of a textual 
interpretation can only occur through recourse to a secure foundation of 
knowledge; and it is the original intention of the author, expressed in his or her 
verbal meaning, that provides this foundation. 
 
Interpretation & Social Cognition 
 Up to this point, we have discussed the origins of epistemological 
hermeneutics as it emerges in the interpretation of legal and biblical texts. We 
have also discussed the concept of the hermeneutic circle, transcendental 
phenomenology, and the way these issues play a role in contemporary literary 
theory. At this point, I would like to draw some parallels with some observations I 
made earlier regarding social cognition. 
 Although it is not clear to what extent transcendental phenomenological 
concepts such as ‘intentional state’ and ‘intentional object’ support Hirsch’s 
approach to textual interpretation, it is obvious that both Hirsch and Husserl are 
interested in establishing a secure foundation for knowledge. In transcendental 
phenomenology, intentional objects emerge in a variety of contexts. Not only 
does my pencil emerge against the background of this piece of paper, but in each 
presentation, only one side is available. Yet within these multiple presentations, I 
experience the unity of the pencil as an object of my consciousness. By moving 
from the natural to the phenomenological attitude, it is possible to identify those 
invariant features of consciousness that provide a secure foundation for 
knowledge. Indeed, Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology, “can be called a 
kind of foundationalism: an attempt to discover a realm of indubitable and 
transparent meanings or experiential entities that can provide a firm basis on 
which to build valid knowledge about human existence (Sass, 1988, p.229). For 
Hirsch, although the text emerges within a variety of historical contexts and 
though readers of various dispositions may attend to different aspects of the text 
itself, it is still possible to discern a unity within the various presentations. The 
text itself does not change. The original intention of the author, expressed in the 
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words that constitute the text, remains the same even as the text is encountered 
in a variety of contexts.  
 Moreover, we will recall that Hirsch’s approach to interpretation requires 
us to recognize meaning as an affair of consciousness rather than words. The 
words on a page represent an author’s intention. Words are merely a means for 
expressing and fixing the ideas residing within the consciousness of a particular 
subject. Indeed, this fixing of consciousness in language ensures that the 
interpreter will have a determinate subject matter with which to adjudicate 
between competing interpretations. As Palmer (1969) notes, the author’s 
intention, 
is a determinate entity about which objective evidence can be gathered and that, when 
evidence is in hand, a determination of the meaning can be made which will be 
universally recognized. Dilthey’s dream of objectively valid interpretation would seem to 
be realized (p.60).  
The distinction between a text’s meaning and its significance allows Hirsch to 
establish a secure foundation for objectively valid interpretation. Because a text’s 
meaning is to be found in the author’s intention, competing interpretations can 
be evaluated according to their correspondence with this original intention. 
Hirsch’s approach allows the historical to be relegated to the realm of significance 
leaving the idea of an original intention unscathed. 
 The idea that determinacy is required for establishing validity in 
interpretation is also important to several key features of social cognition theory. 
In other words, much as Hirsch claims that objectively valid interpretation 
requires that we talk about meaning in terms of authorial intention, social 
cognition’s view of the mind enables researchers to share a common language for 
discussing the way individuals interpret social reality. Social cognition’s view of 
the mind establishes both interior (rules) and exterior (reality) determinate 
regions where competing interpretations can be compared. Through 
experimentation, the cognitive processes that govern human behavior can be 
identified while the correspondence between mental representations and external 
reality can be evaluated.  
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 For example, social cognition researchers acknowledge a difference 
between sensation/perception and input/processing. Sensation or input is 
usually understood as the point of contact between external (physical) reality and 
internal (mental) reality. Save for variations in the individual functioning of 
sensory apparatuses (i.e. eyesight, hearing, etc.) the source of our sensations is 
determinate. If it were possible for two people to occupy the same position in 
space, and assuming that their sensory organs are working properly, they would 
receive identical sensory information. In fact, sensory information is usually what 
is viewed as an unadulterated reception of external reality. In other words, 
sensory information (input) is immediate; our sensory organs are merely the 
location at which external reality is converted to information capable of being 
processed by internal cognitive mechanisms.  
This internal manipulation of information is typically referred to as 
perception or cognitive processing. Although schemas function in the same way 
because of invariant characteristics of the mind, the content of these schemas 
vary from individual to individual based on differences in life experiences. In 
other words, though mental representations may vary in content, the form such 
mental representations take remains a basic feature of our mental activity. My 
friend and I may have different mental representations of Wisconsin, but the fact 
that Wisconsin is represented mentally in one way of another is a basic 
assumption guiding social cognition. Indeed, such schemas represent an 
additional determinate region for identifying stable rules that govern the way 
individuals interpret social reality.  
For Hirsch, the concept of mental representation is vital for understanding 
textual interpretation. In Validity in Interpretation (1967), the concept of schema 
is discussed only briefly, though his idea of  ‘genre’ seems to fulfill a similar role 
in the interpretation of texts. With the publication of The Aims of Interpretation 
(1976), Hirsch explicitly aligns his attempt to establish validity in interpretation 
with developments in cognitive psychology. He suggests that, “for theory of 
interpretation, the potential importance of this psychological-cognitive model is 
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beyond estimate, though, in its ecumenical, nonmetaphysical form, it has 
received little attention in hermeneutics” (Hirsch, 1976, p.33). Indeed, his view of 
understanding fits well with our discussion of the role of schemas in human 
understanding. Indeed, Hirsch (1976) suggests that, 
for that which we understand is itself an hypothesis constructed by ourselves, a schema, 
or genre, or type which provokes expectations that are confirmed by our linguistic 
experience, or when they are not confirmed, cause us to adjust our hypothesis or schema 
(p.33-34) 
Although Hirsch’s initial work focuses on establishing validity in interpretation, 
he came to view the process of validation and understanding as intimately 
related, so much so that he claims, “the process of understanding is itself a 
process of validation” (Hirsch, 1976, p.33). Though he admits that the validation 
procedures he has espouses are of a more public and interpersonal nature, he 
ultimately suggests that a similar procedure occurs within the mind of an 
individual interpreter.  
 Another aspect of epistemological hermeneutics that shows some 
significant similarities to social cognition’s view of mental representation is the 
hermeneutic circle. As we will recall, the hermeneutic circle refers to the fact that 
our understanding of the whole is dependent on our understanding each of the 
individual parts and that these individual parts give us a sense of the whole. It is 
not difficult to see similarities between the hermeneutic circle and the role 
schemas play in the interpretation of social reality. Schemata are continually 
being modified as we have new experiences.  At the same time, these 
representations are responsible for the way we see the world. Because of my 
unique experiences, my mental representations ensure that I see different things 
than people with dramatically different life experiences. Moreover, my 
interpretation of a social situation is at least partially determined by the 
understanding I bring to the situation. What I learn from the situation will be 
incorporated, to some extent, into my schemas thereby influencing the way I 
understand other situations in the future. In fact, for Hirsch (1976), the concept 
of a schema is a superior way to grasp the dialectical aspects of understanding. 
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All cognition is analogous to interpretation in being based upon corrigible schemata, a 
useful phrase I take from Piaget. The model of corrigible schemata, which was 
exemplified in the description of Piaget’s experiments, is, I think, a more useful and 
accurate model than that of the so-called hermeneutic circle (Hirsch, 1976, p.32). 
Even cognitive scientists, such as Gallagher (2004), have begun to notice the 
similarities between schema theory and the hermeneutic circle. 
There is no opposition here between the cognitive sciences and hermeneutics. The 
accounts given by schema theory and protocol theory are perfectly in tune with accounts 
given of the hermeneutical circle. One account would enrich the other and indeed there 
would be a mutual enrichment and a deeper understanding of cognition if we put these 
two kinds of accounts together (p.166). 
 A number of researchers have also begun to explore the relationship 
between Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology and contemporary issues in 
cognitive science. These researchers believe that Husserl’s ideas regarding such 
things as intentional states, the stability of the noemata, and mental 
representation all have a number of implications for contemporary cognitive 
research. As Dreyfus (1982) observes, 
Husserl has finally begun to be recognized as the precursor of current interest in 
intentionality—the first to have a general theory of the role of mental representations in 
the philosophy of language and mind. As the first thinker to put directedness of mental 
representations at the center of his philosophy, he is also beginning to emerge as the 
father of current research in cognitive psychology and artificial intelligence (p.2).  
In all, there appear to be a number of similarities between transcendental 
phenomenology, epistemological hermeneutics, Hirsch’s approach to textual 
interpretation, and the theoretical foundations of social cognition. Each of these 
approaches can be called epistemological in so far as they posit a knower in a 
specific relationship with an object of knowledge. Within an epistemological 
framework, knowledge is give privileged status since my interpretation of social 
reality is always the result of drawing on a shared stock of social knowledge. 
Moreover, interpretation is viewed as residing within consciousness (or mind) 
and is vulnerable to historical, cultural, and subjective prejudices. 
 Before I develop an alternative to this view of interpretation, I would like 
to offer an example that may enable us to make the transition from epistemology 
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to ontology. Given the significance of the ‘cognitive revolution’ for research in 
social cognition, I think it is wise to explore Thomas Kuhn’s’ (1970) contribution 
to the way we understand the practice of scientific research. With cognitive 
psychology hailed as a new psychological paradigm, it would be interesting to 
explore how the concept of paradigm is understood, especially by the philosopher 
who brought the term into general currency in the twentieth century. 
 What is interesting about the concept of paradigm, especially when it 
refers to something like cognitive psychology, is that it often refers to the unique 
way a community of researchers approach a range of scientific problems. Given 
cognitive psychology’s reliance on the concept of a schema as the means for 
interpreting social reality, it would seem that the concept of paradigm would also 
have to be understood as a mental representation. In other words, the paradigm 
of cognitive psychology must constitute a mental representation contained within 
the individual minds of the scientists working within a particular area. That 
paradigms are understood in this way is supported by Mey ‘s (1982) claim that, 
“paradigms are internal models, cognitive structures which give shape to the 
specific expectations that guide the research of ‘normal’ scientists” (p.89). 
 As we have seen, social cognition inherits cognitive psychology’s 
assumption that an individual’s interpretation of a particular situation may be 
regarded as the following of a rule. This is further supported by social cognition’s 
embracing of an information-processing approach to cognition. Within such an 
approach, interpretation is viewed as a serial process that follows a set of discrete 
steps similar to the steps we observed in Ostrum’s (1984) example.  Therefore, if 
a paradigm is responsible for the unique way an individual or community of 
scientists interpret the world, within a social cognitive framework, this 
intepretation must be the result of the application of a rule  -- that is, what course 
of action do I take in this particular situation. Now, although Kuhn’s thesis 
regarding the dialectical nature of scientific progress is generally viewed as his 
most controversial contribution to the sociology of scientific knowledge, I would 
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like to draw attention to another aspect of his thesis that is particularly relevant 
to the idea of mental representations and rule-governed behavior.  
 As a philosopher and historian of science, Kuhn recognizes the difficulty in 
identifying the specific rules that scientists follow when conducting research. If 
one looks at the way researchers conduct everyday scientific activities, it is nearly 
impossible to identify a discrete set of procedures they use to conduct their 
research. For Kuhn (1970), 
though there obviously are rules to which all the practitioners of a scientific specialty 
adhere at a given time, those rules may not by themselves specify all that the practice of 
those specialists has in common. Normal science is a highly determined activity, but it 
need not be entirely determined by rules. That is why, at the start of this essay, I 
introduced shared paradigms rather than shared rules, assumptions , and points of view 
as the source of coherence for normal research traditions. Rules, I suggest, derive from 
paradigms, but paradigms can guide research even in the absence of rules (Kuhn, 1970, 
p.42, italics mine) 
In Kuhn’s view, though it may ultimately be possible to identify rules that people 
within a particular paradigm follow, such an achievement is of a derivative 
character. In other words, these are not the rules that scientists actually follow 
when they conduct their research. For the most part, paradigms operate quite 
smoothly without specifying specific rules or procedures. Once again, Kuhn 
(1970) suggests that a, 
lack of a standard interpretation or of an agreed reduction to rules will not prevent a 
paradigm from guiding research. Normal science can be determined in part by the direct 
inspection of paradigms, a process that is often aided by but does not depend upon the 
formulation of rules and assumptions. Indeed, the existence of a paradigm need not even 
imply that a full set of rules exists (p.44) 
If the following of a formalized set of rules does not unite a paradigm, then how is 
it possible to account for the orderly behavior that one observes within scientific 
communities? In other words, if paradigms are not mental representations or 
rule-governed cognitions, how are we to explain the fact that researchers do in 
fact know what to do when they are conducting research? Kuhn (1970) suggests 
as an alternative to paradigms as shared rules the idea that scientists, 
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may relate by resemblance and by modeling to one or another of the scientific corpus 
which the community in question already recognizes as among its established 
achievements. Scientists work from models acquired through education and through 
subsequent exposure to the literature often without quite knowing or needing to know 
what characteristics have given these models the status of community paradigms. And 
because they do so, they need no full set of rules (p.46)  
It is important to stress that Kuhn is not explicitly arguing against a cognitive 
interpretation of paradigms, nor is he saying that rules play no role in scientific 
research. Instead, Kuhn is suggesting that the identification of such rules is not a 
necessary part of scientific research. Moreover, when such rules are identified, 
they are more likely to be derived from the everyday practical activities of 
scientific researchers.  
One is at liberty to suppose that somewhere along the way the scientist has intuitively 
abstracted rules of the game for himself but there is little reason to believe it. Though 
many scientists talk easily and well about the particular individual hypotheses that 
underlie a concrete piece of current research, they are little better than laymen at 
characterizing the established bases of their field, its legitimate problems and methods. If 
they have learned such abstractions at all, they show it mainly through their ability to do 
successful research. That ability can, however, be understood without recourse to 
hypothetical rules of the game (Kuhn, 1970, p.47; italics mine) 
What I would like to suggest is that although social cognition views interpretation 
as a rule-governed affair of consciousness, it may be possible to see interpretation 
as shared practices emanating from our practical engagement in the world. For 
Kuhn, paradigms do not specify the criteria for interpreting reality in one way 
rather than another but instead are a manifestation of the practices shared by a 
community of scientists. In the next section, I would like to explore developments 
in contemporary hermeneutics that provide an alternative to social cognition’s 
mentalistic view of interpretation. Moreover, I would like to suggest that viewing 
interpretation as shared practices leads to a radically different understanding of 
social reality.    
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Ontological Hermeneutics 
 When interpretation is viewed epistemologically, an individual is placed in 
a knowing relationship with an object to be known. Hirsch, for example, views 
the text as an expression of an author and it is the duty of an interpreter to 
discover the meaning intended by this author. Indeed, it is the original intention 
of the author that should serve as the final criteria for determining whether an 
interpreter has grasped the true meaning of a text.  Valid interpretation requires 
that we have a determinate subject matter and it is authorial intention that 
insures that competing interpretations are to be evaluated by consistent criteria. 
This also prevents readers from substituting their own beliefs regarding the 
meaning of a text (significance) for the unchanging meaning intended by the 
author.  
 Transcendental phenomenology strives to develop a rigorous description 
of human experience that ultimately may provide a secure foundation for all 
other forms of empirical inquiry. By remaining a purely descriptive discipline, 
phenomenology claims to avoid the prejudices that result from interpreting 
phenomena through either established scientific theories or through biases that 
individuals harbor as a result of their immersion in the lifeworld. In other words, 
traditional approaches to knowledge interpret phenomena through the lenses of 
entrenched a priori assumptions. Phenomenology avoids this interpretive 
dilemma by remaining purely descriptive. This guarantees the certainty of the 
knowledge it produces. Moreover, transcendental phenomenology emphasizes 
the role of consciousness in the constitution of objects of experience – a move 
that recognizes intentionality as an essential feature of human experience. 
 Social cognition views interpretation as a mental activity responsible for 
the various ways individuals navigate social reality. Indeed, interpretation is 
analogous to computation, with mental representations guiding the way people 
interpret specific situations. Schemas are viewed as lenses intervening between 
the individual and social reality. This view of interpretation has led researchers to 
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develop methodological procedures for excluding subjective biases that may 
interfere with attempts to develop an accurate perception of reality. 
 Developments in hermeneutic theory suggest that this may not be the only 
way to view interpretation. Though epistemological approaches focus on such 
things as consciousness, subjectivity, and mental activity, it is also possible to 
explore the ontological foundations of interpretation. Instead of relying on 
procedures to distance individuals from phenomena so that they may occupy a 
presuppositionless perspective, ontological hermeneutics seeks to uncover the 
nature of understanding. As Palmer (1969) observes, 
but what if the guiding question is no longer ‘How can I obtain valid interpretations?’ but 
‘what is the nature of understanding itself?” The preoccupation with valid judgments 
causes the question of what elements are involved in all understanding to be passed over; 
conversely, a focus on the essential nature of all understanding will tend to leave aside the 
necessary development of systems of distinguishing valid from invalid interpretations. 
Both questions are worthy, and their exploration makes a contribution to understanding 
the hermeneutical problem (p.66-67) 
What I am proposing is that the movement from an epistemological to an 
ontological hermeneutics has important consequences for the way we view 
interpretation in the social sciences. Moreover, I believe that these developments 
have implications for the relationship between phenomenology and social 
cognition. Finally, I believe that the turn to ontological hermeneutics has 
profound implications for the way we view social reality thus requiring 
researchers in the social sciences to reevaluate their reliance on mental 
representations and cognitive processes. The substance of my critique draws on 
the work of Husserl’s most important student, Martin Heidegger. 
The differences between Husserl and Heidegger’s approach to 
phenomenology remains a controversial topic within phenomenological circles. 
My analysis is based on the work of those authors (Dreyfus, 1991, 1992; Moran, 
2000; Palmer, 1969; Ricoeur, 1991; Sass, 1988) who view Heidegger’s approach, 
not as merely an explication of what the later Husserl terms the lifeworld 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1958), but as a radical departure from Husserlian 
phenomenology all together. Although the extent to which Heidegger’s project is 
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a critique of Husserlian phenomenology is by no means resolved, I agree with 
Palmer (1969) who suggests that, 
it would be a mistake to see ‘phenomenological method’ as a doctrine formulated by 
Husserl and used by Heidegger for another purpose. On the contrary, Heidegger 
rethought the concept of phenomenology itself, so that phenomenology and 
phenomenological method take on a radically different character (p.125-126).  
Husserlian phenomenology rests on fundamental assumptions regarding 
the importance of concepts such as intentionality and the transcendental ego. The 
objects of consciousness are constituted by intentional acts and it is these acts 
that provide a glimpse into the essence of a particular phenomenon. For 
Heidegger, discussions of ‘intentionality’ and ‘constitution’ presuppose a subject 
that is the site of psychical acts. Rather than focusing on the intentional structure 
of consciousness, Heidegger looks to the way Being emerges within the context of 
our everyday practical engagements – what he refers to as being-in-the-world. 
The aim is not to begin with an already constituted subject but to focus on the 
emergence of subjectivity in a concrete historical situation.  This shifts the focus 
from questions of knowledge (epistemology) to an analysis of Being (ontology). 
Within Heidegger’s fundamental ontology, interpretation is not a cognitive event 
but a fundamental condition of human existence. Moran (2000) suggests that for 
Heidegger, “our understanding is interpretive from the very start and that 
interpretive involvement with things need not be at a level of intellection or 
cognition, but more usually comes in concernful, practical dealings” (p.231). The 
focus on practical engagement leads Heidegger to view comportment rather than 
intentionality as the proper foundation for phenomenological analysis.  For the 
psychologist accustomed to viewing the individual mind as the basic unit of 
analysis in scientific inquiry, the movement from cognition to practice may seem 
like little more than an exercise in philosophical obscurity. Yet I believe a further 
analysis of this maneuver may have important implications for the way 
researchers view social reality.  I will begin by discussing key features of 
Heidegger’s turn to ontology with an emphasis on the way his radical 
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interpretation of social reality calls into question specific assumptions of social 
cognition. 
 
Dasein 
Although Heidegger is critical of a number of philosophers, it is probably 
Descartes who bears the brunt of his criticisms. For Descartes, it was necessary to 
call into question all of our taken-for-granted beliefs and it was only through 
rigorous methodological doubt that we could come to understand the nature of 
reality. Descartes ultimately concludes that his existence can be confirmed only 
because he recognizes that he is at this moment thinking. This leads to his 
famous maxim, ‘Cogito Ergo Sum’ – ‘I think, therefore, I am’. Heidegger views his 
own project as a critique of the Cartesian privileging of a knowing subject 
(‘cogito’) encountering its own existence through reflection. For Heidegger, the 
meaning of the Being of this thinking subject has been entirely neglected by 
Descartes. 
With the ‘cogito sum’ Descartes had claimed that he was putting philosophy on a new and 
firm footing, But what he left undetermined when he began in this ‘radical’ way, was the 
kind of Being which belongs to the res cogitans, or—more precisely—the meaning of the 
Being of the ‘sum’. By working out the unexpressed ontological foundations of the ‘cogito 
sum’, we shall complete our sojourn at the second station along the path of our 
destructive retrospect of the history of ontology (Heidegger, 1962, p.46). 
Moreover, Heidegger claims that our everyday use of the copula ‘is’ indicates that 
we already have an understanding of the meaning of Being and that we must 
focus on the everyday practices that disclose this understanding. In other words, 
my relationship to social reality cannot be understood, first and foremost, as the 
relationship of a knowing subject to a known object. What I exhibit in my 
everyday practical activity is an understanding of the meaning of Being itself.  
 For Heidegger, it is important that this understanding not be understood 
as an affair of consciousness or the product of individual subjects. Doing so 
would simply reintroduce the primacy of the Cartesian ‘cogito’ and undercut his 
attempt to ground understanding in shared practices. To combat a premature 
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return to epistemology, he introduces the term ‘Dasein’ (literally ‘being-there’). 
Because Heidegger is attempting to critique the primacy of an isolated ego, it is of 
the utmost importance that we understand what he means by ‘Dasein. For 
Dreyfus (1991), 
the best way to understand what Heidegger means by Dasein is to think of our term 
‘human being,’ which can refer to a way of being that is characteristic of all people or to a 
specific person—a human being . . . The challenge is to do justice to the fact that Dasein 
names beings like you and me, while at the same time preserving the strategy of Being 
and Time, which is to reverse the Cartesian tradition by making the individual subject 
somehow dependent upon shared social practices (p.14) 
The importance of the term ‘Dasein’ is not simply to acknowledge that an 
individual must always be situated within a particular context. If this were all that 
was being said, it would not represent a significant departure from Lewin’s (1951) 
contention that behavior is always a function of the person and the environment. 
The significance of the term ‘Dasein’ is that it does not posit an ego or ‘I’ in a 
particular situation but instead claims that this single term reflects Dasein’s 
ontological primacy. The minute I have posited a subject in a particular situation, 
I have already reverted to Cartesian dualism, inheriting all the problems that 
come with it. For Heidegger, the dichotomy between a subject and her context is 
derived from Dasein’s primordial engagement in the world.  
 Giving Dasein rather than individual consciousness ontological priority 
reflects Heidegger’s desire to avoid a premature return to the Cartesian cogito. 
Yet it is also important to understand that the situated nature of Dasein is itself 
the focus of Heidegger’s inquiry. In other words, delineating the boundaries of 
Dasein must ultimately give way to a more fundamental interest, “in the way of 
being that human beings, cultures, and institutions share. Human beings, it will 
turn out, are special kinds of beings in that their way of being embodies an 
understanding of what it is to be” (Dreyfus, 1991, p.14-15 – italics mine).  This 
understanding is manifested in the everyday practices in which Dasein is engaged 
rather than in the psychological process that may be said to reside within the 
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minds of individual subjects. Such practices are the historically and culturally 
contingent interpretation that Heidegger refers to as ‘existence’.  
For Heidegger, the essence of human existence cannot be completely fixed 
by any single interpretation whether it be a cognitive mechanism or 
reinforcement principle. Through social engagements and practices Dasein 
continually interprets itself. In this sense, an ultimate or final interpretation of 
human existence would be impossible, since every interpretation emerges within 
the concrete practices of human beings. The fact that social cognition posits a 
thinking subject in a specific relation to a situation constitutes only a spurious 
way of viewing social reality. The importance of Heidegger’s use of Dasein is that 
it represents another view of social reality, one not rooted in the cognitive 
mechanisms of an individual subject but instead reflecting a new (for Heidegger, 
perhaps old) way of understanding our fundamental ontological situation.  
 
Hermeneutic Phenomenology  
It is important to understand the significance of Heidegger’s departure 
from Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology. As Dreyfus (1991) observes, 
Heidegger succeeds in taking over Husserl’s definition of phenomenology and totally 
transforming it for his own ends, making ‘phenomenology’ mean exactly the opposite of 
Husserl’s proposed method for spelling out the intentional contents of his own belief 
system and thereby arriving at indubitable evidence. In Heidegger’s hands, 
phenomenology becomes a way of letting something shared that can never be totally 
articulated and for which there can be no indubitable evidence show itself (p.30). 
Instead of viewing phenomenology as an eidetic science leading to a description 
of the essential features of consciousness, Heidegger’s phenomenology is a means 
for bringing into focus the background practices that are an embodiment of our 
understanding. This is clear when we explore Heidegger’s etymology of the term 
‘phenomenology’. 
 Our ordinary understanding of ‘phenomenon’ is that which is immediately 
available to our senses. Our everyday experiences, from the inspection of objects 
in our world to the people we encounter, are understood as phenomena. As 
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Heidegger (1962) notes, “the expression ‘phenomenon’ signifies that which shows 
itself in itself, the manifest” (p.51). Yet for Heidegger, this ordinary 
understanding of phenomenon must give way to an even more fundamental 
sense of the term. That something shows itself presupposes something that 
remains in the background allowing that which shows itself to become thematic 
in a particular sort of way. If we return to our visual example of the figure/ground 
relationship, my pencil emerges against a background and it is because of this 
background that the pencil is able to become thematic in the first place. The 
pencil becomes thematic because the paper remains in the background. Were I to 
focus on the paper, it would emerge against a background that remains hidden 
and in doing so, allows the paper to become visible. For Heidegger (1962),  
that which already shows itself in the appearance as prior to the “phenomenon” as 
ordinarily understood and as accompanying it in every case, can, even though it thus 
shows itself unthematically, be brought thematically to show itself; and what thus shows 
itself in itself (the ‘forms of the intuition’) will be the ‘phenomena’ of phenomenology 
(p.54-55). 
We will see that while the figure/ground relationship may be helpful for 
understanding how that which shows itself always emerges against a background 
of something that remains hidden, it will be necessary to revise this relationship. 
Heidegger will ultimately reinterpret this figure/ground relationship in such a 
way that it is no longer a knowing relationship but instead reflects Dasein’s 
practical involvement in the world. 
 To understand the way Heidegger views ‘phenomenology’ it is also 
necessary to explore the meaning of ‘-logy’ or logos. Although logos can be 
interpreted in a variety of ways, for Heidegger, its basic signification is best 
understood as ‘discourse’. Given contemporary discussion regarding the meaning 
of ‘discourse’, this may not seem to clarify what is already a difficult investigation. 
This is further complicated for in the remainder of his analysis of the meaning of 
logos, Heidegger focuses on exploring the meaning of the Greek ‘logos’ which has 
an extraordinary range of meanings. At one point, Heidegger (1962) suggests that 
logos, “lets something be seen, namely, what the discourse is about; and it does 
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so either for the one who is doing the talking (the medium) or for persons who 
are talking with one another, as the case may be” (p.56). Here I only want to draw 
attention to the similarities between the letting something standout of 
‘phenomenon’ and the letting be seen of the ‘logos’. 
 With Heidegger’s etymology of ‘phenomenology’ complete, we can now 
understand the significance of Heidegger’s departure from Husserlian 
phenomenology. To begin with, Heidegger distinguishes between two different 
ways of understanding the project of phenomenology. The first distinction is a 
formal one and for the most part conforms to Husserl’s understanding of 
phenomenology as a method for discerning the essence of a particular 
phenomenon. For Heidegger (1962), this understanding of phenomenology,  
neither designates the object of its researches, nor characterizes the subject-matter thus 
comprised. The word merely informs us of the ‘how’ with which what is to be treated in 
this science gets exhibited and handled. To have a science ‘of’ phenomenon means to 
grasp its objects in such a way that everything about them which is up for discussion 
must be treated by exhibiting it directly and demonstrating it directly. The expression 
‘descriptive phenomenology’, which is at bottom tautological, has the same meaning 
(p.59) 
Within this conception, phenomenology is a method for identifying the invariant 
features that one perceives when they are in the presence of a particular 
phenomenon.  
 Yet for Heidegger (1962), if phenomenology allows us to see something, 
“what is it that phenomenology is to ‘let us see’? What is it that must be called a 
‘phenomenon’ in a distinctive sense? What is it that by its very essence is 
necessarily the theme whenever we exhibit something explicitly” (p.59)? If we 
return to the pencil example, it is that which is not thematic (the paper) that 
allows the pencil to be seen and it is precisely because it remains hidden that it 
can stand out in the first place. For Heidegger, that which remains hidden 
because it is phenomenologically the closest is Being. This means that 
phenomenology, “is our way of access to what is to be the theme of ontology, and 
it is our way of giving it demonstrative precision. Only as phenomenology, is 
ontology possible” (Heidegger, 1962, p.60). The epistemological sense in which 
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phenomenology is viewed as a method for allowing one to know something about 
a phenomenon is ultimately a derivative sense in which phenomenology brings 
that which remains hidden into sharper focus.  
 At this point, the radical nature of Heidegger’s departure from Husserlian 
phenomenology should be clear. As Dreyfus (1991) observes:  
Husserl says that phenomenology should study only that which can be made fully evident. 
Heidegger’s reverses Husserl’s understanding of phenomenology at this point. Husserl’s 
method, which aims at adequate evidence and complete freedom from prejudice, cannot 
be used when we wish to understand the background upon which all our understanding 
takes place. Our understanding of being is so pervasive in everything we think and do that 
we can never arrive at a clear presentation of it. Moreover, since it is not a belief system 
but is embodied in our skills, it is not the sort of thing we could ever get clear about (p.32) 
Within Heidegger’s approach, phenomenology cannot be viewed as a 
presuppositionless science that provides a neutral description of what is 
immediately available to consciousness. Instead, phenomenology as ontology 
must become hermeneutic, that is, it must become interpretive. 
 
Being-in-the-World 
 As we have seen, Heidegger is interested in challenging the privileged 
status of the Cartesian/epistemological approach to interpretation. To do this, it 
is necessary for Heidegger to clarify the fundamental condition of Dasein’s 
existence. For Heidegger, Dasein’s primordial engagement in the world is 
interpretive. This should not be understood as an affair of consciousness but 
rather as ontological, that is, as residing in shared practices. Heidegger refers to 
this fundamental engagement as being-in-the-world. Yet if Heidegger is to 
present a challenge to the Cartesian approach to interpretation, it is of the utmost 
importance that he clarify the nature of the relationship between individuals and 
their situation.    
 To begin with, Heidegger thinks it is necessary to clarify what he means by 
being-in (In-sein). He wants to separate as much as possible the type of being-in 
of an object from that of Dasein. Whereas the very nature of Dasein is 
interpretive in so far as it, “is an entity which, in its very Being, comports itself 
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understandingly towards that Being” (Heidegger, 1962, p.78), the being of objects 
is entirely different. Heidegger proposes that the sense of ‘in’ that describes the 
location of objects ‘in-the-world’ is entirely different from the ‘in-the-world’ of 
Dasein. For an object, this ‘in’ is understood as designating a location such that 
when we say the water is ‘in’ the glass, we are claiming that objects are spatially 
related to one another. As Heidegger (1962) explains, 
by this ‘in’ we mean the relationship of Being which two entities extended ‘in’ space have 
to each other with regard to their location in that space. Both water and glass, garment 
and cupboard, are ‘in’ space and ‘at’ a location, and both in the same way (p.79).  
Heidegger refers to this being-in of objects as categorical to distinguish it 
from what he views as the “being-in” of Dasein. The being-in of Dasein cannot be 
understood as a spatial relationship in which Dasein occupies a particular 
location over and against the ‘world’. He shows through etymological derivation 
that the term ‘in’ is better understood as ‘to reside’ or ‘to dwell’. As Dreyfus (1991) 
observes: 
Heidegger’s specific discussion of the senses of the preposition ‘in’ will be illuminating 
only to those who know German. We can, however, capture his point in English. In 
English we also distinguish two sense of ‘in’: a spatial sense (‘in the box’) and an 
existential sense (‘in the army,’ ‘in love’). The first use expresses inclusion, the second 
conveys involvement (p.42-43).  
What Heidegger is trying to demonstrate is that the being-in of Dasein can only 
derivatively be understood as the relationship between a conscious subject and an 
object. The being-in-the-world that Heidegger views as primordial to all other 
modes of being-in is better viewed as an inhabiting wherein Dasein’s 
involvement in the world is ontologically primary. Individuals are not in 
situations in the same way that a glass is in the cupboard. For Heidegger, the ‘in’ 
of ‘being-in-the-world’ is one of practical involvement and it is only when this 
involvement has become problematic that a dichotomy between person and 
situation emerges. Although the different understandings of ‘in’ may seem 
unnecessarily precise, I believe that it has a number of important implications for 
the way we approach social cognition. 
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If we return to the emphasis Fiske and Taylor (1991) place on 
understanding “the person in the situation” (p.5), it is possible to see Heidegger’s 
analysis as focusing our attention on the meaning of ‘in’ that precedes any 
distinction between people and situations. This may help us understand the 
importance of the concept of being-in-the-world. Primordially, Dasein is engaged 
in the world through its practical everyday activities. When social cognition 
conceives of human behavior as a function of the person and the environment 
(Lewin, 1951), it overlooks the fact that phenomenologically, Dasein’s activities 
only emerge against the background of practical activities. Within Heidegger’s 
framework, behavior is not the end result of a person located within a context but 
it is a manifestation of Dasein’s being-in-the-world. Any perspective that fails to 
clarify the practical nature of Dasein’s immersion in the world has overlooked 
Dasein’s fundamental way of being-in-the-world. 
 
Comportment 
 If we will recall from our discussion of epistemology, an approach that 
views interpretation as a cognitive process whereby the individual “makes sense” 
of reality will necessarily privilege a detached, objective perspective. In other 
words, mental representations mediate our perception of reality and it is 
therefore necessary to methodologically exclude such biases in order to grasp the 
“true” nature of a phenomenon.  This can be done by relying on specific 
procedures or by restricting observation to the level of description. For 
Heidegger, the infatuation with disinterested knowledge reaches it peak not only 
in contemporary positivist science but also in the transcendental phenomenology 
of his mentor, Edmund Husserl. Instead of beginning with a consciousness that 
synthesizes various perceptions into a coherent unity, Heidegger suggests that we 
first encounter our world in a meaningful way and that this engagement is what 
defines the being of Dasein: 
Rather than first perceiving perspectives, then synthesizing the perspectives into objects, 
and finally assigning these objects a function on the basis of their physical properties, we 
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ordinarily manipulate tools that already have a meaning in a world that is organized in 
terms of purposes (Dreyfus, 1991, p.46). 
Instead of focusing on intentionality – which posits a consciousness directed 
towards a particular object – Heidegger claims that our everyday practical 
engagements must be understood in terms of comportment. This term is meant 
to draw attention to the way Dasein’s understanding is manifested in concrete 
engagements that precede any mentalistic commitments. Hermeneutic 
phenomenology endeavors to foreground these practical engagements and to 
demonstrate the derivative character of approaches that view interpretation as 
mental activity. 
 Yet Dreyfus (1991) is correct in arguing that the movement to 
comportment should not be understood as simply an inversion of the subject-
that-knows for the subject-that-does.  Such a view fails to recognize the degree to 
which Heidegger’s approach is a devastating critique of Husserl’s concept of 
intentionality. As we will recall, intentionality refers to the fact that 
consciousness is always directed towards something whether it be an actual 
object or mental content.  
Heidegger does not want to make practical activity primary; he wants to show (pace 
Husserl) that neither practical activity nor contemplative knowing can be understood as a 
relation between a self-sufficient mind and an independent world… Knowing is an 
exemplary subject/object relation, so that if one makes knowing basic, one is from the 
start locked into the intentionalisitc picture of human beings as subjects with beliefs 
(justified and unjustified) about objects and states of affairs (Dreyfus, 1991, p.49).  
By bringing our practices into the foreground, Heidegger seeks to draw attention 
to a way of being that need not be grounded in intentionality. He sees Husserl’s 
distinction between a mode of consciousness (noesis) and an object of that 
consciousness (noema) as introducing a subject/object dichotomy that is itself 
derived from everyday practical engagements. Thus while Husserl’s analysis 
would permit the essence of a phenomena to be grasped unadulterated by a 
transcendental ego, Heidegger suggests that such disinterested knowledge 
requires a world of practical engagements and that, “all relations of mental states 
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to their objects presuppose a more basic form of being-with-things which does 
not involve mental activity” (Dreyfus, 1991, p.52).  
 That interpretation is ultimately grounded in participation in practical 
activities is in many ways reminiscent of Kuhn’s observation that paradigms need 
not be understood as governed by the following of a rule. For Kuhn, scientific 
communities are united by their involvement in shared activities and it is these 
activities that come to distinguish paradigms from one another.  
Scientists, it should already be clear, never learn concepts, laws, and theories in the 
abstract and by themselves. Instead, these intellectual tools are from the start 
encountered in a historically and pedagogically prior unit that displays them with and 
through their application (Kuhn, 1970, p.46; italics mine). 
Paradigms should not be viewed as mental representations or cognitive 
mechanisms that determine how scientists will interpret reality. Concepts and 
laws are tools that emerge in the way they are applied in specific situations. As we 
will see, Heidegger’s emphasis on comportment will also draw heavily on the way 
tools emerge in our everyday practical activities.  
 
Availableness & Occurrentness 
 Heidegger distinguishes two ways of being which he refers to as 
zuhandenheit (readiness-to-hand) and vorhandenheit (presence-at-hand). Since 
the standard English translation of these terms is somewhat awkward, I will 
follow Dreyfus (1991) in translating the terms as availableness and 
occurrentness.    
 This distinction is important as Heidegger is calling into question the 
notion that we encounter the world as it really is by assuming a disinterested 
position. He suggests that Dasein’s use of equipment reveals an understanding 
that precedes the knowledge one gains from detached reflection. In other words, 
our everyday interactions with objects should not be viewed initially as an 
encounter with a meaningless collection of entities but as an immersion into a 
world saturated with meaning. Thus Heidegger aims to demonstrate that: 
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the situated use of equipment is in some sense prior to just looking at things and that 
what is revealed by use is ontologically more fundamental than the substances with 
determinate, context-free properties revealed by detached contemplation (Dreyfus, 1991, 
p.61). 
The use of equipment reveals a background of practices preceding the adoption of 
a neutral standpoint that purports to describe the world in its “actuality”. This 
calls into question the view that an individual subject is ultimately a collection of 
cognitive processes and mental representations. Moreover, it suggests that we do 
not encounter a realm of neutral entities that we subsequently invest with 
particular meanings. On the contrary, Heidegger notes that such a view is 
necessarily derived from a more primordial engagement with entities and that 
the purpose of phenomenology is to bring these practical dealings into focus.  
It was Heidegger who forced Husserl to face precisely these problems. He pointed out 
that there are other ways of ‘encountering’ objects than relating to them as objects of 
perception or predication. When we use a piece of equipment like a hammer, Heidegger 
claims, we actualize a bodily skill (which cannot be represented in the mind) in the 
context of a socially organized nexus of equipment, purposes, and human roles (which 
cannot be represented as a set of facts). This context and our everyday ways of skillful 
coping in it are not something we know but, as part of our socialization, form the way that 
we are (Dreyfus, 1982, p.20-21). 
By equipment Heidegger refers to the being of entities that we use for specific 
purposes in our everyday interactions. Thus when I pick up a pencil, I am not 
relating to this equipment as a neutral entity that I subsequently infuse with 
meaning; instead I encounter the pencil as a means for pursuing a particular goal, 
which is in this case the writing of my dissertation. Moreover, the use of a pencil 
is embedded within a nexus of other activities that makes the practice of writing 
what it is. For Heidegger, availableness denotes a way of being of equipment that 
is embedded within a particular practice, in this case, writing.  
 As we become immersed in the activity of writing, the being of this 
equipment tends to disappear. In other words, as we are fully engaged in the 
practical activity of writing, we tend to pass over the object as possessing any 
definite properties and instead relate to it in terms of practical dealings. The 
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pencil in my hand is not an entity among others but is indistinguishable from the 
activity that we refer to as writing. Here the pencil assumes a relationship to the 
activity of writing such that, “precisely when it is most genuinely appropriated 
equipment becomes transparent” (Dreyfus, 1991, p.65). The practice of the task 
has taken precedence over the individual functioning of the pencil. In this sense, 
the determinacy of equipment only occurs later and in response to a very specific 
type of relationship, in this case, detached reflection.  
 At this point, it is important to understand the impact of Heidegger’s 
analysis of the use of equipment. To begin with, his analysis suggests that the 
phenomenological (and to some extent cognitive) notion of intentionality fails to 
address the way that Dasein is primordially engaged with entities in a meaningful 
way.  Heidegger introduces the concept of comportment and the being of entities 
that is “availableness” to draw attention to the everyday background practices 
that provide a foundation for more specific modes of being-in-the world. For 
Dreyfus (1991), 
if this introduction of a more primordial level of phenomena is to be convincing, however, 
it cannot ignore the traditional account of subjects and objects but rather, must show its 
limited legitimacy. We shall see that there are subjects and objects but that the tradition 
has introduced them too early in the analysis and, moreover, has mischaracterized them 
so as to give them a foundational function they cannot perform (p.69). 
For Heidegger, the distinction between subjects and objects emerges only when 
our practical engagements have become problematic. In this case, deliberation 
arises when what was previously unproblematic assumes a particular importance. 
 As I write, my pencil assumes no particular importance as it is completely 
integrated into the task at hand. Yet it is possible that when I lose myself in the 
activity of writing, I may press down too hard on my paper and break off the tip 
of my pencil. At this point in time, the being of the pencil is significantly different 
from what it was before. In Heidegger’s (1962) view, the equipment is no longer 
integrated into the ongoing activity in which it was previously employed and 
“when its unusability is thus discovered, equipment becomes conspicuous. This 
conspicuousness presents the available equipment as in a certain 
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unavailableness” (p.102-103). For Dasein, this necessitates a different practice 
whereby the pencil is no longer a piece of equipment for writing but becomes a 
goal of another activity, in this case, some activity designed to reestablish the 
availableness of the pencil. In this case, one may use a pencil sharpener and we 
can see that the sharpener exhibits the same availableness that the pencil 
previously assumed. In this sense, there is deliberation but Heidegger wants to 
make clear that this need not be viewed as a collection of mental processes 
residing within a mind that has been juxtaposed with an independent and 
external reality. For Heidegger, “even deliberation is not the pure detached 
theoretical reflection described by the tradition. Rather it must take place on the 
background of absorption in the world” (Dreyfus, 1991, p.74). What Heidegger is 
saying is that we need not view understanding as a mental process residing 
within individual minds but instead as something that is exhibited in the way we 
engage in our everyday practical activities.  
We have seen that, in dealing with the available, Dasein is transparently absorbed in 
equipment without experiencing its activity as caused by a “mental state.” We have now 
added that temporary breakdown calls forth deliberate action and thus introduces 
“mental content,” but only on the background of nonmental coping (Dreyfus, 1991, p.76). 
What is revealed when equipment ceases to work is the embeddedness of 
Dasein’s understanding in everyday background practices. This breakdown 
permits another level of analysis more closely aligned with the theoretically 
detached attitude we find in contemporary scientific practice.  
 When an entity is no longer available, and it has exhausted any possibility 
of being reintegrated into practice, the entity now exhibits occurrentness. This 
means that equipment has become, for the time being, unavailable and a 
particular theoretical detachment has become necessary to ensure that the 
equipment can once again be made available. For Heidegger, theoretical 
reflection emerges only after our everyday engagements are thoroughly beyond 
repair. This type of reflection removes entities from their practical context in such 
a way that equipment exhibits occurrentness. Within psychology, this 
occurrentness would be similar to the sense data that an individual integrates 
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into a complex interpretation of social reality. Yet the thrust of Heidegger’s 
critique of cognitivism is to draw attention to the way that such an analysis is in 
fact a derivative mode of relating to entities rather than their basic condition. In 
his view, reality is not populated by neutral entities that we only truly encounter 
through detached reflection but that it is through our practical engagements that 
we encounter a world of meaningful relations. This means that the thematization 
of the hermeneutic phenomenologist must be distinguished from the 
thematization that occurs in contemporary scientific research: 
The scientist is detached from and so is able to thematized and objectify his object, 
nature, while the hermeneutic ontologist makes his theme precisely the shared 
background understanding in which he dwells and from which he cannot detach 
himself… Heidegger must mean to distinguish his involved thematic analysis of existence, 
which reveals that in which we already dwell, from the detached, objectifying 
thematization characteristic of any discipline from physics to factual history (Dreyfus, 
1991, p.83) 
The significance of the hermeneutic form of thematizing will become especially 
important when we look to the way hermeneutics discloses the background 
practices that embody our practical understanding. 
 At this point, I would like to return to the figure/ground relationship that 
we discussed in the context of social cognition. For the most part, this 
phenomena has been viewed perceptually in terms of what individuals 
interpreting social reality come to know. Thus people will discuss ‘seeing’ one 
image against another or ‘hearing” an instrument against the background of the 
entire orchestra. Heidegger's aim was not so much to undermine this view of 
‘holism’ but to reformulate it in terms of action or practical activity rather than  
perception or knowledge. If we return to our example of the pencil and paper, up 
to this point, it has principally been introduced as a visual phenomenon – 
something that can be seen. For Gestalt and social psychology, what is 
fundamental is that everything emerges within a particular context. The contours 
of my pencil are discernable because of the paper that provides a background.  
For Heidegger, this phenomenological insight, while important, does not 
penetrate deeply enough into the way we are actually engaged in the world. Even 
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before objects of perception emerge against a specific background, we are 
practically immersed in the world in a way that these items are fused with 
everyday concerns. Indeed, as I sit here writing, to see the pencil against the 
paper is to have ceased to write. To see the pencil as a figure against a ground is 
to no longer treat it as a pencil. It is only when it has ceased to be a pencil with 
which I can write that it emerges as something that I see. Fundamentally, when I 
encounter objects, I encounter them as tools for practical activity. It is only when 
they have ceased to function in a particular way that they take on the derivative 
character of being items. Heidegger has not abandoned holism but has suggested 
that we understand this relationship not as a perceptual item against a particular 
background but as emerging against a background of practical activity. This 
background of practical activity provides a means for objects to emerge in 
particular ways. 
 
Artificial Intelligence 
 The view that interpretation is embedded in our practical engagements 
rather than in cognitive processes is a controversial claim, especially for areas 
such as social cognition that appear to be committed to a mentalistic view of 
human understanding. Given cognitive psychology’s reliance on a computational 
model of the mind, it seems appropriate to compare Heidegger’s insights with 
interpretive issues that have emerged in the field of Artificial Intelligence (AI). To 
do this, I will draw primarily on Dreyfus’ book, What Computers Still Can’t Do 
(1992). 
 In discussing the applicability of the information-processing model to 
human cognition, there are at least two different ways to discuss the matter: (1) is 
to look to empirical work within cognitive science to see if evidence supports the 
hypothesis that the mind functions like a computer or (2) is to demonstrate the 
contingency of several a priori arguments and to show that something more than 
empirical research is being used to buttress an information-processing model of 
human cognition. Both possibilities are covered extensively by Dreyfus (1992) 
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though I would like to devote the majority of my discussion to arguments of the 
theoretical variety. In other words, I would like to show that while empirical 
evidence can be produced and evaluated by social cognition researchers, these 
approaches remain grounded in non-empirical (i.e. a priori) assumptions 
regarding the nature of interpretation. These problems are directly related to 
what we have discussed regarding epistemological and ontological approaches to 
interpretation. Moreover, these critiques support the suggestion that 
phenomenology, instead of providing a foundation for social cognition (Fiske & 
Taylor, 1991), actually calls into question many of its most cherished 
assumptions. 
To begin with, Dreyfus highlights the way psychology has come to be 
dominated by a computational view of the mind. He suggests that, 
in psychology, the computer serves as a model of the mind as conceived of by empiricists 
such as Hume (with the bits as atomic impressions) and idealists such as Kant (with the 
program providing the rules). Both empiricists and idealists have prepared the ground for 
this model of thinking as data processing (Dreyfus, 1992, p.157; italics mine).  
This observation is congruent with Fiske and Taylor’s (1991) suggestion that 
contemporary research in social cognition is ultimately grounded in the 
dialectical relationship between Humeian elementalism and Kantian holism. As 
we have already seen, this part/whole relationship shares a number of 
similarities with schema theory and the hermeneutic circle. What I would like to 
suggest is that Heidegger’s transition from epistemological to ontological 
hermeneutics has profound implications for the way we consider this 
relationship.  
 As we will recall from Heidegger’s discussion of ontological hermeneutics, 
when people inquire into a particular state of affairs, scientific or otherwise, they 
always begin with an understanding that determines what an appropriate answer 
would resemble. If I am interested in the cognitive mechanisms that account for 
variation in orderly behavior, I have already delimited what will count as a 
suitable explanation. What an information-processing approach views as an 
adequate psychological explanation is not an empirical question but is instead an 
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a priori assumption regarding the nature of the mind. Psychologists working 
within an information-processing framework, 
assume that our very notion of explanation or complete description requires that 
behavior be described in terms of a set of instructions, that is, a sequence of determinate 
responses to determinate situations… In their view, if psychology is to be possible at all, 
an explanation must be expressible as a computer program. This is not an empirical 
observation but follows from their definition of explanation (Dreyfus, 1992, p.175). 
This insight is at the heart of the epistemological approach to interpretation. All 
inquiry must begin with a set of assumptions that are not themselves empirical in 
nature. In every act of investigation, the nature of that which is to be investigated 
is assumed to be of a particular type. If we recall Ostrom’s (1984) list of twelve 
cognitive tasks that are likely to occur when we interact with another person, it is 
clear that he views an explanation of human behavior as synonymous with 
identifying a series of rules that intervene between input and output. Moreover, 
even the recognition that such a series of tasks seems at least improbable elicits a 
telling response from Ostrom: 
It is staggering, indeed, to realize that these myriad concurrent tasks are compressed into 
the time it takes to nod understandingly, raise an eyebrow, or fleet a smile. The 
motivational, cognitive, and affective mechanisms that allow us to perform them are at 
present bafflingly complex and poorly understood. Of course, this quest for 
understanding has always been, and will continue to be, the primary objective of 
psychology. It is in the field of social cognition that the full complexity of this task 
becomes apparent (Ostrom, 1984, p.16; italics mine). 
In other words, despite our reluctance to believe that these tasks do occur in 
everyday social interactions, it is not clear what a scientific psychology would 
look like without such an explanation. For social cognition researchers, 
interpretation must be viewed in this way if they are to identify variables that lead 
to specific interpretations of social reality.  
 Social cognition’s exclusion of discourses that do not correspond to a 
computational model of mind is strikingly similar to Hirsch’s attempt to restrict 
all legitimate discourse regarding the meaning of a text to approximations of the 
intention of the author. In other words, Hirsch believes that it is necessary to 
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have a determinate subject matter in order to discuss issues of validity. For him, 
it is the author’s intention that ensures rival interpreters will understand one 
another even if they disagree on the validity of a particular interpretation. Were 
theorists unable to agree as to what constitutes a legitimate form of inquiry, it 
would not be possible to progress beyond endless bickering regarding the nature 
of a phenomenon. 
Moreover, Kuhn’s discussion of paradigms draws attention to the role such 
dominant forms of discourse play in scientific understanding. In each case, a 
determinate subject matter is established on a priori grounds so that competing 
interpretations can be compared within the framework of ‘legitimate’ discourse. 
Yet for Dreyfus (1992), the discourse of information-processing represents an a 
priori rather than an empirical framework for viewing the human mind: 
Although man is surely a physical object processing physical inputs according to the laws 
of physics and chemistry, man’s behavior may not be explainable in terms of an 
information-processing mechanism processing inputs which represent features of the 
world. Nothing from physics or experience suggests that man’s actions can be so 
explained, since on the physical level we are confronted with continuously changing 
patterns of energy, and on the phenomenological level with objects in an already 
organized field of experience (Dreyfus, 1992, p.187-188).   
With social cognition’s desire to identify a determinate region that is neither 
reducible to neurophysiology nor phenomenology, it has had to colonize the 
human mind. Yet the fact that an explanation of the human mind must ultimately 
take the form of a series of specific rules is by no means an empirical claim. On 
the contrary, it is an a priori framework for deciding whether a particular 
explanation constitutes legitimate psychological discourse. 
 A further problem arises when we reflect on the type of world one would 
have to inhabit in order for the human mind to be a computational device. As 
long as social cognition views interpretation as a rule-governed cognitive process, 
it will have to continue to posit a determinate region which can supply variables 
to be manipulated by the proper cognitive equation. In other words, when I have 
had ‘X’ past experiences and I find myself in situation ‘Y’, I will behave in a 
predictable way. Of course, the point of social cognition is to increase the 
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complexity of this equation to account for variation, yet the basic desire to 
understand behavior in terms of rules remains the same. Given social cognition’s 
reliance on an information-processing model, this would appear to be the only 
compelling way to explain variations in the interpretation of social reality. 
Moreover, our failure at times to develop an accurate perception of reality would 
have to be explained by suggesting that certain interpretive rules have led us 
astray.  Much as we may fail to grasp a text’s meaning if we rely exclusively on the 
contingent significance that it has in a particular time period, so do we fail to gain 
an accurate perception of reality if we confuse our contingent perceptions with 
that reality. 
 As we have seen from our discussion of schema theory and the 
hermeneutic circle, this knowledge is gained through a dialectical relationship 
between parts and the whole. Our understanding of the whole leads us to view 
parts in a particular fashion while individual parts allow us to grasp the whole. 
Although this is something that humans do easily in their everyday social 
interactions, it is an extremely difficult process for a computer to complete. For 
Dreyfus (1992), “in order to understand an utterance, structure a problem, or 
recognize a pattern, a computer must select and interpret its data in terms of a 
context. But how are we to impart this context itself to the computer” (p.208)? In 
other words, how are we to account for interpretation as a computational process 
when the context that social cognition acknowledges is necessary for all 
interpretation cannot be apprehended through rule-governed processes? Indeed, 
if interpretation requires a cognitive equation, how can the proper variables be 
gathered from the situation if an understanding of the situation is what is 
required to identify these variables in the first place? One would need to process 
the individual elements to determine the context, yet it is the context that makes 
these individual elements intelligible:  
It is only in the broader context of social intercourse that we see we must normally take 
into account what people are wearing and what they are doing, but not how many insects 
there are in the room or the cloud formations at noon or a minute later … only this 
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broader context enables us to determine whether these facts will have their normal 
significance” (Dreyfus, 1992, p.221).  
For Heidegger, context is not provided by knowledge represented in the mind but 
through our everyday practical activities. The fact that it is difficult for AI 
researchers to instantiate such basic processes in specific rules calls into question 
the appropriateness of an information-processing model of the human mind.  
 
Implications 
 Dreyfus (1991) identifies several assumptions guiding Western philosophy 
that he believes are especially vulnerable to Heidegger’s criticisms. Moreover, 
these assumptions provide a foundation for research in social cognition. Indeed a 
thorough examination of these assumptions may have a profound impact of the 
way we view phenomenology, cognitive science, and social reality. 
 
Explicitness. The idea that human thought and behavior is governed by 
rules is perhaps the defining feature of modern psychological theory and 
research. Social cognition researchers focus on uncovering the cognitive 
mechanisms and situational variables that produce specific interpretations of 
social reality. If we return to the figure/ground relationship, we can see that 
although these variables and mechanisms remain in the background, scientific 
procedures aim to bring them into focus. Indeed, this may be the essence of what 
is referred to as scientific progress – bringing what is hidden into the light of day. 
Yet Heidegger’s radical approach to the hermeneutic circle calls into question the 
possibility of bringing such background practices completely into focus. 
 The hermeneutic circle refers to the fact that all understanding involves a 
dialectical relationship between the parts and the whole. It suggests that when we 
know something, this knowledge influences the way we understand any of a 
number of phenomena. Moreover, we have seen that this dialectical relationship 
shares a number of similarities with schema theory, transcendental 
phenomenology, and certain approaches within literary theory. For Heidegger, 
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this dialectical approach is relevant to all forms of human understanding, 
including the accumulation of scientific knowledge:  
In a scientific proof, we may not presuppose what it is our task to provide grounds for. 
But if interpretation must in any case already operate in that which is understood, and if 
it must draw its nurture from this, how is it to bring any scientific results to maturity 
without moving in a circle, especially if, moreover, the understanding which is 
presupposed still operates within our common information about man and the world 
(Heidegger, 1962, p.194). 
Here, Heidegger is claiming that scientific inquiry always begins with an 
understanding of the phenomenon in question. Moreover, this understanding 
emerges in the way a community of researchers have come to define the object 
under investigation. In The Basic Problems of Phenomenology (1982), Heidegger 
focuses on how the dialectical nature of understanding influences scientific 
inquiry. 
For nature, physical as well as psychical, always replies in an experiment only to that 
which it is interrogated about. The result of positive inquiry can always corroborate only 
the fundamental mode of inquiry in which it moves. But it cannot substantiate the 
fundamental mode of inquiry itself and the manner of thematizing entities that is implicit 
in it (p.52).  
Heidegger is claiming that every question that posits itself on the relationship 
between a knower and a known (epistemology) presupposes what constitutes an 
answer to that question; that is, what we understand as the being of the entities 
to which the question is put. Thus, if I posit an entity that is a collection of 
cognitive mechanisms, schemas, and mental processes, I have already 
determined what sort of information will be salient in my investigation. This has 
not occurred because of explicit rules as to what is or is not relevant but is instead 
the result of shared practices in a scientific community – practices that never 
become fully explicit. For Heidegger (1982), 
the positive positing of any being includes within itself an a priori knowledge and an a 
priori understanding of the being’s being, although the positive experience of such a being 
knows nothing of this understanding and is incapable of bringing what is understood by it 
into the form of a concept (p.52) 
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In other words, although this knowledge is operative in the way we encounter a 
phenomenon, it is not something that can be made completely explicit. As we 
have seen with Kuhn, a community of scientists is often unable to supply rules for 
how they are to behave in particular situations. Instead, researchers come to 
behave in certain ways because of their immersion in a scientific community. 
While science has privileged the sort of conceptual knowledge that can be made 
fully explicit, it is our background practices that make such knowledge 
meaningful in the first place.  
 But if scientific inquiry is already guided by a particular understanding of 
the phenomenon under investigation, how are we to ever grasp reality as it 
“really” is? Indeed, doesn’t the dialectical nature of understanding demonstrate 
that what we have really encountered is a vicious circle? Heidegger does not 
believe that the hermeneutic circle must be a vicious one; instead, he believes 
that when the circle has been properly understood, it offers us a positive means 
for disclosing the nature of understanding. Heidegger (1962) argues that, 
if we see this circle as a vicious one and look for ways of avoiding it, even if we just 
‘sense’ it as an inevitable imperfection, then the act of understanding has been 
misunderstood from the ground up… If the basic conditions which make interpretation 
possible are to be fulfilled, this must rather be done by not failing to recognize beforehand 
the essential conditions under which it can be performed. What is decisive is not to get 
out of the circle but to come into it in the right way (p.194-195). 
This means that we must remain aware of the way background practices shape 
our understanding of a phenomenon while simultaneously recognizing that such 
practices cannot be made completely explicit. For Heidegger, all inquiry is 
intimately related to the practices that emerge within a particular cultural and 
historical community:  
Heidegger is very aware that our understanding grows or decays according to the kind of 
lives we are leading and the kind of cultural situation we inhabit. So to understand the 
question of Being we have to be alert to the kind of situation which gives rise to that 
question or covers it up. In particular, we shall have to be aware of the average 
understanding of being which our particular culture or mood carries with it (Moran, 
2000, p.237). 
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This means that the hermeneutic circle should not be approached as an 
unavoidable means for gaining knowledge (epistemology) but as the way of 
being-in-the-world that underlies all forms of understanding (ontology), 
scientific or otherwise.  
 
Theoretical Holism. We have already noted social cognition’s commitment 
to a holisitic view of human knowledge (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). This holism is 
reflected in Lewin’s (1951) elaboration of the relationship between individuals 
and their environment. Since Heidegger also appears to advocate a holistic 
position, it is important to distinguish his holism from the one maintained by 
social cognition. The type of holism embraced by social cognition is what Dreyfus 
(1980, 1991) refers to as theoretical holism. While a theoretical holist may 
acknowledge that interpretation is ultimately grounded in everyday background 
practices, she does not see any obstacle to making such practices entirely explicit. 
Indeed, if these practices are to be the foundation of human understanding, a 
theoretical holist would demand that such practices be made explicit in terms of 
concrete rules and beliefs. In other words, “insofar as background practices 
contain knowledge, they must be based on implicit beliefs; insofar as they are 
skills, they must be generated by tacit rules (Dreyfus, 1991, p.5). 
Dreyfus (1980, 1991) argues that Heidegger embraces a practical holism in 
which the shared practices that unite a community are not capable of being fully 
formalized into tacit rules or implicit beliefs. Instead, such practices represent a 
commitment to a particular mode of being-in-the-world. Dreyfus (1980) suggests 
that  
practical understanding is holistic in an entirely different way from theoretical 
understanding. Although practical understanding—everyday coping with things and 
people—involves explicit beliefs and hypothesis, these can only be meaningful in specific 
contexts and against a background of shared practices… such skills embody a whole 
cultural interpretation of what it means to be a human being, what a material object is, 
and, in general, what counts as real (Dreyfus, 1980, p.7). 
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The significance of this position is that it offers a radically different 
perspective on the hermeneutic circle and the nature of interpretation. We are 
not involved in the world in such a way that our background practices can be 
made entirely explicit. Indeed, these practices represent an interpretation of our 
existential situation. This knowledge is not to be found within our mental 
representation of the world but in our active involvement in practical activities.  
It is clear that this approach represents a significant departure from the view of 
interpretation that one finds within social cognition. As Stern (2003) observes  
the practical holist agrees with the theoretical holist that we are already within the 
‘hermeneutic circle’ – we have no alternative to starting with our current understanding – 
but argues that theoretical holism mistakenly conceives of understanding a language on 
the model of formulating a theory, or mapping an unfamiliar landscape. This leaves out 
the background practices, equipment, locations, and broader horizons that are not 
specific presuppositions or assumptions, yet are part and parcel of our ability to engage in 
conversation or find our way about (p.189). 
In addition, Stern (2003) suggests that the theoretical holist’s 
presumptions regarding the possible explicitness of background practices is 
entirely unfounded. He suggests that, “it is a mistake to postulate tacit belief 
whenever explicit beliefs cannot be found, and to fail to do justice to the 
contextual, embodied, and improvisational character of practice” (p.189). Indeed, 
the practical and theoretical holist agree that understanding involves a dialectical 
process but differ in the way they view the nature of these background practices. 
For the theoretical holist, the way people interpret social reality can ultimately be 
formalized into specific rules. The practical holist, on the other hand, argues that 
the theoretical holist’s explanation of human behavior in terms of rules is 
dependent on the practical activities of a community of scientists whose behavior 
cannot be reduced to the “following of a rule.” We fail to make these background 
practices explicit not because of any temporary limitation of scientific knowledge 
but because the very nature of human understanding is dependent on these 
practices remaining essentially hidden. 
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Detachment and Objectivity. While the theoretical holist would like to 
formalize background practices into explicit rules and beliefs, she still must 
contend with the specter of relativism that haunts those who wish to adopt a 
holistic position. To a large extent this challenge has been met by claiming that 
while the hermeneutic circle may be vicious, one’s ability to adopt a position 
outside of this dialectical process facilitates an understanding that remains 
untainted by implicit assumptions or prejudices. As we have seen, this is a vital 
move for anyone working within an epistemological framework. 
For Hirsch, by restricting discussion of the meaning of a text to the 
author’s original intention, it is possible to prevent a text’s significance in a 
particular time period from distorting its true meaning. In other words, Hirsch 
controls for the effect of changing significance by restricting all legitimate 
discussion of a text’s meaning to issues of authorial intention. This enables him to 
adopt a perspective immune to historical contingencies. Moreover, Hirsh argues 
that objectivity in interpretation absolutely requires that we identify a 
determinate region of meaning. By equating the true meaning of a text with the 
intention of the author, Hirsch claims to provide a way for readers to compare 
competing interpretations. 
Husserl believed that he could cure what he diagnosed as the crisis 
plaguing Western science by developing a rigorous method free from all 
philosophical presuppositions and prejudices. By seeking to be a descriptive 
science, transcendental phenomenology tries to avoid interpretive practices that 
distort the intuiting of essences – the ultimate aim of an eidetic science. Through 
rigorous description of the way experience appears to consciousness, 
transcendental phenomenology endeavors to put scientific inquiry on firm 
footing once and for all. 
Conventional science is also guided by the idea that a true representation 
of reality requires that scientists and lay people distance themselves from the 
distorting influence of their own beliefs and desires. For Dreyfus (1991), 
“according to the philosophical tradition, whether rationalist or empiricist, it is 
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only by means of detached contemplation that we discover reality” (p.6). Once 
again, the understanding we derive from a theoretically detached position is 
viewed as superior to the vagaries of subjective prejudices.  Methodological 
procedures ensure that subjective biases will not prevent researchers from 
ultimately grasping the nature of reality. Indeed, by positing both a determinate 
mental and physical reality, social cognition researchers hope to discover the 
cognitive mechanisms and situational variables responsible for specific 
interpretations of social reality. 
Within this epistemological approach to knowledge, prejudice, whether it 
is in the guise of ‘significance’, ‘interpretation’ or ‘subjective bias’, represents an 
obstacle to valid knowledge of the nature of reality. Yet for Heidegger, it is this 
view that needs to be called into question. He suggest that a strictly negative view 
of prejudice presumes the very subject/object split that it claims to uncover and 
that such objectivity must ultimately be understood as deriving from our 
everyday practical engagements.  
From Heidegger’s perspective, prejudices do not only serve a deleterious 
role in human understanding but instead are the foundation for all forms of 
human understanding. Understanding does not occur by adopting a disinterested 
perspective but emerges through practical engagement with the phenomenon in 
question.  Indeed, Heidegger’s distinction between the being of objects and the 
being of Dasein calls into question the privileging of knowledge gained from a 
‘disinterested’ perspective. For if Dasein’s fundamental involvement is being-in-
the-world, it is only a derivative stance that places an object in front of a 
conscious subject. Yet it is not clear why this derivative stance has been given 
priority since the time of Descartes:  
The whole array of philosophical distinctions between inner subjective experience and the 
outer object of experience, between perceiving and the perceived, and between 
appearance and reality arise at this point … Only by exposing the derivative character of 
the detached, reflective stance, Heidegger holds, can we see the limits of subjective 
consciousness and the object it knows (Dreyfus, 1991, p.45) 
 60
For Heidegger, traditional approaches to knowledge privilege a disinterested 
knower encountering a reality beyond the influence of subjective biases. Yet, as 
we have seen, this is only a derivative way of encountering other people and 
objects. Primordially, we are immersed in a world of practical activities and it is 
only through these activities that other people and objects are ultimately 
disclosed to us. For Heidegger, shared practices are not revealed by locating them 
in cognitive mechanisms or implicit belief systems but by looking to the 
fundamental way in which people are engaged in their world. This does not mean 
that such practices can be rendered entirely explicit but instead suggests that any 
perspective beginning from a disinterested perspective has already 
misunderstood the nature of Dasein’s being-in-the-world. 
 
Practice Theory 
The movement from epistemology to ontology entails a radical 
transformation of the phenomenological foundations of social cognition. Instead 
of focusing on mental representations, intentionality, and consciousness, this 
new approach looks to the everyday activities that already embody an 
interpretation of social reality. Indeed, the foundation for analysis is no longer 
the individual mind but the practical activities of a group of people. From this 
perspective, interpretation is a practice rather than a mental activity. For 
Westerman (2004), 
our understanding, even when it takes the form of theoretical propositions, remains at 
bottom a lived knowledge. It is not a view of the world as it is “in itself” nor how we would 
choose to see it, but a hold on things that always refers beyond itself to our involvement 
in the world of practices (p. 134). 
 The concept of practice has been explored either explicitly or implicitly 
within a variety of areas including sociology (Giddens, 1976, 1984; Coulter, 2001, 
Turner, 1994), anthropology (Bourdieu, 1977, 1990), cognitive science (Dreyfus, 
1988, 1992, 2002; Turner, 2001, 2002), literary theory (Fish, 1980; Knapp & 
Michaels, 1985) and philosophy (Gadamer, 1976; Heidegger, 1962; Rorty, 1979; 
Wittgenstein, 2001). Moreover, psychologists have begun to discuss the 
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implication of moving the level of analysis away from individual consciousness 
(Gergen, 1991, 2001; Potter, 1996; Richardson & Bishop, 2004; Richardson & 
Christopher, 1993; Sampson, 1983; Slife, 2005; Stenner, 1998; Westerman, 
2004). While there has been a growing interest in the concept of practice, it 
would be a mistake to assume that all practice theorists agree on the role this 
concept plays in scientific research (Schatzki, Cetina & Savigny, 2001). Moreover, 
even an agreed upon definition of ‘practice’ has not always been forthcoming.  
 Despite these ambiguities, I would like to discuss several 
conceptualizations of practice that are relevant for the present project. In practice 
theory, the goal is to establish a level of analysis that is neither reducible to the 
functioning of individual subjects nor completely dependent of systematic 
considerations. For Barnes (2001),  
the successful execution of routines at the collective level will involve the overriding and 
modification of routines at the individual level. Practice at the collective level is not a 
simple summation of practices at the individual level (habits). Shared practice is, as the 
ethnomethodologists say, a collective accomplishment (p.23). 
In other words, orderly behavior need not be understood as simply the aggregate 
of individual actions. Collective behavior exhibits a quality that supersedes the 
functioning of individual agents. Practical activities constitute an interpretation 
of reality that is neither the product of consciousness nor entirely determined by 
systematic factors.  
It is clear that one of the benefits of the concept of practice is its ability to 
resolve a number of dualisms that have plagued Western thought. As we have 
seen, Heidegger’s conception of Dasein was intended to undercut the tendency to 
conceptualize human subjectivity as an entity distinct from the world in which it 
inhabited. Instead, Heidegger views human existence as being-in-the-world, a 
practical engagement that already embodies a particular understanding of the 
meaning of Being. Within sociology, the concept of practice has been hailed as an 
alternative to choosing between a micro-level of analysis with it’s focus on human 
subjectivity and a macro-level of analysis that views systemic factors as solely 
determining the functioning of society. For Coulter (2001), “the proper route to a 
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solution to the ‘micro-macro’ relationship problem is to be found in a systematic 
elucidation of the logic of our ordinary practices (including our communicative 
practices) in our ordinary life circumstances “(p.29).  
Perhaps one of the most interesting contributions to practice theory has 
been undertaken by the sociologist Anthony Giddens (1976, 1984). Giddens 
structuration theory attempts to mediate between some of the micro/macro 
debates we have already discussed.  
The basic domain of study of the social sciences, according to the theory of structuration, 
is neither the experience of the individual actor, nor the existence of any form of societal 
totality, but social practices ordered across space and time. Human social activities, like 
some self-reproducing items in nature, are recursive. That is to say, they are not brought 
into being by social actors but continually recreated by them via the very means whereby 
they express themselves as actors. In and through their activities agents reproduce the 
conditions that make these activities possible” (Giddens, 1984, p.2). 
For Giddens, people within a society are not simply constrained by systematic 
factors – such factors are reproduced by the everyday practical activities of a 
community. In other words, individuals not only behave in ways that conform to 
societal norms, they also reproduce such norms in their various activities. The 
concept of practice allows researchers to understand the activities that people 
engage in and that therefore embody an interpretation of reality.  
 I will have much more to say about practice throughout the remainder of 
this project. The important point at this moment is that by focusing on the 
practices that embody an interpretation of reality, we can begin to explore a new 
role for phenomenological investigations in the social sciences. With the 
transition from epistemology to ontology, phenomenology is no longer a 
foundation for social cognition research but instead a radical critique of social 
psychology’s interpretation of social reality. This is especially important as the 
present project will focus on politics – an area within psychology that has come to 
be dominated by social cognitive theories of interpretation. As such, it is 
important to understand how this revised interpretation of phenomenology can 
contribute to our understanding of political phenomena. 
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 In the first chapter, we explored the implications of viewing 
phenomenology as an investigation of shared practices. Indeed, I believe that 
analysis is absolutely essential if we are to understand the practices that embody 
an interpretation of political reality. At this time, I would like to explore various 
ways of approaching political research. For the present project, it is important to 
understand how the political is typically approached psychologically, 
sociologically, and phenomenologically. This should give us a clue as to the role 
this revised understanding of phenomenology can play in political research. 
 
Political Psychology 
 I would like to begin my discussion of political psychology by focusing on 
its origins as an interdisciplinary field as well as some of the ways it has been 
defined by its most prominent scholars. In tracing the origins of political 
psychology, Deutsche and Kinnvall (2002) note that, 
the increasing political turmoil, the irrationality and destructiveness of the First World 
War, the development of modern totalitarian regimes with their barbarities, the 
emergence of the mass media and their systematic use by propagandists, suggested an 
urgent need for more systematic knowledge about the relationship between political and 
psychological processes (p.15). 
Prior to the First World War, psychology and political science generally 
developed independently with few researchers exploring points of intersection. 
With political tensions increasing throughout the world during the first half of 
the twentieth century, it became increasingly important to integrate an 
understanding of basic psychological processes with investigations of both 
totalitarian and democratic societies (see Adorno et al., 1950). By focusing on 
various aspects of the individual, psychologists and political scientists believed 
they could prevent the formation of repressive regimes and facilitate the 
emergence of democratic forms of government. Moreover, as mass media 
emerged as the dominant form of communication between political elites and 
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citizens, it became necessary to focus on the way individuals interpret mediated 
images and messages within a political context. This led to an interest in what has 
become the interdisciplinary field of political psychology.  
 Most scholars see political psychology as a field integrating insights from 
political science and psychology. Indeed, Deutsche and Kinnvall (2002) suggest 
that political psychology, “is a child of political science and psychology, having 
been conceived in the ambivalent mood of optimism and despair that has 
characterized the scientific age” (p.15). Yet Sears et al (2003) argue against the 
idea of a single political psychology given the difficulties of identifying any 
uniform approach within either political science or psychology. They note that, 
there is no one “political psychology.” Rather, there are a number of political 
phenomenon that have been investigated from a psychological approach, and using a 
number of different psychological theories. In that sense there are a number of “political 
psychologies,” though of course every theory is more appropriate for some phenomena 
than for others (Sears et al., 2003, p.4). 
Instead of providing a general definition of political psychology, Sears et al 
(2003) divide political psychology into several, “major psychological theoretical 
approaches” including personality, behaviorist learning theories, developmental 
theory, incentive theories, intergroup relations, and social cognition. They 
suggest that political psychology is, “at the most general level, an application of 
what is known about human psychology to the study of politics. From psychology 
it draws on theory and research on personality, psychopathology, social 
psychology, developmental psychology, cognitive psychology, and intergroup 
relations” (Sears et al., 2003, p.3). Bar-Tal (2002) defines political psychology as 
a science, 
concerned with the influence of psychological factors, such as perceptions, beliefs, 
attitudes, values, motives, personality, cognitive styles, dynamic processes, group 
membership, group characteristics, structure and  performance, and way of social 
influence, on political beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors of individuals and groups alike, on 
the one hand, and with the influence of political culture, systems, movements, parties, 
ideologies, mechanisms of political socialization, and intergroup relations on the human 
repertoire, on the other (p.174-175). 
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Deutsche and Kinnvall (2002) argue that political psychology’s primary focus, 
especially in America, has been on, “individual and social psychological processes 
– such as motivation, conflict, perception, cognition, learning, socialization, 
attitude formation, and group dynamics – and on individual personality and 
psychopathology as the causal factors influencing political behavior” (p.16). From 
these definitions, it is clear that the political realm is primarily seen as an 
additional context for exploring basic psychological processes. Moreover, political 
psychology’s trajectory largely parallels changes in psychological theory. Thus, 
psychology’s transition from behavioral to cognitive forms of explanation is 
duplicated within political psychology. Indeed, Sullivan, Rahn and Rudolph 
(2002) suggest that the emphasis in political psychology has gradually shifted, 
”from personality and politics, to political attitudes and beliefs, and then to 
political cognition and information processing. In turn, there is evidence of an 
evolving emphasis on the role of affective factors in politics” (p.27). 
 Contemporary research in political psychology draws on a number of 
insights from the more general field of social psychology. Indeed, Taber (2003) 
notes that, “to an increasing extent, political psychologists and social 
psychologists use a common language to address an overlapping set of research 
questions” (p.433). As we have already seen, much contemporary social 
psychological research is grounded in the theoretical orientation of social 
cognition. As a result, Sullivan, Rahn and Rudolph (2002) suggest that political 
psychology primarily focuses on cognitive processes and mental activity: 
In part due to the success of the interdisciplinary “cognitive science” revolution, social 
psychology turned away from an almost exclusive focus on attitude theory to a strong 
emphasis on social cognition. Social psychologists began to study very precisely how 
people perceive, store, process, recall, and use information from their social environment. 
In turn, then, political psychologists began to turn their attention to how people similarly 
deal with information about their political world (p.25). 
Moreover, Bar-Tal (2002) argues that, “by providing the basis for the 
development of political psychology, social psychology stamped political 
psychology with its own cognitive orientation” (p.180). Clearly, social cognition 
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provides a foundation for much of the research conducted within the area of 
political psychology. As noted in the first chapter, social cognition’s reliance on a 
computational model of the mind and its adherence to theories of mental 
representation has important implications for psychological research. This is 
equally true for research in political psychology. 
 We will recall that social cognition views interpretation as a mental 
process that resides within the minds of individual actors. Indeed, social 
cognition strives to identify the rules that govern particular interpretations of 
social reality. In other words, social cognition researchers are interested in 
understanding the mental processes that lead people to think or behave in 
particular ways in particular situations. Within political psychology, this has led 
to a tremendous amount of research into the way people’s mental representations 
and cognitive processes influence their political beliefs and activities. As Taber 
(2003) notes, 
the engines of public opinion are individual citizens as information processors. However 
humble their location in the political process, people form their opinions – when they 
form opinions – in response to political discourse, public and private. At times they may 
actively seek out information about candidates, parties, or issues; more frequently, 
citizens receive political information unsolicited. When they attend to it, this information 
is interpreted and evaluated by citizens and integrated into their existing political 
attitudes and beliefs. These private opinions become public when they are converted into 
some form of political action … (p.435). 
Here we see that citizens are generally seen as “information processors.” 
Interpretation is viewed as a mental activity where individuals process political 
information according to their existing beliefs, integrate this information into 
those beliefs, and then engage (or fail to engage) in relevant political activity. In 
other words, social cognition sees political activity as a form of output resulting 
from specific interpretations of social reality. Indeed, Taber (2003) suggests that, 
democratic citizens may fruitfully be thought of as information processors … they are 
expected to convert their private opinions into public participation … Their now public 
opinions may have greatest impact on public policy and broader political action when 
combined with the opinions of others, but this does not invalidate the individualistic 
nature of the opinion formation process (p.439). 
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Further along, Taber (2003) suggests that, “the information-processing approach 
gives us methods and theory that allow us to peer into the minds of citizens” 
(p.455). Once again, the focus is on an interpretive mental process that guides 
political activity. Political opinions, presumably in the form of mental 
representations, are both an influence on these interpretive processes and the 
outcome of this process. In other words, interpretation results in a more or less 
coherent political opinion that is capable of governing the public expression of 
that opinion; what researchers refer to as political participation. At the same 
time, political opinions influence the way novel information is processed leading 
to variations in political activity. In this sense, political opinions can serve as 
filters or biases that influence the processing of specific aspects of political 
reality. Indeed, Hermann (2002) suggests that,  
how people define what is in their self interest, what is salient to them, what they feel 
compelled to act on can differ depending on the lenses through which they view the world 
… these lenses become their “possessions” and descriptive of who they are politically and 
what they value (p.48). 
Thus, people view the world through different lenses and it is these lenses, among 
other things, that account for variations in political belief and behavior. From this 
perspective, who we are politically (i.e. existentially) is a result of the various 
lenses we posses, which in turn leads us to engage in particular political 
(in)activities. What I would like to suggest is that this view of political belief, 
opinion, and activity has several important implications for political psychology.  
 To begin with, if political beliefs, attitudes, or cognitions are viewed as the 
impetus for political activity, then it is not clear how we could understand 
political ideology as anything but a mental construct. In other words, if people 
interpret political reality in specific ways because they possess a particular 
political ideology, then ideology would seem to be virtually synonymous with 
one’s political beliefs, attitudes, or cognitions. This is congruent with 
Klandermans’ (2003) definition of ideology as, “a relatively coherent set of 
cognition, attitudes, and feelings maintained by an individual” (p.684). 
Moreover, Rosenberg, Ward and Chilton (1988) draw on Piaget’s explorations in 
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genetic epistemology to assert that political ideology, “is the result of an ongoing 
process of subjective construction, negation, reflection and reconstruction” 
(p.13). This is not to say that political ideologies only exist within the minds of 
individual actors. History and art demonstrate the power of ideological symbols 
and slogans embedded within various cultures and historical epochs. Yet it is 
clear that social cognition researchers believe that ideologies guide political 
activities only in so far as these ideologies are represented within the mind. Of 
course, ideologies generally gain their strength from large numbers of individuals 
possessing what social cognition researches would refer to as the relevant 
ideological lenses, but then the relationship between individuals and groups 
becomes all the more pressing. Are ideologies, and therefore political beliefs, 
attitudes, and feelings, represented in each of the individual minds of those 
participating in political activities? Furthermore, if political ideologies are 
conceptualized as mental representations, should these mental entities be viewed 
as antecedents to political activity? To answer these questions, it is necessary to 
focus on the way political psychology approaches the relationship between the 
individual and the group.  
 Clearly, political psychology is extremely interested in the relationship 
between the individual and the group, especially in the context of political 
activity. Indeed, Deutsche and Kinnvall (2002) note that, “how we define the 
individual as a political actor also has implications for how we understand 
collective identity formation and collective action” (p.21). Moreover, they argue 
that, 
collective identity, whether based on ethnicity, class, gender, race, religion, nation, or the 
state must, in other words, be understood within the framework of how individuals 
constitute political actors. The focus, and problem, of aggregating from the individual 
level to the group level is thus at the forefront of political psychology (Deutsche & 
Kinnvall, 2002, p.21). 
Exploring the relationship between individual and group is one of the most 
formidable challenges for political psychology researchers. Yet it is clear that 
political psychologists working within a social cognitive framework generally see 
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groups simply as a collection of individual actors. This does not mean that actors 
operate independently of one another when they are in a group; rather, social 
cognition researchers view shared interpretations of a situation as located within 
each of the individual minds of the actors involved. While these individual 
representations may result in thoughts or behaviors unique to the group, such 
behaviors are still viewed as the outcome of individual interpretations coalescing 
into group behavior. 
 While political psychologists may disagree as to the relative emphasis that 
should be given to the individual in organized behavior, it is clear that the 
individual remains the basic unit of analysis in political psychology research. 
Indeed, Herman (2002) argues that political psychologists, 
focus on the individual person as the unit of analysis – not the group, not the institution, 
not the government, not the international system. Of critical importance is how 
individuals (voters, protesters, opinion makers, leaders) interpret, define, and represent 
their political environments … true, in much of politics, people are embedded in groups, 
institutions, cultures, and governments, and it is the decisions of these entities that we 
seek to understand. However, it is individuals who identify and frame the problems that 
face such entities, who have disagreements and jockey for position, who generate 
compromises and build consensus, and who originate and implement change. Leaders are 
chosen by individuals either through election, selection, or the use of coercion; ideologies 
and causes are delineated and promulgated by individuals; ideas and norms become 
shared through the efforts of individuals (p.46-47). 
Clearly, approaches that view interpretation as a mental activity will emphasize 
the role the individual plays in political activities. This is not to say that 
situational factors are irrelevant to political psychology research; rather, social 
cognition researchers believe that such factors only become relevant when they 
lead individuals to interpret political reality in specific ways. 
It is also interesting to note that one of the primary means by which 
researchers establish the individual as the basic unit of analysis is by reference to 
political systems that are grounded in some form of individualism. Thus, 
democratic societies require citizens to choose representatives in elections in 
which their individual votes are aggregated and compared to determine a winner. 
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Because each individual has to make his or her own choice, political psychologists 
sometimes argue that it is necessary to focus on the beliefs, attitudes, feelings, 
and ideologies that guide these decisions. Indeed, Taber (2003) notes that, “in 
principle democracy invests the responsibility for public opinion in individual 
citizens. Democracy, at least in its Enlightenment form, is inherently 
individualistic” (p.435). Here we see that the focus on the individual is not merely 
as a choice among a variety of possibilities but instead is a result of the demands 
of a particular political system. From this perspective, it is not the researcher who 
decides to focus on individual mental processes but the nature of democracy 
itself. 
Yet there has also been a call to reflect on political psychology’s focus on 
the individual as the basic unit of analysis. Indeed, some argue that an exclusive 
focus on individual mental processes obscures other potential avenues of inquiry. 
For Deutsche and Kinnvall (2002), 
there has been a propensity to neglect previously important fields in political psychology, 
such as anthropology, microsociology, and cultural studies. To provide a more dynamic 
and complex picture of political action, it is important that this omission is rectified, that 
we balance the scales between the individual and society (p.35) 
Integrating this call to focus on political issues that emerge at the intersection of 
the individual and society with the transition from epistemology to ontology I 
outlined in the first chapter, several observations seem particularly relevant. To 
begin with, political psychology’s focus on individual mental processes should not 
be adopted uncritically. Indeed, given Heidegger’s ontological view of 
interpretation, we may begin to call into question the subject/object dichotomy 
on which political psychology appears to be grounded. The implication here is 
that subjectivity is something that emerges out of a shared understanding of a 
situation. Thus, it may not be individuals that come together to form a group but 
the group that provides a background against which different forms of 
subjectivity emerge. While this may have a number of implications for 
psychological research into group and political behavior, it also has serious 
consequences for the concept of the subject. 
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 Clearly, if subjectivity emerges against the background of a shared 
community, social scientists are in the interesting position of needing to justify 
their focus on the individual as the basic unit of analysis. Because the decision to 
focus on subjectivity is embed in the dynamics of a particular community of 
scholars, it seems that the subject may be the end rather than the beginning of a 
political process. In other words, it is not individuals that come together to 
further political goals but a community already held together by resources, 
training, traditions, cultural heritage etc., that provides a background against 
which certain forms of subjectivity emerge. Indeed, one purpose of the analysis 
presented in the first chapter is to bring this insight to bear on political 
phenomena. The focus is no longer on consciousness but on the shared practices 
of a community. If we enlarge the community to include Western thought, we 
may inquire into the historical, economic, and social context in which the 
contemporary subject emerges. In this sense, the movement towards practice 
draws attention to the way the very concept of the subject emerges through the 
collective arrangement of a particular community. 
It is also clear that calling the primacy of the subject into question has 
important implications for the way we approach ideology. Within a social 
cognitive framework, ideology is viewed as a mental construct guiding certain 
interpretations of political reality. Thus, people who possess divergent mental 
representations of political reality will see the world in different ways. As a result, 
their political activities are engineered to bring about different outcomes, a 
situation that often puts ideologies in conflict with one another. Indeed, from a 
social cognition perspective, ideologies would seem to function in much the same 
way as Kuhn’s paradigms. Yet it was precisely Kuhn’s point that paradigms 
cannot be viewed as rules governing scientific activity. A scientific paradigm is 
grounded within the concrete scientific practices of a community of scholars. 
These scholars are not necessarily guided in their activities by an explicit (or 
implicit) understanding of a set of rules that prescribe how scientific research 
should be conducted. Instead, these practices embody an interpretation of their 
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scientific tradition. In other words, it is not a mental representation of a tradition 
that guides scientific activity – these scientific practices are a tradition. Indeed, 
this moves us in the direction of understanding ideology in terms of practices 
rather than as possessions of individual minds.     
 While contemporary political psychology has increasingly followed 
psychology’s lead in viewing interpretation as a mental activity located within the 
minds of individual actors, the tensions and contradiction surrounding 
subjectivity and ideology should warrant greater attention to the intersubjective 
aspects of political life. Indeed, Deutsche and Kinnvall (2002) argue that, 
to the extent that that the social sciences, including political psychology, have uncritically 
imitated the methodologies appropriate to a technical cognitive interest, they have tended 
to neglect the fact that human action has to be understood with reference to the meanings 
that the action has for the actors and its audience: Human action is rooted in 
intersubjective contexts of communication, in intersubjective practices and forms of life 
that have distinctive historical origins. The uncritical imitation of the technical 
orientation of the natural sciences has also led many social scientists to ignore how their 
theoretical and empirical work – that is, their scientific activities – are influenced by the 
implicit assumptions, the value positions, ideological orientations, and political-economic 
viewpoints in the communities in which they participate (p.18 – italics mine). 
For these scholars, political psychology researchers need to recognize the extent 
to which their own conceptualizations of human subjectivity influence the 
trajectory of their political investigations. Rather than focusing exclusively on 
mental representations and cognitive processes, political researchers need to 
explore “interpersonal practices” that cannot be reduced to the functioning of 
individual minds. In this context, Ward (2002) argues that, 
political psychologists cannot be content to focus on individual or psychological 
explanations of political behavior, nor can we limit our attention to the systemic roots of 
individual psychology. Individuals and systems interact and that interaction transforms 
both the individual and the system, sometimes almost imperceptibly and on occasion 
radically (p.72). 
Moreover, he suggests that, “points of friction between the individual and the 
culture are perhaps the most important areas political psychologists can study. 
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Here is where we can discover the links between individual, social, and cultural 
change” (Ward, 2002, p.73). 
 Clearly, researchers need to pay more attention to issues that emerge at 
the intersection of the individual and society. Up to this point, I have focused on 
political psychology’s emphasis on the individual as the basic unit of analysis. I 
have argued that contemporary political psychology generally focuses on the 
mental processes that contribute to particular interpretations of political reality. 
These interpretations then serve as the impetus for engaging in specific political 
activities. Moreover, interpretation is viewed as a mental activity residing within 
the minds of individual actors while group activities are usually conceptualized as 
an aggregate of individual behavior. At this point, I think it is important to 
compare political psychology with a neighboring interdisciplinary field in order 
to understand the implications of grounding political research in either 
subjectivity or in the collective we have come to refer to as “society.” I would also 
like to explore the implications of introducing some flexibility into what we 
regard as the foundation of political life.  
 
Political Sociology 
 A number of scholars have attempted to delineate the proper boundaries 
for research in political sociology. For Nash and Scott (2001), “the problem of 
boundaries is particularly intense in the case of a subarea like political sociology 
which exists within or between the two disciplines which have formed it: political 
science and sociology” (p.1). Yet they also note that this ambiguity places political 
sociology in a unique position to explore a variety of issues that might have 
otherwise gone unnoticed. Indeed, they suggest that, 
… political sociology, precisely because of its location in the gaps of the conventional 
boundaries drawn between the political, cultural, and economic is, and always has been, 
in a particularly good position to absorb and transmit emerging developments, to 
understand the ambiguity of these – possibly arbitrary – boundaries and to recognize the 
intimacy of the connections between these “spheres” (Nash & Scott, 2001, p.2). 
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Thus, political sociology finds itself in a unique position to explore issues 
emerging at the intersection of politics, culture, economics, and society.  
 Dowse and Hughs (1972) suggest that, “political sociology is a branch of 
sociology that is mainly concerned with the analysis of the interaction between 
politics and society” (p.6). Moreover, they argue that politics should be 
understood as, “the exercise of power in social situations” (p.7). This definition of 
politics, 
encourages an awareness of the potential political relevance of almost all aspects of social 
life not obviously to do with government and the state. Thus all structures and processes 
having an impact, intended or otherwise, on the political system become of interest to the 
student of political life (Dowse & Hughs, 1972, p.6) 
By purposely defining political sociology in broad terms, Dowse and Hughs 
(1972) hope to encourage research in areas that are not always expressly 
identified as “political.” Here politics is not restricted to issues of “government” 
and “state” but instead encompasses all social situations in which power plays a 
decisive role. Indeed, Bottomore (1993) concurs by arguing that, “political 
sociology is concerned with power in its social context” (p.1) while Burnham 
(2003) defines political sociology as, “the study of power and domination in 
social relationships. It could thereby include analysis of the family, the mass 
media, universities, trade unions, and so on” (p.421). Braungart (1981) claims 
that political sociology focuses on, “the dynamic associations among and between 
(1) the social origins of politics, (2) the structure of politics or the political 
process, and (3) the effects of politics on the surrounding society and culture” 
(p.3). Moreover, he notes that political sociology investigates, 
political development, class and status politics, generational and mass politics, political 
socialization, elites, sociopolitical systems, the distribution of power (at the community, 
national, and multinational levels), the nation-state, institutional politics (including 
parties, voting, participation, consensus), and non-institutionalized politics (such as 
mobilization and mobility, revolution, conflict and violence, social movements, and 
terrorism) (Braungart, 1981, p.3) 
From these observations it is clear that political sociology is particularly 
interested in exploring the way power functions in a variety of social contexts. 
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This may involve investigating how class differences influence the relationship 
between different groups or the way modern institutions centralize power in the 
hands of a minority of individuals. In any event, it appears that political sociology 
conceptualizes the social in a significantly different way from political 
psychology. Generally speaking, it does not begin with individuals as information 
processors but with groups related to one another in a particular social context. 
 Scholars also note that political sociology has gone through a number of 
transitions since its emergence in the middle of the twentieth century. For 
Outhwaite and Martell (1998), these changes are largely due to attempts by 
political sociologists to distinguish their own aims from those of political science: 
Where political science tended to concentrate on constitutional issues and on the 
technical aspects of voting and other forms of political behaviour, studied in relative 
isolation from wider social processes, political sociology was concerned in essence with 
the social structural determinants of that behaviour, notably with the effects of class and 
social mobility on voting and other forms of political participation (p.ix). 
For political sociology, political participation is fundamentally grounded in 
economic, social, and historical processes. Indeed, these processes play an 
important role in the political activities of the members of a society. Yet, 
beginning in the 1970’s, the field of political sociology began to expand rapidly as 
it attempted to integrate insights from various political and intellectual 
developments during this tumultuous time period. As Outhwaite and Martell 
(1998) note, 
a thinker such as Michel Foucault suddenly appeared highly relevant to the sociology of 
politics as he did to the sociologies of medicine, deviance, education and so forth. The 
theme of power linked all these areas of inquiry, and political power appeared as just one 
form of this, and in Foucualt’s view one whose importance has been somewhat 
exaggerated. Foucault’s observations on the mobilization of power outside political 
institutions led to broader concern with power in its social context (p.ix). 
Clearly the concept of power occupies a central role in political sociology 
research. Yet it is also true that the meaning of power has depends on the way 
political sociologists view modern institutions as a whole.  
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 Within political sociology, there has been a tendency to view the exercise 
of power either as a means for ensuring society’s smooth functioning or as a way 
to radically alter existing power relationships. Indeed, Bottomore (1993) suggests 
that, 
in the political sociology of the past few decades there has been a general opposition 
between those who are mainly preoccupied with the functioning of existing political 
institutions, conceived as one element in a social system that tends toward a state of 
equilibrium; and those who concentrate their attention mainly upon the forces which 
tend to produce instability and potentialities for change (p.5). 
The first approach, known as functionalism, views modern institutions as a 
means for fulfilling social needs.  Society is viewed as a means for ensuring that 
individuals and groups have access to the resources they need for their continued 
existence. Thus, societies are populated by various institutions and norms that 
enable people to satisfy fundamental needs (Dowse & Hughs, 1972). Within this 
framework, institutions, norms, and rules are connected and provide support for 
the members of a society. Indeed, functionalists believe that modern institutions 
exert a stabilizing influence on the trajectory of modern society. Bottomore 
(1993) notes that functionalism, 
was especially influential in sociology during the 1950’s and conveyed an image of society 
as an integrated system which is maintained in existence by complementary  
relationships between its various elements, or sub-systems, and rests ultimately upon a 
set of common values. It was in terms of this image or model that the notion of ‘stable 
democracies’ was propounded, and the same general model shaped much of the 
discussion of ‘development’ and ‘modernization,’ which were conceived largely as a 
process whereby agrarian societies gradually adapted to the conditions of life, values and 
institutions of the present-day industrial societies (p.6). 
For functionalists, the modernization of societies refers to the movement of these 
societies towards a state of relative stability. Modern institutions such as the 
state, school, and family are seen as integral to establishing this stability. 
Bottomore (1993) notes that, “in this manner, stability was enshrined as the 
highest political value, most fully exemplified in the politics of the democratic 
industrial societies” (p.6). Democratic societies were seen as relying on a shared 
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system of values ensuring their prosperity in the modern age. For Kourvetaris 
and Dobratz (1980),  
the functionalists (consensus model) conceive of society as a social system. To them the 
social system consists of well-integrated interdependent parts of social units (institutions, 
groups, classes, organizations). Both the structure and the function of each social unit 
contribute to the harmony and fulfill the needs of the social system. The structural 
relationship of the parts and processes to the social system in general are viewed by 
functionalists as complex, and system are held together by shared common values and 
goals of its members (consensus) (p.5). 
Functionalists see society as an interconnected whole with various institutions 
linked by a shared system of values and beliefs. This common foundation enables 
individuals and groups to focus on similar goals. In this sense, society becomes a 
means for forwarding the shared aspirations of a group of people. 
 For other theorists, society is not a collection of interrelated institutions 
moving towards stability but a site of internal contradiction perpetuated by a 
variety of antagonisms endemic to modern capitalistic societies. Within political 
sociology, these conflict theories became particularly prominent during the 
political crises of the 1960’s. During this time period, there was, 
a marked renewal of interest in the alternative model, broadly Marxist in inspiration, 
which takes as its starting point the existence of strains, contradictions and conflicts in all 
social systems, and treats the maintenance of order and stability as only a partial and 
temporary (though in historical terms not necessarily short-lived) resolution of the 
various antagonisms (Bottomore, 1993, p.6). 
Unlike the functionalists, conflict theorists emphasized the tensions and 
contradictions inherent to modern capitalistic institutions. Moreover, they focus 
on the historical origins of contemporary inequality. For these theorists, power 
provides a means for maintaining an unequal distribution of resources in the face 
of growing social unrest. Indeed, Kourvetaris and Dobratz (1980) note that, 
the conflict perspective challenges the basic assumptions of the functionalists. Society is 
not a well integrated social system but one based on conflict and dissensus. Society is held 
together not by consensus but by coercion. While the functionalists stress stability and 
shared values as the key functional prerequisites of the system, the conflict theorists 
stress social change and dissensus as the most dynamic aspects of society (p.5). 
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Instead of citizens in a democratic society sharing values that ensure the stability 
of the political process, conflict theorists emphasize the role power plays in 
preventing the members of a society from recognizing contradictions that may 
become the impetus for radical social change. Indeed, it is clear that the meaning 
of democracy is significantly different when the background against which it 
emerges promotes stability or encourages dissent.  
 Finally, an important difference between political psychology and political 
sociology lies in the latter’s recognition of the social foundations of scientific 
inquiry. Political sociologists often focus on the way scientific knowledge is 
embedded in a specific historical, cultural, and economic context. Dowse and 
Hughes (1972) argue that,    
what was ultimately responsible for the present uneasy separation of the social sciences 
was a process which has marked academic development in industrial societies for the last 
century, namely the professionalization of the academic role and the institutionalized 
differentiation of scholarly activities. No longer is it possible for scholars to receive much 
the same classical education. Instead specialization begins early and full professional 
academic license requires many years of apprenticeship within the chosen ‘field.’ This 
tendency has its organizational reflection in the increased size and complexity of the 
institutions of higher learning … [which have become] large, federally organized 
institutions, with considerable budgets, and accounting and managerial problems 
common to extensive business firms (p.1-2). 
As we have seen, political sociologists are interested in the way power functions 
in a variety of social contexts. This makes topics such as the increased pressure 
on social scientists to specialize in exceedingly narrow areas of study of particular 
interest to political sociologists. By focusing on the division of labor that often 
prevents researchers from collaborating with colleagues in neighboring 
departments, political sociologists draw attention to the way modern institutions 
play an important role in reproducing some of the dominant features of modern 
society. In this sense, political sociology exhibits a degree of reflexivity that often 
seems missing from psychological investigations of political phenomena. This 
reflexivity enables researchers to reflect on the interdisciplinary foundations of 
political sociology research:   
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Social scientists easily forget that they and the subjects they teach are every bit part and 
parcel of the society which they study. While we would not necessarily argue that this 
renders them ‘invalid,’ it does have important repercussions on the nature of the 
disciplines concerned. For one thing, the compartmentalization of the social sciences has 
meant the separate self-development of each … this has meant that some areas of the 
social sciences, like political sociology, stand uneasily upon academically separated 
disciplines (Dowse & Hughes, 1972, p.2). 
A sociological analysis of the division of academic departments brings a number 
of issues into focus. By looking at the way power functions in a variety of social 
contexts, political sociology broadens our understanding of political phenomena. 
Furthermore, political sociology encourages us to reflect on the cultural, 
historical, and economic foundations of social science research. 
 My primary aim in juxtaposing political psychology and political sociology 
is to introduce some flexibility into the way social scientists approach political 
research. Contemporary political psychology generally focuses on individual’s 
cognitive processes as explanations of political activity. Political sociology 
typically looks at the role this political activity plays in the distribution of power 
between the groups and institutions that constitute modern society. At this time, 
I would like to explore the implications these two areas have for 
phenomenological investigations of the political. Integrating this with the 
analysis in the first chapter will set the stage for the remainder of the present 
project.  
 
Political Phenomenology 
 As we have seen from our discussion of political psychology and political 
sociology, different insights emerge depending on whether our basic unit of 
analysis is the mental activity of individual minds, or the relationship between 
groups and institutions. The present project is an attempt to navigate between 
the individual and society by focusing on the practices that embody an 
interpretation of political reality. In the first chapter, I argue that the movement 
from epistemology to ontology requires a radically different conception of the 
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nature of social reality. It requires us to, “rethink interaction in such a way that 
we can recognize its place in political life” (White, 1989, p.9). Indeed, the 
movement towards practice enables us to foreground contemporary political 
practices that may have otherwise been reduced to mental activity or to the 
macro-level processes of sociological analysis. With the emergence of the concept 
of practice in social and political theory, new ways of conceptualizing the 
relationship between the individual and society are beginning to come into focus. 
Dallmayr (1984) suggests that, “it is possible to discern a subtle shift of attention 
in contemporary social and political thought: a shift involving a progressive 
deemphasis of epistemology in favor of pragmatic or “practical” preoccupations” 
(p.1). Here we see that even in political research, the movement towards practice 
has encouraged researchers to challenge the epistemological foundations of their 
disciplines. For Dallmayr (1981), 
the literature of social and political science is filled with observations about human action 
or behavior, and also about the salient features of societies, cultures, and political 
communities. But the meanings of these terms are rarely explored and, for the most part, 
remain obscure. Sample questions arising on this level are: What is the significance of 
action or practice and what is its relationship to behavior? To what extent is social or 
political practice an outgrowth of human agency or a human subject, and what is the 
meaning of subjectivity? In what sense can social and political life be said to emerge from 
human interaction or intersubjectivity? Does intersubjectivity denote an aggregation of 
human actors, and how is such aggregation intelligible (p.39)? 
These questions focus attention on the way our understanding is grounded in 
everyday practices. Instead of focusing on subjectivity or society, a practice 
oriented approach attempts to uncover the concrete activities that both 
reproduce dominant features of modern society and provide a background 
against which political subjects emerge.  
 As the present project focuses on practice, it is necessary to reflect on the 
type of phenomenology adequate to this task. In the first chapter, I argued that a 
phenomenology grounded in ontological hermeneutics enables us to investigate 
the background practices that embody an interpretation of social reality. Since 
this project centers on political practice, it is important that we concentrate on 
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previous attempts to explore these issues. This brings us to two of the most 
important intellectual influences on the trajectory of the present project. While 
Michael Oakeshott and Fred Dallmayr’s work covers a number of the issues 
explored in the first part of this project, their insights are particularly relevant to 
the intersection of practice, politics, and phenomenology. 
 Much as the history of psychology records a transition from behavioral to 
cognitive explanations of human activity, researchers and theorists interested in 
political phenomenon have also focused on the relative merits of these 
approaches. For Oakeshott, neither approach appears particularly well suited for 
investigating political activity. Indeed, his work can be understood as an attempt 
to develop an alternative to either behavioral or cognitive explanations of political 
activity. Oakeshott (1962) begins by noting that, “every science, every art, every 
practical activity requiring skill of any sort, indeed every human activity 
whatsoever, involves knowledge. And, universally, this knowledge is of two sorts, 
both of which are always involved in any actual activity” (p.7). He refers to the 
first form as technical knowledge. This sort of knowledge can be,  
formulated into rules which are, or may be, deliberately learned, remembered, and, as we 
say, put into practice; but whether or not it is, or has been, precisely formulated, its chief 
characteristic is that it is susceptible of precise formulation, although special skill and 
insight may be required to give it that formulation (Oakeshott, 1962, p.7). 
For Oakeshott, people possess technical knowledge when they identify a rule 
governing a particular situation and apply that rule when the relevant situation 
arises. The important point about this sort of knowledge is that it can be 
expressly formulated so that once it has been learned, it is only up to the 
individual to execute the rule in an appropriate context. Indeed, whenever people 
use a technique to do any sort of activity – from baking a cake to testing a 
scientific hypothesis – they are necessarily drawing on technical knowledge.  
 On the other hand, people also draw on practical knowledge when they 
participate in a variety of activities. Oakeshott (1962) argues that this form of 
knowledge,  
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exists only in use, is not reflective and (unlike technique) cannot be formulated in rules. 
This does not mean, however, that it is an esoteric sort of knowledge. It means only that 
the method by which it may be shared and becomes common knowledge is not the 
method of formulated doctrine. And if we consider it from this point of view, it would not, 
I think, be misleading to speak of it as traditional knowledge. In every activity this sort of 
knowledge is also involved; the mastery of any skill, the pursuit of any concrete activity is 
impossible without it (p.8). 
The primary difference between technical and practical knowledge is that the 
latter cannot be formulated as an explicit rule. As such, the acquisition of 
practical knowledge does not involve the transfer of specific rules but emerges 
through direct participation in the relevant activities. Furthermore, Oakeshott 
notes that the concept of “tradition” may be helpful in understanding the nature 
of practical knowledge. Thus, although each of us is embedded within a variety of 
traditions (ex. America, psychology, quantitative research, etc.), our knowledge of 
these traditions cannot be expressed in the form of an explicit rule. Indeed, our 
understanding of these traditions and our ability to successfully participate in 
activities associated with these traditions comes from our participating in these 
traditions. Oakeshott (1962) notes that, 
practical knowledge can neither be taught nor learned, but only imparted and acquired. It 
exists only in practice, and the only way to acquire it is by apprenticeship to a master – 
not because the master can teach it (he cannot), but because it can be acquired only by 
continuous contact with one who is perpetually practicing it. In the arts and in natural 
science what normally happens is that the pupil, in being taught and in learning the 
technique from his master, discovers himself to have acquired also another sort of 
knowledge than merely technical knowledge, without it ever having been precisely 
imparted and often without being able to say precisely what it is … a scientist acquires 
(among other things) the sort of judgment which tells him when his technique is leading 
him astray and the connoisseurship which enables him to distinguish the profitable from 
the unprofitable directions to explore (p.11). 
For example, let us take the indoctrination of new scholars into an area of 
scientific inquiry. While emerging researchers are usually required to take 
courses designed to teach them which research methods are applicable in 
particular situations, they are also required to conduct their own research under 
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the direction of a scholar in their area of study. In doing so, they not only acquire 
technical knowledge such as “do X in circumstance Y”, they also learn a host of 
skills that cannot be expressed in terms of specific rules or procedures. This 
practical knowledge comes from participating in a research tradition that cannot 
be made fully explicit in terms of discrete rules or procedures. Nonetheless, new 
scholars eventually become senior scholars as a tradition continues without every 
activity being guided by a scientific rule book. 
 Although practical knowledge cannot be given precise formulation in 
terms or discrete rules or procedures, it is possible to recognize this sort of 
knowledge by paying attention to the practices that embody an understanding of 
these activities. Indeed, practical knowledge’s, “normal expression is in a 
customary or traditional way of doing things, or, simply, in practice. And this 
gives it the appearance of imprecision and consequently of uncertainty, of being a 
matter of opinion, of probability rather than truth” (Oakeshott, 1962, p.10; italics 
mine). For Oakeshott, the perceived imprecision or uncertainty of practical 
knowledge should not be used as an argument against its status as a form of 
knowledge. Rather, the desire to make something fully explicit in terms of rules 
or procedures signifies an attempt to view all legitimate knowledge as ultimately 
synonymous with technical knowledge. In other words all knowledge comes to be 
judged by the extent to which it can be specified in discrete rules and procedures 
– knowledge becomes technical knowledge.  
Oakeshott (1962) explores the way technical knowledge has come to 
occupy a dominant position, specifically in political science, but also more 
generally in the natural and social sciences. Indeed, his critique of rationalism 
centers around the privileging of technical over practical reasoning: 
Rationalism is the assertion that what I have called practical knowledge is not knowledge 
at all, the assertion that, properly speaking, there is no knowledge which is not technical 
knowledge. The Rationalist holds that the only element of knowledge involved in any 
human activity is technical knowledge, and that what I have called practical knowledge is 
really only a sort of nescience which would be negligible if it were not positively 
mischievous. The sovereignty of ‘reason,’ for the Rationalist, means the sovereignty of 
technique (Oakeshott, 1962, p.11). 
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The substitution of technical knowledge for knowledge in general is, in 
Oakeshott’s estimation, a result of the influence of “rationalist” doctrines on 
contemporary scientific research. Indeed, research in political science, sociology, 
and psychology is often evaluated by assessing the degree to which the research 
recognizes the “sovereignty of technique.” In this case, technical knowledge, “has 
the aspect of knowledge that can be contained wholly between the two covers of a 
book, whose application is, as nearly as possible, purely mechanical, and which 
does not assume a knowledge not itself provided in the technique” (p.11-12).  
 While descriptions of the way individuals interpret social reality are often 
formulated in terms of the demands of technical knowledge, the latter also exerts 
a significant influence on the way scientific research is actually conducted. Thus, 
researchers not only describe social knowledge in terms or rules and procedures, 
they also follow explicit rules and procedures when conducting their own 
research. For Oakeshott (1962),  
what is required is a ‘sure plan,’ a new ‘way’ of understanding, an ‘art’ or ‘method’ of 
inquiry, an ‘instrument which (like the mechanical aids men use to increase the 
effectiveness of their natural strength) shall supplement the weakness of the natural 
reason: in short, what is required is a formulated technique of inquiry (p.14)   
Oakeshott singles out the philosophers Bacon and Descartes as two of the most 
vocal advocates of the “sovereignty of technique.” Indeed, he suggests that 
Descartes’ intellectual journey is grounded in the belief that, “certain knowledge 
can spring up only in an emptied mind; the technique of research begins with an 
intellectual purge” (Oakeshott, 1962, p.16). 
 Thus, it is not only the social actor who possesses a knowledge that can be 
formulated in rules and procedures but researchers must also follow specific 
procedures if they are ever to be able to arrive at certain knowledge. For 
Oakeshott, this represents the triumph of technical knowledge over all other 
forms of knowledge. Indeed, he notes that,  
the history of Rationalism is not only the history of the gradual emergence and definition 
of this new intellectual character; it is, also, the history of the invasion of every 
department of intellectual activity by the doctrine of the sovereignty of technique 
(Oakeshott, 1962, p.17). 
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In both the conduct of research and the knowledge that is sought, technical 
knowledge has come to be understood as the only form of knowledge worthy of 
being called scientific. Moreover, knowledge that cannot be formulated in terms 
of specific rules or scientific practices that cannot be instantiated in terms of 
discrete procedures are ultimately viewed as obstacles to scientific progress. For 
Oakeshott, this is an error that is in drastic need of correction. He notes that, 
the precise formulation of rules of inquiry endangers the success of the inquiry by 
exaggerating the importance of method … the significance of Rationalism is not its 
recognition of technical knowledge, but its failure to recognize any other: its philosophical 
error lies in the certainty it attributes to technique and in its doctrine of the sovereignty of 
technique; its practical error lies in its belief that nothing but benefit can come from 
making conduct self-conscious (Oakeshott, 1962, p.20). 
By paying excessive attention to methodological issues, the social sciences have 
failed to recognize the extent to which our knowledge is embedded within 
everyday practices. Our inability to formulate these practices in terms or rules or 
procedures is an indication of the nature of this knowledge and the dominance 
technical knowledge exercises both in the natural and social sciences. 
 Oakeshott believes that this situation is particularly pronounced in the 
realm of politics where rationalism maintains a firm grip on the boundaries of 
legitimate scientific research: 
That all contemporary politics are deeply infected with Rationalism will be denied only by 
those who choose to give the infection another name. Not only are our political vices 
rationalistic, but so also are our political virtues. Our projects are, in the main, rationalist 
in purpose and character; but what is more significant, our whole attitude of mind in 
politics is similarly determined (Oakeshott, 1962, p.21). 
Indeed, it is particularly within the realm of “political education,” that Oakeshott 
recognizes an excessive focus on technical knowledge and a failure to grasp the 
more practical aspects of human understanding. His discussion of political 
education is particularly illuminating as it not only challenges our understanding 
of the development of political ideas, but it also offers a novel role for these ideas 
in political activity. For the purposes of exploring political education, Oakeshott 
(1962) sees politics as, 
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the activity of attending to the general arrangements of a set of people whom chance or 
choice have brought together. In this sense, families, clubs, and learned societies have 
their own politics … as we have come to understand it, the activity is one in which every 
member of the group who is neither a child nor a lunatic has some part and some 
responsibility. With us it is, at one level or another, a universal activity (p.112) 
This should be viewed less as a strict definition of politics and more as an 
invitation to focus on the “general arrangements” or practices that embody an 
interpretation of political reality. In changing our focus, we shift from the minds 
of individual actors and technical knowledge to the political activities and 
practical understanding permeating the political. 
 Oakeshott focuses on the concept of “political ideology” as a means for 
exploring the role technical knowledge plays in contemporary political research. 
Indeed, it is here that he believes the emphasis on abstract principles and discrete 
procedures is particularly prominent. For Oakeshott (1962), a political ideology, 
purports to be an abstract principle, or set of related abstract principles, which has been 
independently premeditated. It supplies in advance of the activity of attending to the 
arrangements of a society a formulated end to be pursued, and in so doing it provides a 
means of distinguishing between those desires which ought to be encouraged and those 
which ought to be suppressed or redirected (p.116). 
Within political research, the concept of ideology is often used to explain why 
individuals or groups engage in certain political activities or behaviors. The 
strength of the concept of ideology supposedly lay in its ability to direct the 
concrete behaviors of political actors. In other words, one behaves in a particular 
way because one posses a particular political ideology. Variations in political 
behavior can be attributed to divergent political ideologies which may postulate 
different concrete political goals. Oakeshott (1962) argues that the concept of 
ideology acquires its explanatory force by asserting that political activity is 
preceded by, 
knowledge of the chosen political ideology – a knowledge of the ends to be pursued, a 
knowledge of what we want to do … the common characteristic of all the kinds of 
knowledge required is that they maybe, and should be, gathered in advance of the activity 
of attending to the arrangements of a society… It is supposed that a political ideology is 
the product of intellectual premeditation and that, because it is a body of principles not 
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itself in debt to the activity of attending to the arrangements of society, it is able to 
determine and to guide the direction of that activity. (p.117-118) 
As we have seen in our discussion of political psychology, this is precisely the role 
that political attitudes and beliefs arer supposed to play in explaining political 
activity. In this case, political ideology was viewed as a cognitive bias coloring the 
way an individual perceives political reality. Thus, to say that someone possesses 
a political ideology is to say that mental representations and cognitive processes 
guide the way political actors interpret various aspects of that reality.  
 Yet Oakeshott wants to point out that this way of viewing political activity 
may be motivated by rationalism’s failure to recognize the role practical 
knowledge plays in our everyday political interactions:  
So far from a political ideology being the quasi-divine parent of political activity, it turns 
out to be its earthly stepchild. Instead of an independently premeditated scheme of ends 
to be pursued, it is a system of ideas abstracted from the manner in which people have 
been accustomed to go about the business of attending to the arrangements of their 
societies. The pedigree of every political ideology shows it to be the creature, not of 
premeditation in advance of political activity, but of meditation upon a manner of 
politics. In short, political activity comes first and a political ideology follows after … 
(p.119) 
For Oakeshott, political ideologies are abstractions that are ultimately derived 
from our everyday political practices. Yet contemporary science has seen fit to 
privilege the abstraction over the concrete political engagements. Clearly, 
Oakeshott’s critique of the role rationalism plays in politics is similar to 
Heidegger’s notion of being-in-the-world. In both cases, we are primordially 
engaged in the activities of a community and it is only in a derivative fashion that 
something like a solitary political subject emerges. Indeed, Oakeshott (1962) 
emphasizes this point by exploring the relationship between scientific practices 
and research. 
The truth is that only a man who is already a scientist can formulate a scientific 
hypothesis; that is, an hypothesis is not an independent invention capable of guiding 
scientific inquiry, but a dependent supposition which arise as an abstraction from within 
already existing scientific activity (p.119) 
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Scientific research is always embedded within a collection of practices that enable 
researchers to formulate a scientific hypothesis. In this case, it is not the 
hypothesis that guides scientific research but the concrete practices of which the 
hypothesis is an abstraction. The hypothesis does not guide the research but 
instead embodies in derivative form the practices that are scientific research. 
Moreover, Oakeshott (1962) suggests that,  
even when the specific hypothesis has in this manner been formulated, it is inoperative as 
a guide to research without constant reference to the traditions of scientific inquiry from 
which it was abstracted. The concrete situation does not appear until the specific 
hypothesis, which is the occasion of empiricism being set to work, is recognized as itself 
the creature of knowing how to conduct a scientific inquiry (p.119) 
In this sense, a hypothesis only makes sense against a background of scientific 
research practices and these research practices are as much a part of science as 
the explicit formulation of rules and procedures.  
 Oakeshott’s focus on scientific practice is meant to demonstrate the error 
of placing a theoretical abstraction ahead of concrete scientific activities. 
Although these practices cannot be translated into technical knowledge, they play 
a fundamental role in the conduct of scientific research. He suggests that the 
situation is much the same for political ideology. Scientific hypotheses and 
political ideology are derived from concrete scientific and political practice. 
Oakeshott (1962) argues that political ideology, 
must be understood, not as an independently premeditated beginning for political 
activity, but as knowledge (abstract and generalized) of a concrete manner of attending to 
the arrangements of a society. The catechism which sets out the purposes to be pursued 
merely abridges a concrete manner of behavior in which those purposes are already 
hidden. It does not exist in advance of political activity, and by itself it is always an 
insufficient guide. Political enterprises, the ends to be pursued, the arrangements to be 
established (all the normal ingredients of political ideology), cannot be premeditated in 
advance of a manner of attending to the arrangements of a society; what we do, and more 
over what we want to do, is the creature of how we are accustomed to conduct our affairs 
…  (p.120).  
Oakeshott (1962) concludes by suggesting that, “what has to be learned is not an 
abstract idea, or a set of tricks, not even a ritual, but a concrete, coherent manner 
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of living in all its intricateness” (p.129). I believe this view is congruent with the 
transition from epistemological to ontological hermeneutics outlined in the first 
chapter. Instead of focusing on the lifeworld of an individual subject or the power 
dynamics within modern society, the present project focuses on the practices that 
embody an interpretation of political reality.  
 While Oakeshott has contributed much to our understanding of the 
relationship between politics and practice, it is important for the present project 
to integrate his insights into a phenomenological orientation.  For Dallmayr 
(1984), by focusing on concrete political practices and the “general arrangement” 
of a group of people, Oakeshott, “sought to preserve the wholeness of practical 
experience: the synthesis of thought and reality, of agency and world” (p.62). 
Indeed, Dallymayr’s project can be viewed as an attempt to integrate this insight 
into Heidegger’s interest in the ontological foundations of human understanding. 
As White (1989) notes, 
to found analysis on “subjectivity” of any sort means that one has already presupposed 
the validity of that binary distinction, so basic to Western thought, between subject and 
object. And that separation itself already orients philosophical reflection on politics in 
precisely those directions Dallmayr wanted to avoid (p.5). 
 Dallmayr’s work emerges at the crossroads of politics, practice and 
phenomenology. One of his most systematic attempts to explore the relationship 
between these three issues can be found in the Twilight of Subjectivity (1981). 
Dallmayr begins by noting that, 
the theoretical perspective animating this volume might be labeled critical post-
phenomenology; but it might also (and perhaps better) be described as a practical 
ontology – provided ontology is not confused with an ontic objectivism and the term 
practical is not narrowly or exclusively identified with subjective-intentional activity 
(Dallmayr, 1981, p.5). 
As we have already seen, Heidegger’s critique of transcendental phenomenology 
centers on the role accorded to subjectivity in Western thought. In Heidegger’s 
view, Dasein is fundamentally being-in-the-world such that singling out 
subjectivity already grants too much to the epistemological project. If 
phenomenology is to recognize Dasein’s indissoluble unity, it is necessary for it to 
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become ontological. Dallmayr calls his investigation a practical ontology in order 
to align his interest in political practice with Heidegger’s ontological 
investigation. Morover, Dallmayr suggests that his project also shares a number 
of similarities with investigations grounded in French phenomenology, the work 
of Merleau-Ponty and Foucault being notable examples.  
 In a fashion similar to Heidegger and Oakeshott, Dallmayr argues that 
‘practice’ should not be viewed simply as a theoretical abstraction that is applied 
in a concrete situation. He notes that a practice, “is not the application of a prior 
theoretical blueprint, nor does it furnish (in a narrowly inductive vein) a reservoir 
of cognitive lessons” (Dallmayr, 1984, p.4). Indeed, he argues that Heidegger’s 
movement away from epistemology and toward ontology throws the traditional 
distinction between theory and practice into disarray. In his view, practice should 
not be seen as the application of an idea residing within the mind but as an 
indication of our immersion in a world of practical affairs. Indeed, to formulate it 
in this way is perhaps not strong enough. It is not that a subject is immersed in a 
world that opens up to surround her but that a distinction between subject and 
object is a derivative understanding of our fundamental being-in-the-world. 
Dallmayr’s point is that person and world are not two entities but an indissoluble 
unity such that an emphasis on subjectivity already presumes the legitimacy of 
the subject/object dichotomy.  
 In the first chapter, we discussed the difference between Husserl’s focus 
on the lifeworld and Heidegger’s notion of being-in-the-world. While the former 
takes subjectivity as its presupposition, the latter calls into question the 
legitimacy of the distinction between subject and object or person and world. 
Dallmayr explores this issue by suggesting that we recognize variations in the way 
theorists have used the lifeworld for their own investigations. He argues that 
these variations typically fall somewhere between “weak” and “strong” 
conceptions of the lifeworld:  
In the weak conception, the life-world is basically viewed as a preamble to reason or 
rational reflection, as a non- or pre-rational antechamber to cognition – but an 
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antechamber that pliantly submits to thought (as the result of an inherent affinity 
between prereason and reason) (Dallmayr, 1989, p.26). 
Dallmayr identifies Husserl as the primary example of a theorist who relies on a 
weak conception of the lifeworld. Within his approach, the basic unit of analysis 
remains the individual ego. Although Husserl recognizes that all scientific 
understanding is fundamentally grounded in this lifeworld, it is still through the 
process of constitution that a world emerges for an individual subject. As we have 
already noted, Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology relies on examples from 
visual perception to demonstrate how objects of consciousness come into view. 
Indeed, Dallmayr (1989) notes that, 
the focus on things or objects is justified by Husserl by the (normal) primacy of visual 
perception in human experience. More importantly, the focus in his view is able to 
surmount or undercut cultural or idiosyncratic variability and to lay bare generic or 
universal structures of the life-world (p.31). 
By focusing on things in the world as objects of consciousness, Husserl endeavors 
to identify invariant features of the lifeworld so that its essential structure can 
come into view. Because Husserl believes that all scientific knowledge is 
ultimately grounded in the lifeworld, discerning a universal structure would 
enable him to provide a secure foundation for all forms of scientific 
understanding. 
For Dallamyr (1989), this “weak” version of the lifeworld should be 
juxtaposed with a “strong” version of the lifeworld: 
In the strong version, by contrast, the life-world functions no longer as a mere precursor 
of reason or as its relatively immature or embryonic modality, but rather emerges as an 
integral dimension of thought, a dimension impinging powerfully on the status of rational 
or cognitive claims (not by nullifying them, but by changing their sense) (p.26). 
The movement from epistemology to ontology that I outlined in the first chapter 
parallels Dallmayr’s observation that, since Heidegger, theorists have usually 
found themselves oscillating somewhere between a version of the lifeworld 
grounded in human subjectivity and an understanding of the lifeworld grounded 
in what has been referred to as practice. This “strong” version of the lifeworld, 
which I take to be synonymous with Heidegger’s being-in-the-world, challenges 
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the claim that understanding should be viewed within a strictly egological 
framework. Indeed, Dallmayr (1989) notes that, 
presenting human Dasein as a “being-in-the-world” (or a being in integral union with the 
world), Being and Time from the outset countered the phenomenological construal of the 
life-world as an incipient subject-object correlation; also, by concentrating on everyday 
routine activities, the study … inaugurated a practical or “pragmatic” shift from cognitive 
or epistemological modes of analysis (p.48).  
All of this calls into question the role of subjectivity in contemporary political 
activity. We need not begin with a solitary individual who, out of a desire to 
achieve his or her own goals, collaborates with other individuals so that a group 
begins to exert political pressure. Instead, we can focus on the concrete political 
practices that embody our primordial immersion within a tradition. For 
Dallmayr, political research should investigate practices that cannot be reduced 
to the functioning of individual minds of the power dynamics regulating the 
relationships between groups and institutions.  
 Of course, this has a number of implications for the way we view the 
citizen in a democratic society. Should we view democracy as an idea (even an 
ideology) that guides the formation of democratic societies? If so, then it seems as 
if society is conceptualized as an aggregate of individuals who orient themselves 
according to the idea of a democracy. On the other hand, we can view democracy 
not as an idea or ideology but instead as an abstraction derived from our 
everyday political practices. If we link this with the suggestion that subjectivity 
emerges against the background of a community, the political individual can be 
seen as the outcome of a political process rather than its origin. At the same time, 
this becomes problematic in so far as democratic practices such as voting are 
grounded in the aggregation of individual votes. Perhaps this means that our 
understanding of democracy, grounded in our everyday political activities, 
requires substantial revision.  In any event, the relationship between the 
individual and political practices seems to be more problematic than initially 
imagined.   
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 All of this leads me to the conclusion that phenomenologists should be 
weary of following the lead of either political psychology or political sociology. In 
both cases, the political is usually viewed as an additional domain for 
consolidating the explanatory power of the more fundamental disciplines. In 
other words, researchers ask whether psychological or sociological knowledge 
remains consistent within political contexts. If so, then each discipline’s ability to 
make general statements about the basic process underlying psychological or 
societal functioning has been enhanced. I think it is important for 
phenomenology to avoid traversing the same path. It would be a mistake for 
phenomenology to treat politics as a domain where phenomenological insights 
(and more importantly method) can simply be applied. Clearly, a phenomenology 
that focuses on subjectivity and consciousness would approach the political in a 
very different way from a practical/ontological orientation that calls into question 
the subject/object dichotomy.  
In the next section, I would like to outline the specific course taken in the 
present project. I intended to show that the move from epistemology to ontology 
requires a radical shift in the way we understand the role of method in the social 
sciences.  
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CHAPTER III 
METHODS 
 In the first chapter, I stressed that epistemological approaches to human 
experience and behavior fail to recognize their ontological commitment to an 
individual knower interpreting social reality in one fashion or another. The 
movement towards practice was meant as a means for applying Heidegger’s 
insights into the nature of being-in-the-world, an insight that has important 
implications for epistemological approaches to human understanding. One of the 
most important implications of this transition revolves around the role of method 
in the human sciences. If we no longer view interpretation as an affair of 
consciousness, what can we make of the methodological procedures that aim to 
eliminate the “prejudices” of individual knowers? Moreover, what role does 
understanding play in the human sciences? So important was Heidegger’s insight 
into the relationship between understanding and the human sciences that one of 
his most influential students, Hans-Georg Gadamer, devoted a dense volume to 
the issue of Truth and Method (1989). Indeed, given the nature of Heidegger’s 
transition from epistemology to ontology, is it even feasible to speak of a method 
in terms of the present project?  
 The difficulty in identifying discrete procedures for the present study is 
tied to the way method is generally understood in the social sciences. More often 
than not, a method enables researchers to distance themselves from the 
phenomenon under investigation. This seeks to ensure that subjective biases do 
not interfere with a researcher’s ability to discover objectively valid knowledge. In 
this sense, the use of a scientific method provides researchers with a common 
language for adjudicating between competing knowledge claims. Indeed, when 
scientific research is disputed, it is often the case that this dispute centers on 
issues of method. 
 As we will recall from our discussion of paradigms, Kuhn (1970) argued 
that scientific practitioners are not necessarily united by an explicit rule that 
governs the way they conduct research but instead relate to one another through 
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a set of scientific practices that embody an understanding of the phenomenon of 
interest. For the present analysis, this means that understanding should not be 
viewed as a collection of mental representations that govern the way an 
individual interprets a particular situation but as a collection of activities that 
embody an interpretation of that reality. In other words, the methodological 
prescription that procedures should remove subjective biases already represents 
a specific interpretation of human knowledge and existence. In fact, the 
methodological priority of “alienated distanciation” (Ricoeur, 1991) embodies a 
social practice – one that already assumes an epistemological stance regarding 
the nature of human understanding. As Gadamer (1989) observes, 
the recognition that all understanding inevitably involves some prejudice gives the 
hermeneutical problem its real thrust. In light of this insight it appears that historicism, 
despite its critique of rationalism and of natural law philosophy, is based on the modern 
Enlightenment and unwittingly shares its prejudices. And there is one prejudice of the 
Enlightenment that defines its essence: the fundamental prejudice of the Enlightenment 
is the prejudice against prejudice itself, which denies tradition its power (Gadamer, 1989, 
p.270).  
It is not the removal of prejudice that grants us a privileged view of reality. 
Indeed, it is only through our participation in shared practices that something 
like understanding can emerge in the first place. 
 The challenge to the present study is to make the various aspects of this 
research as explicit as possible without generating a set of procedures that aspire 
to become a prescription for conducting research. Thus, it is necessary to, “steer 
between the free spontaneity of a no-method approach and the rigid structures of 
an all-method approach” (Kvale, 1996, p.13). Moreover, the way we understand 
the concept of method should change to fit the nature of the present analysis. As 
many researchers have noted, one way of generating a novel insight within a 
traditional domain is to alter the metaphor structuring our understanding of a 
particular phenomenon (Kuhn, 1979; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Pepper, 1970, 
Pollio, Smith & Pollio, 1990). At this juncture, I would like to explore the 
implications of altering the metaphor that typically guides empirical research. 
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 For Kvale (1996), altering the metaphor that dominates empirical research 
changes the way we approach the qualitative research interview. Within 
traditional approaches to research, the interviewer is often viewed as a miner. 
When this is the case, 
knowledge is understood as buried metal and the interviewer is a miner who unearths the 
valuable metal. Some miners seek objective facts to be quantified, others seek nuggets of 
essential meaning. In both conceptions the knowledge is waiting in the subjects’ interior 
to be uncovered, uncontaminated by the miner. The interviewer digs nuggets of data or 
meanings out of a subject’s pure experiences, unpolluted by any leading questions … The 
knowledge nuggets remain constant through the transformations of appearances on the 
conveyor belt from the oral stage to the written storage. By analysis, the objective facts 
and the essential meanings are drawn out by various techniques and molded into their 
definitive form. Finally the value of the end product, its degree of purity, is determined by 
correlating it with an objective, external, real world or to a realm of subjective, inner, 
authentic experiences (Kvale, 1996, p. 3-4; italics mine). 
When the researcher is viewed in this way, method becomes a means for 
preventing subjective biases from distorting an accurate perception of reality. 
Indeed, this view of the role of the researcher is grounded in epistemology in so 
far as the knower is placed in a specific relationship with the phenomenon under 
investigation. Yet this is not the only way to approach scientific research. As a 
number of theorists have noted (Gadamer, 1989; Gergen, 1999; Hazelrigg, 1989; 
Heidegger, 1962; Kvale, 1996; Smith & Deemer, 2000), one can also view 
research in a way that does not see the individual’s horizon as strictly detrimental 
to developing a rigorous understanding of a particular phenomenon. Instead, the 
researcher may play an integral role in the research as a traveler navigating new 
vistas of experience. As Kvale (1996) notes, 
the interviewer-traveler wanders through the landscape and enters into conversation with 
the people encountered. The traveler explores the main domains of the country, as 
unknown territory or with maps, roaming freely around the territory. The traveler may 
also deliberately seek specific sites or topics by following a method, with the original 
Greek meaning of “a route that leads to the goal.” (p.4) 
In this case, method is not a means for distancing the investigator from a 
particular phenomenon but instead enables the researcher to explore a rich range 
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of important issues. Through this process, the researcher uncovers aspects of 
human understanding that may have been overlooked if he or she was confined 
to an exceedingly rigid methodological framework. In the present study, 
what the traveler reporter hears and sees is described qualitatively and is reconstructed as 
stories to be told to the people of the interviewer’s own country, and possibly also to those 
with whom the interviewer wandered. The potentialities of meanings in the original 
stories are differentiated and unfolded through the traveler’s interpretations; the tales are 
remolded into new narratives, which are convincing in their aesthetic form and are 
validated through their impact upon the listeners (Kvale, 1996, p.4). 
For the present project, I will draw on some of the developments in hermeneutics 
and phenomenology that I outlined in the first chapter in order to explore the 
practices that embody an interpretation of the political reality 
A number of texts focus on the proper procedures for conducting 
phenomenological research (Aanstoos, 1984; Churchill & Wertz, 2001; Colaizzi, 
1978; Giorgi, 1970, 1975, 1985; Giorgi, Fischer & Murray, 1975; Kvale, 1983, 1996; 
Moustakas, 1994; Polkinghorne, 1989; Pollio, Graves & Arfken, 2006; Pollio, 
Henley & Thompson, 1997; Pollio & Ursiak, 2006; Thomas & Pollio, 2001; von 
Eckartsberg, 1986; Wertz, 1984, 2005). The present project is an attempt to 
integrate insights from these sources while also remaining committed to a focus 
on the practices that embody an interpretation of political reality. As such, the 
procedures employed in the present project are somewhat different from 
traditional phenomenological approaches that attempt to derive an essential 
structure from participant’s reports of a particular experience. Congruent with 
the theoretical orientation outlined in the first chapter, this project attempts to 
move away from a focus on consciousness (epistemology) and towards an 
understanding of concrete political practice (ontology). In the remainder of this 
chapter, I describe and justify the procedures I use in the present study. The 
overall structure of this project corresponds to Kvale’s (1996) seven stages of a 
qualitative research interview: (1) thematizing (2) designing (3) interviewing (4) 
transcribing (5) analyzing (6) verifying and (7) reporting. We will take each one 
of these stages in turn. 
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Thematizing 
In this stage, the researcher clarifies the content and the purpose of the 
research study (Kvale, 1996). The point is to ensure that the research question 
and theoretical orientation of the study are as explicit as possible. The present 
study focuses on political practices. Within this framework, the term “practice” is 
used to denote the intersection between individual consciousness and everyday 
practical involvement (being-in-the-world) in social, historical, and cultural 
activities. These activities need not be restricted to observable behavior – instead, 
the focus on practice is intended to prevent a hasty reduction to situational or 
dispositional factors, what some have termed the struggle between “system and 
lifeworld” (Habermas, 1987) or “agency and structure” (Giddens, 1984). The 
analysis presented earlier was intended to clarify the theoretical orientation of 
the entire project. Drawing on insights from hermeneutic phenomenology, the 
present study focuses on the concrete political practices that people discuss when 
asked to reflect on salient political situations. Instead of viewing interpretations 
of political reality as residing within the minds of individuals, I will look at the 
way these practices embody an interpretation of the political. In this sense, the 
movement is away from individual consciousness and epistemology and towards 
practices and ontology. The primary research question is: When people are asked 
to discuss concrete political situations, what practices/activities are particularly 
salient?    
 
Designing 
 For the present study, I decided that an unstructured phenomenological 
interview would be the best way to explore salient political practices. These 
interviews encourage participants to choose situations that they believe are 
particularly relevant (Fontana & Frey, 2000). I will have much more to say about 
specific aspects of the interview in a moment. 
 I selected research participants based on two criteria. To begin with, 
participants needed to have an interest in discussing salient political situations. 
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Moreover, participants need to be able to provide a thorough description of their 
experiences (Creswell, 1998; Polkinghorne, 1989; Pollio, Graves & Arfken, 2006; 
Pollio, Henley & Thompson, 1997). Based on these criteria, I selected a total of 12 
participants to interview for the present study. The number of participants 
reflects the point at which participants description of salient political situations 
reached a point of saturation and minimal novel practices were introduced in the 
interviews (Guest, Bunce & Johnson, 2006; Kvale, 1996; Pollio, Henley & 
Thompson, 1997). Moreover, the number of research participants is congruent 
with Kvale’s (1996) claim that, “in current interview studies, the number of 
interviews tend to be around 15 +/- 10. This number may be due to a 
combination of the time and resources available for the investigation and of the 
law of diminishing returns” (p.102).  
Participants ranged in age from 20 to 35. All participants had at least some 
college education. Participants came from various occupations including 
undergraduate and graduate students, college professor, bartender, and 
pharmaceutical salesperson. All 12 participants reside in the United States with 9 
living in the southeast, 2 in the north, and 1 in the south.  
 
Interviewing 
As already noted, the format of the interview was unstructured so that 
participants were given maximum flexibility to describe in as much detail as 
possible salient political situations. In an unstructured interview, “a first, topic-
introducing question is asked and the remainder of the interview proceeds as a 
follow-up and expansion on the interviewee’s answer to the first questions” 
(Kvale, 1996, p.127). All participants were given the same initial research 
question: Can you tell me about some times when politics stood-out to you? The 
question was designed to enable participants to describe specific situations where 
politics were figural. Once an experience had been fully explored, I asked 
participants to describe any additional situations where politics stood-out to 
them.   
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While the initial research questioned encouraged participants to describe 
in detail salient political situations, I formulated follow-up questions during the 
interview that were designed to encourage participants to continue to talk about 
these experiences. These follow-up questions typically took one of three forms: 
(1) concretizing (2) elaborating or (3) interpreting. The following passage is an 
example of a concretizing follow-up question: 
P: It wasn’t even really--it wasn’t elections; I’m thinking I guess how like the school 
systems works, like I was trying to graduate high school early and I had to go 
through certain people that knew certain other people; so I guess more the 
politics of being connected to the right people. 
I: Can you think about a time when that happened? 
P: Oh it was just--I was trying to go--I had to get it approved by the County Board; 
so I had to … 
In this case, the follow up question encouraged the participant to focus on a 
concrete situation when her sense of having to be “connected to the right people” 
was salient. These questions were designed to move participants from the 
abstract to the concrete, though insights gleaned from abstract reflection were 
not excluded from the analysis. Another type of follow-up question encouraged 
participants to go into greater detail regarding a particular aspect of their 
experience: 
P: … and so in doing that paper, I like--I ended up writing like a really long 
autobiographical section and I think after finishing that though, it kind of--it gave 
me a sense of more coherence to my political views. 
I: Can you say a little bit more about that? 
P: Yeah; what that sense of coherence is about?  
I: Uh-hm. 
P: It just--it--it was--it seemed like--like it made sense that I believed what I 
believed in terms of my life experiences. Whereas before … 
Here the follow-up question “Can you say a little bit more about that?” 
encourages the participant to expand on a particularly salient experience. Finally, 
the last type of follow-up question provides an interpretation of a participant’s 
experience which participants were free to either accept or refute. In the 
following example, the participant agrees with my interpretation: 
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P: Well I mean it’s--it’s a fine line because I mean you draft your strategy and you’re 
painting a picture. When you go through the explanation of what’s going on with 
the customer you emphasize things more and de-emphasize other things, because 
you’re trying to create a panic or a dire situation. You want them to go you know 
what; if we don’t do this which is the decision we want then we’re going to lose 
this account or we’re going to lose this negotiation. And at sales we ultimately 
can't do anything unless the Business Group signs off on it, so we have to paint 
that--paint that picture. 
I: I see; so you’re saying that you kind of--you all draft a sort of strategy 
and that you emphasize certain things and de-emphasize others kind 
of trying to get people to come to the conclusions that you already…? 
P: Exactly, yeah. 
In another case, the participant modified and expanded on my interpretation of 
their experience: 
P: … and this whole fusion of like God, soldier, and President; you see bumper 
stickers that say support--I support our President and our troops, and it’s almost 
like it’s unpatriotic to criticize the President--no, it’s un--it’s almost like spitting 
in the face of soldiers if you have a problem with Bush right now. That’s almost 
how I feel like public debate has been cast. 
I: Uh-hm; that’s interesting. So for you these things get linked up 
together like God, soldiers, country, and you know politics and they 
all get kind of confused as one another so they inhibit you from 
perhaps criticizing things that you’d like to criticize? 
P: I don’t know if they inhibited me from criticizing them. I just know I have like a 
visceral emotional reaction to what I feel like is a cluster of values that--that the 
opposing or that--that many people here have that I don’t like at all that feel are 
negative and harmful.  
In this case, the participant indicated that my interpretation was not entirely 
accurate. Moreover, he provides his own interpretation in order to clarify the 
point he was trying to convey. As Kvale (1996) has notes, these interactions 
suggest that, 
the research interview is an interpersonal situation, a conversation between two partners 
about a theme of mutual interest. It is a specific form of human interaction in which 
knowledge evolves through a dialogue. The interaction is neither as anonymous and 
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neutral as when a subject responds to a survey questionnaire, nor as personal and 
emotional as a therapeutic interview (p.125) 
Within the present study, the interview involves two people interested in 
exploring salient political situations. 
 
Transcribing 
 Interviews were recorded and transcribed to facilitate a subsequent 
analysis of the data. For Kvale (1996), “transcribing the interviews from an oral to 
a written mode structures the interview conversations in a form amenable for 
closer analysis. Structuring the material into texts facilitates an overview and is in 
itself a beginning analysis” (p.168-169). In this case, the transcripts enable me to 
make comparisons in terms of content and form within as well as between 
specific interviews. 
 All interviews were transcribed verbatim, leaving in place such things as 
grammatical errors and including instances when those involved in the interview 
sighed, laughed, or produced any sounds relevant to the interview. This form of 
transcription was a compromise between approaches that focus on the discursive 
and conversational aspects of an interview (Atkinson & Heritage, 1984; Potter, 
1996; Potter & Wetherell, 1987) and a desire to transcribe interviews into a 
smooth prose that focuses the reader’s attention on content and form rather than 
grammatical errors. It is especially important to note that the transcription of a 
research interview already represents an interpretation of what the researcher 
views as relevant for a particular investigation.  Indeed, Kvale (1996) suggests 
that, “transcriptions are not copies or representations of some original reality, 
they are interpretive constructions that are useful tools for given purposes” 
(p.165). For the present project, the purpose of the interview is to uncover those 
practices that embody an interpretation of political reality.  
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Analyzing 
 With the interviews transformed into text, it was possible for me to begin 
the analysis. It is important to note that a qualitative approach to data analysis is 
often very different from the statistical analyses used in quantitative research. 
Indeed, the circular nature of a qualitative analysis is perhaps one of its defining 
features. For Addison (1999),  
analysis is not just one step in a linear progression that comes soon after data collection 
and sometime before writing up the results. Good qualitative research is always more of a 
circular process than a linear one. Analysis does not fall outside this circular or spiral 
form. Analysis is part of a larger interpretive process (p.147). 
As I have already noted, interpretation is not simply an additional mental activity 
contributed by an individual researcher but instead embodies what Heidegger 
(1962) refers to as a way of being-in-the-world. Within the present project, 
interpretation is a part of the research question, selection of participants, 
interview process, transcription, and data analysis. As a researcher, this 
interpretation is embodied in the actual practice of research as I participate in 
and challenge the research tradition of phenomenological, hermeneutic, 
qualitative research. Indeed, in this research practice, I reproduce and transform 
various aspects of the qualitative research tradition. As Kvale (1996) notes, “a 
recognition of the pervasiveness of interpretation throughout an entire interview 
inquiry may counteract a common overemphasis on methods of analysis as the 
one way to find the meaning of interviews” (p.205). Once again, interpretation 
need not be viewed as the product of an individual knower but can instead be 
understood as a practice that lies at the intersection of the individual and his or 
her immersion within a particular tradition.  
 Clearly, qualitative research represents an emerging approach to 
understanding a variety of experiences, discourses, and practices. Within this 
tradition, a number of texts provide overviews for the analysis of qualitative data 
(Crabtree & Miller, 1999; Creswell, 1998; Denzin & Lincoln, 2000; Huberman & 
Miles, 2002; Kvale, 1996; Miles & Huberman, 1994; Pollio, Graves & Arfken, 
2006; Silverman, 1993; Wolcott, 1994). As I have noted, the present analysis not 
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only draws on techniques developed within the qualitative tradition but it also 
explores alternative ways of approaching interpretation and subjectivity. In the 
present analysis, I will attempt to articulate as clearly as possible the various 
stages I traveled through in order to grasp the practices that embody an 
understanding of political reality. As Giorgi (1975) notes, 
the chief point to be remembered with this type of research is not so much whether 
another position with respect to the data could be adopted (this point is granted 
beforehand), but whether a reader, adopting the same viewpoint as articulated by the 
researcher, can also see what the researcher saw, whether or not he agrees with it. That is 
the key criterion for qualitative research (p.96). 
It is important to note that the present analysis is guided by a specific question 
that has been put to the data. In traditional phenomenological research, the 
question usually focuses on identifying the invariant features of participants’ 
descriptions of their lifeworlds. These features are used to construct a structure 
reflecting the essence of the phenomenon under investigation. Moreover, a 
discursive psychologist, ethnomethodologist, or discourse analysts may focus on 
very specific features of the dialogue such as turn-taking behavior, pauses, and a 
variety of other discursive features. The point is that the interviews do not furnish 
a particular means of analysis but instead assume a particular role within the 
horizon of a specific research project. In this case, I am looking at the interviews 
in terms of the practices that embody an interpretation of political reality. 
It is also important to note that the present approach to phenomenology is 
significantly different from transcendental phenomenological approaches. Thus, 
traditional terms such as the “phenomenological reduction” begin to take on a 
different meaning when placed in the context of the present project. In The Basic 
Problems of Phenomenology (1982), Heidegger explicitly distinguishes his 
approach to the phenomenological reduction from that of his mentor. Indeed, he 
even suggests that the term ‘reduction” is itself being adopted in its “literal 
wording” rather than its “substantive intent:”  
For Husserl, phenomenological reduction, which he worked out for the first time 
expressly in the Ideas Toward a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological 
Philosophy (1913), is the method of leading phenomenological vision from the natural 
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attitude of the human being whose life is involved in the world of things and persons back 
to the transcendental life of consciousness and its noetic-noematic experiences, in which 
objects are constituted as correlates of consciousness (Heidegger, 1988, p.21). 
Husserl promotes phenomenology as an eidetic science capable of identifying 
invariant features or essences that can provide a solid foundation for the special 
sciences.  This focus on consciousness makes Husserl’s phenomenology 
epistemological in so far as objects are apprehended by an individual ego. On the 
contrary, Heidegger’s phenomenology is ontological so that the 
phenomenological reduction takes on an entirely different character: 
For us phenomenological reduction means leading phenomenological vision back from 
the apprehension of a being, whatever may be the character of that apprehension, to the 
understanding of the being of this being (projecting upon the way it is unconcealed). Like 
every other scientific method, phenomenological method grows and changes due to the 
progress made precisely with its help into the subjects under investigation. Scientific 
method is never a technique. As soon as it becomes one it has fallen away from its own 
proper nature (Heidegger, 1988, p.21). 
For the present project, the Being that is concealed refers to the everyday 
practices that embody an interpretation of political existence and it will be the 
aim of the present project, to the extent that it is possible, to bring these practices 
into the foreground. This is what it means to view phenomenology as 
“unconcealment.”  
Perhaps the most important insight emerging from my initial perusal of 
the transcripts involves the recognition that people often discussed similar 
practices, situations, and events when describing concrete political experiences. 
Thus, it became important to gain a sense of the types of practices that were 
prevalent in these descriptions.  Let me begin with my initial reading of the 
transcripts. 
After all interviews were transcribed, the first step involves reading 
through the transcripts to become familiar with the interviews as a whole. During 
this process, I took notes on my reactions to the transcripts. These reactions 
typically took the form of observations regarding the similarities and differences 
between specific portions of the transcripts.  
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In the next step, I read the transcripts again but this time I summarized 
portions of the text in my own words. This has been referred to as meaning 
condensation which entails, 
an abridgement of the meanings expressed by the interviewees into shorter formulations. 
Long statements are compressed into briefer statements in which the main sense of what 
is said is rephrased in a few words. Meaning condensation thus involves a reduction of 
large interview texts into briefer, more succinct formulations (Kvale, 1996, p.192). 
Take the following passage from the present study: 
P: Yeah; or spectacle may not--not be the correct word, but I don’t know--something 
more honorable, less planned and scripted and fake and--I mean maybe that’s 
what you have to be to win an election these days but I don’t know … 
Here the participant wants politics to be “more honorable” or “less planned and 
scripted.” In this case, I summarized the passage with the phrase “Concerned 
about politics being planned and scripted.” In this stage, the goal is to condense 
information into more manageable formulations. 
 In the next step, I read through the meaning condensations in an attempt 
to identify similarities and differences. Grouping together similar summaries 
generated categories under which a variety of summaries could be subsumed. In 
one sense, this represents an extension of the meaning condensation stage 
although the purpose of the present stage is to group meaning condensations 
under larger categories. Because the focus of this research is on the way concrete 
activities embody an interpretation of political reality, the next step involves 
interpreting these categories within a practice orientation. 
 At this point, it is important to make a comment regarding the use of 
categories rather than themes. Both terms have a wide variety of meanings and 
often convey different ideas depending on the context in which they are found. 
The term category refers to the classification of specific concepts. For Strauss 
and Corbin (1990), “this classification is discovered when concepts are compared 
one against another and appear to pertain to a similar phenomenon. Thus, the 
concepts are grouped together under a higher order, more abstract concept called 
a category” (p.61). For the purposes of the present study, a category simply refers 
to more general cluster of practices that provide a ground for talking about 
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specific practices in detail. Indeed, political practices have been arranged 
according to categories to enable the reader to apply the insights gleaned from 
the present analysis to other domains.  
 I have reserved the term “theme” for the initial stage of the analysis where 
I clarify my own aims and the particular research questions to which the present 
project is devoted. I have purposely avoided using the term theme in the context 
of the analysis of transcripts in order to distinguish the present project from 
traditional phenomenological approaches. Within transcendental approaches to 
phenomenological psychology, the aim is grasp the essential structure of an 
experience, what has sometimes been referred to as “explication” (Polkinghorne, 
1989; Van Kaam, 1969). Indeed, For Polkinghorne (1989), “the term 
thematization, borrowed from qualitative research, has also been used to 
describe this process; in phenomenological research, it denotes that the search 
for essential structures involves identifying the constituents or themes that 
appear in the description” (p.51).  The present project is an attempt to move away 
from a focus on the invariant features of the lifeworld and towards the practices 
that embody an interpretation of reality, what Heidegger refers to as “being-in-
the-world.”  
 The major categories of practices I identified in the present project are (1) 
media, (2) conventional political activities and (3) political socialization. 
Although these observations have been divided into ostensibly discrete 
categories, in actual practice, all of these activities coalesce into an interpretation 
of the political.  
 
Verifying 
 Throughout our discussion of the role of method in scientific inquiry, I 
have attempted to show that while traditional approaches often focus on the way 
methodological refinements prevent subjective biases from interfering with an 
accurate representation of reality, this framework already presupposes a specific 
relationship between an individual knower and a phenomenon of interest. In 
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other words, as long as these biases are viewed as subjective interpretations and 
as long as interpretation is understood exclusively as a form of mental activity, it 
would seem that we remain grounded in epistemology – an approach the present 
project has sought to challenge. I have argued that by treating, in practice, the 
knower as discrete from the known, epistemology seems to presume what 
heretofore it has claimed to demonstrate. In other words, the relationship 
between the knower and the known that Heidegger’s notion of being-in-the-
world is intended to critique turns out to be a fundumental assumption guiding 
contemporary scientific research. Indeed, the epistemological tradition furnishes 
social scientists with specific criteria for judging the quality of scientific research. 
Within psychology, research is typically evaluated by three specific criteria: 
validity, reliability, and generalizability. Moreover, these criteria are often 
applied as a standard for determining the veridicality of qualitative research in 
general. As Janesick (2000) notes, “questions addressed to qualitative 
researchers are constructed from the psychometric paradigm and revolve around 
the trinity of validity, reliability, and generalizability … “(p.393). Although I will 
discuss the relationship between these criteria and the present project in a 
moment, I will begin by focusing on issues of validity, which I believe are central 
to tensions between epistemological and ontological approaches to human 
understanding.  
 
Validity 
In the first chapter, we discussed the work of E.D. Hirsch whose approach 
to literary interpretation shares a number of similarities with social cognition, 
transcendental phenomenology, and the entire epistemological project. It is no 
coincidence that his first major work, Validity in Interpretation (1967), focuses 
specifically on the way literary theorists can determine whether a particular 
interpretation of a work can be called its true meaning. As we will recall, Hirsch 
believes that it is necessary to distinguish between the meaning of a text, which 
he identifies with the original intention of the author, and its significance in a 
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particular cultural and historical context. He concludes that it is only by 
identifying the meaning of a text with the original intention of the author that we 
can establish validity in interpretation. For Hirsch (1967), 
if a meaning can change its identity and in fact does, then we have no norm for judging 
whether we are encountering the real meaning in a changed form or some spurious 
meaning that is pretending to be the one we seek. Once it is admitted that a meaning can 
change its characteristics, then there is no way of finding the true Cinderella among all 
the contenders. There is no dependable glass slipper we can use as a test, since the old 
slipper will no longer fit the new Cinderella. To the interpreter this lack of a stable 
normative principle is equivalent to the indeterminacy of meaning (p.46; italics mine). 
The original intention of the author as a stable normative principle enables 
interpreters of a text to distinguish valid from erroneous interpretations.  In the 
absence of such a norm, the meaning of a text is indeterminate which means that 
no single interpretation can claim to be more valid than any other. Indeed, 
Hirsch argues that if we reject the possibility of objectively valid interpretation, 
we ultimately succumb to a form of relativism thereby forfeiting our ability to 
adjudicate between competing interpretations of a text.  
 Yet it seems that Hirsch’s account of interpretation demonstrates 
something important about the epistemological project as a whole. In this case, 
we may need to look no further than his Cinderella example. As Hoy (1978) notes, 
Hirsh’s account does not seem to do a better job in explaining the possibility of the shoe 
fitting the foot. What guides the explication is the interpreter’s “understanding” of the 
text and, for Hirsch, of the author’s intention. To find Cinderella—that is, the version that 
is really the literary text—we need only find out whom the shoe fits. This seems fine until 
we ask how we know that we have discovered the author’s intention. To this the answer 
will be, try it on Cinderella. But now we are right back where we started, since the original 
problem is that we do not know who Cinderella is. Unfortunately the proof for the 
possibility of objective, valid commentary in Hirsch’s theory hinges on the notion of 
determinacy of meaning, and the proof of the latter depends on the former (p.18-19). 
Within an epistemological framework, we need to know what it is that we are 
looking for to ensure that we have found it, yet if we already know what it is, it is 
unclear why the investigation was necessary in the first place. Moreover, if we are 
to adjudicate between competing interpretations, we must already know the 
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correct interpretation. In this case, we must know who Cinderella is before we 
can be sure that the shoe fits.  
 Of course, this is the issue of the hermeneutical circle that we discussed in 
the first chapter. And as we have seen, the circular nature of interpretation is 
relevant to issues of validity in textual interpretation as well as in the social 
sciences. In Hirsch’s case, the only way to escape this vicious circle is to develop a 
stable norm that will introduce determinacy into the interpretive process. Indeed, 
his thesis on authorial intention is in many ways rhetorical as it seeks to persuade 
others to adopt the same norm lest we succumb to the misfortunes of relativism. 
 In this sense, validity becomes a means for distinguishing legitimate from 
illegitimate textual interpretations. Clearly, validity functions in much the same 
way within the social sciences. Scheurich (1997) suggests that, 
validity became the line of bifurcation for a two-sided map. On one side of the map was 
that research which had passed the test of validity (i.e., was valid); on the other side of the 
map was that research which had not passed the test (i.e. was invalid), along with aspects 
of ‘reality’ that had not yet been researched. Validity as a set of research practices within 
the conventional social sciences is, thus, the name for the boundary line separating 
research that is acceptable from research that is not and from the, as yet, unresearched 
(p.81).  
Further along, Scheurich (1997) argues that, “validity is the name of the policing 
practices that divide good research from bad …” (p.91; italics mine). Indeed, 
Eagleton (1996) views Hirsch’s focus on authorial intention as a form of policing: 
The aim of this policing is the protection of private property. For Hirsch, an author’s 
meaning is his own, and should not be stolen or trespassed upon by the reader. The 
meaning of the text is not to be socialized, made the public property of its various readers; 
it belongs solely to the author, who should have the exclusive rights over its disposal long 
after he or she is dead (p.59-60). 
What I am suggesting is that the issue of validity often hinges on stable 
normative principles that embody a form of social practice policing the 
boundaries of legitimate and illegitimate research. When we discuss validity, we 
have not transcended the realm of social practice but are instead thoroughly 
involved in establishing criteria integral to the course of various forms of textual 
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and scientific inquiry. For Foucault (1977), “discursive practices are characterized 
by the delimitation of a field of objects, the definition of a legitimate perspective 
for the agent of knowledge, and the fixing of norms for the elaboration of 
concepts and theories” (p.199). Indeed, norms are a form of social practice 
patrolling the boundary of legitimate textual/scientific interpretation. As a social 
practice, validity is defined by the community of scholars participating in the 
tradition of textual/scientific inquiry. In this sense, validity cannot be relied on to 
support forms of social practice, indeed, the criteria that determine validity are 
themselves embedded in the practices they seek to support. Yet this is not the 
only problem with introducing validity into the realm of textual / scientific 
inquiry.  
 In Hirsch’s approach to interpretation, the aim is to identify those 
interpretations of a text that correspond to the author’s original intention. In this 
sense, a valid interpretation is one that matches a text’s determinate meaning. 
We have already noted several similarities between Hirsch’s approach to 
interpretation and contemporary research in social cognition. In fact, social 
cognition’s adherence to a mental representational view of the mind is in many 
ways congruent with psychology’s view that truth is a matter of correspondence. 
In other words, a construct, insight, schema, measure, representation, 
observation, etc. is valid to the extent that it corresponds with something that is 
believed to be valid. In fact, truth as correspondence provides a foundation for 
much of the effort to standardize psychometrics based on additional measures or 
observations that are believed to be valid. Furthermore, researchers are often 
guided by the metaphor of research as an attempt to mirror reality so that 
research findings will accurately reflect the true state of affairs (Rorty, 1979). 
 Although a number of theorists have approached truth as a matter of 
correspondence (Field, 1972; Moore, 1953; Popper, 1972; Russell, 1913; Tarski, 
1983), others have proposed alternative theories of truth including coherence 
(Blanshard, 1939; Joachim, 1906; Putnam, 1981; Walker, 1989; Young, 1995, 
2001), deflationary (Field, 1994; Horwich, 1994; Quine, 1970) and identity 
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theories (Baldwin, 1991; Bradley, 1914; Candlish, 1989, 1995, 1999; Dodd, 1996, 
2000). Clearly, outside the field of psychology the correspondence theory of truth 
is not without its detractors.  Given the flexibility with which we can approach 
issues of validity, what role should validity play within the present project? 
 A number of researchers have focused on the meaning of validity within a 
qualitative research project (Cherryholmes, 1988; Gergen & Gergen, 2000; Kvale, 
1989; Lather, 1986, 1993, 1995; Lincoln & Guba, 2000; Maxwell, 1992; Mishler, 
1991; Scheurich, 1997). Moreover, many of these researchers question the value 
of applying the concept of validity to research within the qualitative tradition. 
Most believe that the concept of “validity” is loaded with some of the 
philosophical assumptions we have already discussed and therefore its utility 
within qualitative research is inherently suspect. Gergen and Gergen (2000) 
suggest that, 
in the conventional terms by which it has been formulated, the debate on validity has 
reached an impasse. On the one hand, those pursuing their work as if their descriptions 
and explanations were transparent reflections of their subject matter lack any rationale 
for this posture. They are vulnerable to host of deconstructive logics. Yet those who find 
fault with this tradition are, in the end, without means of justifying their critique. In the 
very process of deprivileging they are relying on the selfsame assumptions of language as 
correspondent with its object. Thus, rather than either reinstating the modernist tradition 
of objective truth or opening the throttle on anything goes, discussion is invited into ways 
of reconceptualizing the issue (Gergen & Gergen, 2000, p. 1031). 
Within the present project, it is important to understand that research findings 
do not represent a univocal interpretation of the phenomenon under 
investigation. Alternative interpretations are both possible and encouraged – 
such interpretations are not viewed as a threat to the sanctity of an immutable 
interpretation. This is in stark contrast to experimental research where 
methodological procedures aim to facilitate an unambiguous interpretation of 
research findings.  
 Moreover, I believe my approach to issues of validity is congruent with 
Heidegger’s phenomenological orientation. Given that the present project draws 
on Heidegger’s critique of epistemology, it seems clear that an adherence to the 
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correspondence theory of truth would be unwise. Indeed Palmer (1969), argues 
that even in Heidegger’s later work, he specifically rejects the notion of truth as 
correspondence: 
In “Plato’s Doctrine of Truth,” Heidegger turns to the famous cave allegory. In the overall 
allegory, there is a suggestion that truth is unconcealment, for one climbs up out of the 
cave into the light and goes back down into the cave; but the conception of truth as 
“correspondence” came to predominate over the more dynamic conception of 
unconcealment. Truth became correct seeing, and thinking became a matter of placing an 
idea before the mind’s eye, that is, it became the proper manipulation of ideas (p.142). 
In the present project, I am trying to draw attention to the practices that embody 
an interpretation of political reality. I attempt to buttress my observations by 
pointing to portions of the interview that support my interpretations while 
remaining as forthcoming as possible about alternative interpretations. The 
present project can be seen as the beginning of a dialogue rather than an attempt 
to provide a single, unambiguous interpretation of the data. I have tried to draw 
attention to issues of validity as a form of social practice, one that runs the risk of 
excluding perspectives that do not share the same ontological commitments. 
Moreover, I agree with Palmer (1969) who suggests that in the midst of these 
issues,  
the hermeneutical debate goes on. On the one side are the defenders of objectivity and 
validation, who look to hermeneutics as the theoretical source for norms of validation; on 
the other side are the phenomenologists of the event of understanding, who stress the 
historical character of this “event,” and consequently the limitations of all claims to 
“objective knowledge” and “objective validity” (Palmer, 1969, p.65). 
Within the present project, the aim is to develop the concept of practice as an 
alternative to psychology’s view of interpretation as strictly an affair of 
consciousness. I intended to show that a close look at everyday political practices 
can illuminate the existential foundations of interpretation and that such 
interpretations within the political realm have important implications for 
scientific research. Indeed, the concept of practice also changes the way we view 
another common criterion for evaluating empirical research.   
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Generalizability 
As we have already seen, qualitative researches are hesitant to apply 
quantitative criteria within the realm of qualitative research. Indeed, it is clear 
that issues of validity become highly problematic when they are integrated into a 
critique of epistemology. The same is true of the criterion of generalizability. For 
the most part, research findings are considered generalizable if what has been 
discovered in a particular context can be extended to other contexts as well. For 
Lincoln and Guba (1985),  
all that is necessary to ensure transferability is to know something with high internal 
validity about Sample A, and to know that A is representative of the population to which 
the generalization is to apply. The generalization will apply to all contexts within the same 
population (p.297). 
Internal validity refers to the extent to which researchers are confident that they 
have identified a causal relationship. In an experimental situation, the more 
researchers are able to control relevant variables, the greater their ability to 
assert that the relationship they have observed is a causal one.  
 External validity (generalization) refers to the fact that this causal 
relationship can be extended to additional contexts. Burgeoning psychological 
researchers are often instructed on the importance of procedures for establishing 
a representative sample of the population under investigation. These procedures 
ensure that results of a particular study are applicable to segments of the 
population that did not directly participated in the study. Moreover, researches 
are encouraged to make sure that experimental situations are as realisitic as 
possible to ensure that findings are applicable to “real world” situations. In each 
case, generalizability refers to the extent to which findings are viewed as 
externally valid.  
Within the qualitative tradition, issues of generalizability have been 
particularly pernicious as most qualitative studies focus on a small number of 
participants in relatively natural situations. This is especially true for case study 
research where the focus may be on a single individual or event (Donmoyer, 
1990; Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Kvale, 1996; Schofield, 1990; Kennedy, 1979; Yin, 
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1994; Stake, 1994, 2000). While the sampling procedures and small number of 
subjects for the present study make it difficult to generalize results to a larger 
population in any traditional sense, this study enables us to develop unique 
insights into the everyday political practices of interview participants. Indeed, 
Kvale (1996) argues that pioneers in the field of psychology, such as Freud, 
Ebbinghaus, Piaget, and Skinner, have all used a small number of cases to 
develop intriguing insights into human behavior and experience: 
Quantitatively, each case contained an immense number of observations of single 
individuals. Qualitatively, the focus on single cases made it possible to investigate in 
detail the relationship of a specific behavior to its context, to work out the logic of the 
relationship between the individual and the situation. The specific kind of relationship 
varied from transference of a psychoanalytic therapy to the reinforcement schedules of 
learning. What they have in common is the working out of consistent and recurrent 
patterns through intensive case studies (p.103) 
The point is that a focus on a small number of cases is not necessarily a threat to 
extending understanding beyond the confines of a particular study. Indeed, 
Schofield (2002) argues that, 
most researchers writing on generalizability in the qualitative tradition agree that their 
rejection of generalizability as a search for broadly applicable laws is not a rejection of the 
idea that studies in one situation can be used to speak to or to help form a judgment 
about other situations (p.179). 
This is particularly interesting when we note that the experimental tradition in 
which issues of generalizability arise also encounter their own problems when 
they try to extend research findings to other contexts. In fact, the emphasis 
experimental researchers place on establishing causality often makes it 
exceedingly difficult to extend findings beyond the confines of the laboratory. As 
Lincoln and Guba (1985) note, “the very controls instituted to ensure internal 
validity militate against clean generalizations. In the final analysis, results that 
are acquired in that epitome of the controlled situation—the laboratory—are 
discovered to be applicable only in other laboratories” (p.297). Thus, it becomes 
clear that disagreements regarding the relative merits of generalizability have not 
always fallen along traditional quantitative/qualitative lines. Indeed, quantitative 
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researchers have sometimes argued that a preoccupation with issues of external 
validity (generalizability) can draw attention away from what should be a more 
pressing concern – the ability to identify causal relationships. 
 Within the quantitative tradition, Mook (1983) argues that it may be 
unnecessary for researchers to discard experimental results for lack of a 
representative sample or because the research situation appears to be too far 
removed from “real-life.” In fact, he argues that while some research may aim to 
generalize findings to other situations, it is often the case that experiments enable 
researches to control situations to such an extent that it is not the specific 
findings that are generalized but the understanding of causal relationships that 
can be transferred to other situations. This leads Mook to propose a distinction 
between generalizing research findings and generalizing theoretical conclusions: 
The distinction between generality of findings and generality of theoretical conclusions 
underscores what seems to me the most important source of confusion in all of this, 
which is the assumption that the purpose of collecting data in the laboratory is to predict 
real-life behavior in the real world. Of course, there are times when that is what we are 
trying to do, and there are times when it is not. When it is, then the problem of EV 
[external validity] confronts us full force. When it is not, then the problem of EV is either 
meaningless or trivial, and a misplaced preoccupation with it can seriously distort our 
evaluation of the research (p.381).  
Experimental procedures often enable researchers to contribute to theoretical 
goals that can be applied in a number of ways and in a variety of situations. For 
Mook, researchers must not look exclusively at research findings to see if they can 
be generalized; rather, researchers should reflect on whether findings enable 
them to generate novel insights into the causal relationship between relevant 
variables. He suggests that, “it is that understanding that has external validity (if 
it does) – not the findings themselves” (p.382). In fact, to require experiments to 
generalize to the “real-world” may be asking them to do something they were 
never intended to do. In some cases, it is the understanding gained from 
experiments that generalizes from one situation to another rather than the 
specific research findings. Indeed, researchers have sometimes used Mook’s 
position to argue for the adequacy of their own research when issues of external 
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validity are on the horizon (Altermatt, DeWall & Leskinen, 2003; Chin, 2005; 
Chin & Taylor-Robinson, 2005; Herbst, Gaertner & Insko, 2003; Hosoda, Stone-
Romero & Stone, 2004; Shapiro & Chock, 2003). 
 It is important to note that Mook’s (1983) argument has a number of 
important implications for the present project as well as for qualitative 
researchers struggling to defend the legitimacy of their own findings. To begin 
with, Mook is quite clear that his focus on external validity relies on the 
hypothetico-deductive method so that what is extended to other situation is not 
so much the research findings as it is the understanding that emerges from 
identifying the mechanisms and processes that cause people to think or behave 
in predictable ways. Indeed, when we are dealing with the knowledge of causes, 
we may not need to justify research in terms of realistic experimental procedures 
or representative samples. Moreover, it could be argued that the researcher 
discovering a causal relationship is not necessarily responsible for generalizing 
this understanding. Instead, a community of scholars must decide whether such 
understanding is applicable in other contexts. In this way, Mook’s view of 
generalization shares some affinity with the way legal scholars attempt to apply 
general ideas to specific cases – what the legal community refers to as case law.  
The term “case law” refers to that portion of the law that is built up from specific cases 
rather than from statutes. These specific cases are resolved on the basis of statutes, but 
interpretations of statutes that are made in each case set precedents for future cases. 
Thus, the decisions reached regarding a single case may be generalized to future cases. 
If decisions are described in terms of general ideas, these ideas may become principles 
and take on a life of their own. Though these decisions may be stated with the intention 
that they be generalized, it is the later court which must decide whether in fact a 
particular decision generalizes to its own case (Kennedy, 1979, p.672; italics mine). 
If we extend legal hermeneutics to the social sciences, it is not the initial 
researcher who generalizes findings but the person applying this understanding 
to a novel context that bears responsibility for generalizing the findings. In other 
words, once understanding has been gained within a particular domain, it is the 
responsibility of future scholars to decide if this understanding is relevant to 
other areas. Indeed, Lincoln and Guba (1985) argue that, 
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if there is to be transferability, the burden of proof lies less with the original investigator 
that with the person seeking to make an application elsewhere. The original inquirer 
cannot know the sites to which transferability might be sought, but the appliers can and 
do. The best advice to give to anyone seeking to make a transfer is to accumulate 
empirical evidence about contextual similarities; the responsibility of the original 
investigator ends in providing sufficient descriptive data to make such similarity 
judgments possible (Lincoln & Guba, 1985, p.298). 
Mook’s suggestion that understanding rather than specific research findings 
generalize to other situations implies that it is the experimental procedures that 
must be scrutinized in order to determine the veracity of the understanding. In 
this case, when researchers are confident that the experiment is internally valid, 
it is then possible to ask whether this understanding applies to other situations.  
Of course, Mook’s argument hinges on what he means by understanding. 
And we have already noted that the movement from epistemology to ontology has 
serious implication for the concept of understanding itself. We should recall 
Ostrom’s (1984) comments regarding the list of cognitive tasks one must perform 
if he or she is to interpret social reality: 
It is staggering, indeed, to realize that these myriad concurrent tasks are compressed into 
the time it takes to nod understandingly, raise an eyebrow, or fleet a smile. The 
motivational, cognitive, and affective mechanisms that allow us to perform them are at 
present bafflingly complex and poorly understood. Of course, this quest for 
understanding has always been, and will continue to be, the primary objective of 
psychology. It is in the field of social cognition that the full complexity of this task 
becomes apparent (Ostrom, 1984, p.16; italics mine). 
Once again we must ask why understanding within psychology has been 
restricted to identifying the causal mechanisms and processes that exert an 
influence on an individual’s thoughts and behaviors. This is not to say that such 
understanding is unimportant; rather, the question is why approaches to 
understanding have been limited to issues of causality.  
Ultimately, Mook (1983) concludes that, “what makes research findings of 
interest is that they help us understand everyday life. That understanding, 
however, comes from theory or the analysis of mechanisms; it is not a matter of 
‘generalizing’ the findings themselves” (p.386). Indeed, I will go one step further 
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and suggest that understanding as essentially theoretical and/or mechanical 
already embodies a specific interpretation of human knowledge and existence. 
Mook’s insistence that scientific understanding is strictly a matter of identifying 
causal mechanism and processes embodies an interpretation of what it means to 
understand. Moreover, this narrow view of understanding is embodied in the 
practices of researchers who see qualitative research as somehow lacking the 
scientific sophistication of more quantitatively oriented approaches.  
 Thus, while I agree with Mook (1983) that a dogmatic adherence to 
generalizability may obscure other important aspects of scientific research, I do 
not agree that the concept of understanding should be restricted to identifying 
causal relationships in a controlled experimental situation. Perhaps part of the 
aim of not only the present project, but of qualitative research in general, is to 
draw attention to forms of understanding that are not restricted to issues of 
causality. But if we can agree that causality is but one form of understanding, 
what can be said about psychology’s near exclusive focus on causal mechanisms 
and processes? 
For Habermas (1971), the empirical-analytic sciences are oriented towards 
a desire for technical control, which he views as but one possible “knowledge-
constitutive interest.” His observations are especially relevant to Mook’s equating 
of understanding with mechanical causality: 
In controlled observation, which often takes the form of an experiment, we generate 
initial conditions and measure the results of operations carried out under these 
conditions. Empiricism attempts to ground the objectivist illusion in observations 
expressed in basic statements. These observations are supposed to be reliable in 
providing immediate evidence without the admixture of subjectivity. In reality basic 
statements are not simple representations of facts in themselves, but express the success 
or failure of our operations. We can say facts and the relations between them are 
apprehended descriptively. But this way of talking must not conceal that as such the facts 
relevant to the empirical sciences are first constituted through an a priori organization of 
our experience in the behavioral system of instrumental action (Habermas, 1971, p.308-
309; italics mine) 
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While Habermas views the “a priori organization of our experience” cognitively, it 
is equally plausible, as I have argued throughout this discussion, that this 
organization is embedded in shared practices rather than individual mental 
activity. Moreover, the understanding that emerges from traditional empirical 
methods can be viewed as but one type of practice embedded in the broader view 
of the nature of understanding itself.  
All of this leads us to what Palmer (1969) refers to as, “a more 
comprehensive conception of understanding” (p.227). In this case, understanding 
is not restricted to the identification of mechanism and causally related variables 
nor is it located with the mind of an individual knower: 
According to Heidegger, understanding is not some faculty among others that man 
possesses; understanding is his fundamental mode of existing in the world. Through 
understanding we are able to have a sense of the way we are placed, we grasp meaning 
through language, and something like world can come to be the horizon in which we exist. 
If we start with subjectivity, then understanding will seem to be a faculty of man; if we 
start with the facticity (Faktizität) of the world, however, understanding becomes the way 
in which the facticity of the world is presented to man. Heidegger takes this latter 
approach, and therefore understanding is seen as grounded not in the autonomous 
reflexive activity of man but in the act of the world, the facticity of the world, on man. 
Understanding is then the medium by which the world comes to stand before a man; 
understanding is the medium of ontological disclosure (Palmer, 1969, p.227-228; italics 
mine) 
For Mook, research should not be discarded simply because it fails to live up to a 
scientific community’s demand for external validity. On the contrary, scientific 
understanding proceeds by identifying specific mechanisms and processes that 
are causally related to a particular phenomenon. Yet Mook’s view fails to 
recognize that such an approach to understanding functions in much the same 
way as the general concept of validity – to police the border of legitimate 
research. The aim of the present study is not to identify variables that are causally 
related to subjective interpretations of political reality. Instead, it focuses on the 
political practices that participants discuss when asked about political situations. 
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Moreover, these practices are viewed as neither antecedents nor consequences of 
an interpretation but instead embody an interpretation of political reality.  
 
Reliability 
Thus far, we have discussed the role issues of validity and generalizability 
play in both the present project and qualitative research in general. I have argued 
that because this project represents an attempt to tease out the implications of 
viewing understanding ontologically rather than epistemologically, traditional 
verification criteria become highly problematic. This is no less the case with 
issues of reliability (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Kvale, 1996; Janesick, 2000).  
Within quantitative research, reliability refers to the stability or 
consistency of a particular measure. For Lincoln and Guba (1985),  
reliability is usually tested by replication, as, for example, the odd-even correlation of test 
items, or the test-retest or parallel forms correlation. Reliability is threatened by any 
careless act in the measurement or assessment process, by instrumental decay, by 
assessments that are insufficiently long (or intense), by ambiguities of various sorts, and a 
host of other factors (p.292).  
In other words, if a measure is to be judged reliable, it should be able to measure 
the same phenomenon either at different points in time or at the same time as 
other measurements are being gathered depending on the specific correlation 
procedures (ex. split-half, test-retest, interrater, etc.) used by the researcher. 
Moreover, measures of reliability must contend with the extent to which the 
phenomenon under investigation is viewed as a stable characteristic. Within 
psychology, human intelligence is often regarded as a stable characteristic such 
that researchers focus on developing precise tests to measure this characteristic. 
On the other hand, an individual’s mood is generally regarded as mutable so that 
a measure may not yield the same results when it is given on different occasions. 
In this case, the flexibility of the measure can be used to draw attention to the fact 
that an individual’s mood is indeed a relatively unstable characteristic, though it 
may fluctuate in predictable ways.  
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 Clearly, the reliability of much of the present project can be challenged. To 
begin with, one may ask whether research participants are likely to discuss the 
same political situations, in the same way, if asked the same question on a 
different occasion. If the same participant discusses the same situations, the 
research question would appear to elicit something stable from the participant. 
This stability would be an indication that the research question was a reliable 
measure of salient political situations. 
 Moreover, by asking multiple participants the same research question, one 
could ascertain the extent to which different participants discussed similar 
experiences. Indeed, phenomenological approaches often look to these 
similarities, what they refer to as invariant features, as an indication of an essence 
or structure – something general that links specific cases to one another. The 
phenomenologist then presents these features in such a way as to describe what 
he or she believes to be the essence of a particular phenomenon. As we have 
already noted in the first chapter, this view of essence was common to Husserl’s 
transcendental phenomenology, Hirsch’s notion of determinacy of meaning, and 
social cognition’s attempt to discern invariable mental rules that govern specific 
interpretations of social reality. 
One may also question whether both my selection of specific aspects of the 
interviews and my interpretation of these passages are reliable. Asked in this way, 
the question concerns whether my interpretations are merely a reflection of 
individual biases or whether there is something more in these interpretations 
that transcends individual subjectivity. To mitigate the deleterious effects of 
subjectivity, researchers sometimes enlist the help of several “judges” to ensure 
that individual interpretations are shared – what is often referred to as interrater 
reliability. 
 The focus of the present project is to identify political practices that people 
discuss when asked to talk about salient political situations. I have selected 
segments of the interviews that provide a good example of the political practices I 
identified during my analysis of the interviews. Often, several participants 
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discussed the same practice and I have tried to indicate when this was the case. 
For some, the fact that participants often discussed the same situations may be 
viewed as an indication of reliability while others may view it as an indication of a 
phenomenological essence. Whatever the case, the issue of reliability, as with 
each of the other types of verification criteria, ultimately resides within the realm 
of rhetoric and common social practices. I leave it to the reader to decide if he or 
she finds both my selection of quotes and my interpretation of those quotes 
convincing.   
At this point, it is clear that the epistemological focus on consciousness 
and subjectivity is not merely an auxiliary aspect of contemporary empirical 
research. Indeed, at each point in the journey towards verification, subjectivity 
has been reproached as a source of destructive prejudices. If we are to continue to 
challenge the division of subject and object, as our move towards ontology seeks 
to do, we must realize that traditional verification criteria both reflect and 
reproduce the very tradition upon which they are grounded. Indeed, Schofield 
(2002) argues that within the qualitative research tradition,  
the goal is not to produce a standardized set of results that any other careful researcher in 
the same situation or studying the same issue would have produced. Rather it is to 
produce a coherent and illuminating description of and perspective on a situation that is 
based on and consistent with detailed study of that situation (p.174).  
For the purposes of the present study, the aim is to identify the concrete practices 
that constitute an interpretation of political reality.  
 
Reporting 
 After the interviews are collected, transcribed, and analyzed, it is time to 
report the findings to those interested in the topic under investigation (or those 
who have agreed to be on a dissertation committee). In many ways, this 
represents the culmination of the entire project, a time to evaluate the fruits of 
the research process and to reflect on how this understanding can be applied in 
new directions. For Kvale (1996),  
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the aim of a report is to inform other researchers and the general public of the importance 
and the trustworthiness of the findings. The report should contribute new knowledge to 
the development of a field, and be cast in a form that allows the conclusions to be checked 
by the reader. The interview report is the end product of a long process; what is worth 
communicating to others from the wealth of interview conversations is to be conveyed in 
the limited number of pages of an article of a book, presenting the main aims, methods, 
results, and implications of an interview inquiry (Kvale, 1996, p.256).  
For the present project, the next chapter is organized according to the categories I 
identified during the analysis of the transcripts. These categories organize the 
practices that embody an interpretation of political reality. I have made extensive 
use of segments of the interview in order to support my interpretations of these 
practices. I have also sought to connect these interpretations with relevant 
theoretical and empirical research. The last chapter of this project explores some 
of the implications of this analysis for areas such as psychology, sociology, and 
political science.  
 It is clear that the writing style in this analysis is somewhat different from 
traditional approaches to scientific writing. I have tried to make it clear that I am 
not merely a researcher encountering a distant phenomenon but that my own 
horizons are intimately involved in the production of this work. Kvale (1996) 
suggests that the style and aim of an interview research report typically falls 
somewhere along the continuum between a direct reporting of the results and a 
mixture of literary and artistic innovation. Indeed, an interview report, “should 
ideally be able to live up to artistic demands of expression as well as to the cross-
examination of the court room” (Kvale, 1996, p.259). To this end, I concur with 
William James (2003) who warns that, 
to foreshadow the terminus of one’s investigations is one thing, and to arrive there safely 
is another. In the next [chapter], abandoning the extreme generalities which have 
engrossed us hitherto, I propose that we begin our actual journey by addressing ourselves 
directly to the concrete facts (p.46). 
For the present project, these “facts” are the practices that embody an 
interpretation of political reality. 
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CHAPTER IV 
ANALYSIS 
 In the preceding chapters, I have repeatedly referred to “the practices that 
embody an interpretation of political reality.” I have offered this as an alternative 
to the view that interpretation is strictly a mental activity or that phenomenology 
must restrict its focus to consciousness and subjectivity. I argue that traditional 
phenomenological approaches remain well within the realm of epistemology and 
that our exploration of an alternative conception of phenomenology cannot make 
use of concepts such as mental representation or essence so long as we treat 
understanding ontologically. In other words, I am using the term practice to 
highlight our practical everyday engagement (being-in-the-world) in political 
reality. Moreover, viewing traditional concepts as practices also prevents the 
analysis from prematurely succumbing to either subjectivism or objectivism – 
that is, from reducing our analysis either to individual consciousness or 
systematic constraints.  
 Clearly, I have also tried to highlight the way researchers engage in and 
reproduce their own research practices. Indeed, I have tried to show that 
contemporary research, especially in psychology, may benefit from exploring the 
understanding researcher’s exhibit when they conduct research without any 
necessary recourse to mental representations. Yet I am well aware that such a 
proposition will sound unusual to those who have been trained to focus on 
individual consciousness as the basic unit of analysis.  
 At the same time, I do not want the fact that the movement from mental 
representation to practice appears strange to detract from the aims of the project 
as a whole. In fact, I believe that the movement from epistemology to ontology 
may entail an additional shift away from knowledge as it has been traditionally 
conceived and towards what Rorty (1979) refers to as edification or, “the attempt 
to reinterpret our familiar surroundings in the unfamiliar terms of our new 
inventions” (p.360). Indeed, the following analysis may at times seem unusual as 
I avoid identifying antecedents, moderating variables or even themes or essences. 
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Yet I believe this is consistent with Rorty’s suggestion that, “edifying discourse is 
supposed to be abnormal, to take us out of our old selves by the power of 
strangeness, to aid us in becoming new beings” (p.360). Indeed, Rorty’s views on 
edification are especially appropriate given the present project’s focus on human 
understanding as ontological.  
 As we will recall from the chapter on methods, I implored the reader to 
explore the possibility of viewing the researcher as a traveler rather than as a 
miner of data (Kvale, 1996). I argued that shifting our research metaphor enables 
us to see understanding as a creative process, something that is made rather than 
found. Moreover, I argued that the correspondence theory of truth is inadequate 
to such a task. Indeed, Rorty (1989), makes a similar observation: 
As long as we think that that there is some relation called “fitting the world” or 
“expressing the real nature of the self” which can be possessed or lacked by vocabularies-
as-wholes, we shall continue the traditional philosophical search for a criterion to tell us 
which vocabularies have this desirable feature. But if we could ever become reconciled to 
the idea that most of reality is indifferent to our descriptions of it, and that the human self 
is created by the use of a vocabulary rather than being adequately or inadequately 
expressed in a vocabulary, then we should at last have assimilated what was true in the 
Romantic idea that truth is made rather than found (p.7; italics mine). 
In other words, we must realize that our practices do more than shape the way we 
understand a particular issue. These practices embody an interpretation of what 
it means to be; that is, human subjectivity and existence can already be found in 
the way we talk about the individual. This is particularly relevant to psychology as 
the individual is, for the most part, taken as the basic unit of analysis. Yet in 
contemporary psychology, the individual has come to be regarded as a collection 
of mental representations and basic psychological processes. My attempt to 
conceptualize human subjectivity as a collection of practices (and therefore prior 
to the division of subject and object) is an attempt to change the dominant 
vocabulary of the modern individual. 
To speak of social practices rather than mental representations or essences 
involves, “changing the way we talk, and thereby changing what we want to do 
and what we think we are… ” (Rorty, 1989, p.20). Indeed, I believe it may be 
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useful for phenomenologists, social psychologists, clinicians, and literary 
theorists, among others, to talk about traditional topics in their respective fields 
in terms of social practices as the concept of practice recognizes the ongoing 
participation of a group of individuals in a dynamic, linguistic, cultural, and 
social system. In other words, to talk about traditional psychological issues in 
terms of practices is to open new worlds of human understanding. As such, I beg 
the reader’s indulgence as I focus on some of the practices that embody an 
interpretation of political reality 
 
Media 
 Looking up from this paper, one is sure to find him or herself in the midst 
of various forms of media, from television and movies, to books, posters and 
compact discs. Moreover, the majority of media we encounter today did not exist 
as recently as one hundred years ago. It is surely no exaggeration to say that 
today we inhabit a society thoroughly saturated with mediated messages and 
images (Gergen, 1991). The abundance of media has produced a tremendous 
amount of research into the way people’s lives have changed as their world 
becomes increasingly populated by technological innovations designed to deliver 
messages and images whether they are in their homes, cars, or places of work 
(Croteau & Hoynes, 2003; Fiske, 1987; Graber, 2006; Norris, 2000; Thompson, 
1995). This research has been conducted within a variety of disciplines including 
psychology, sociology, political science and in interdisciplinary areas such as 
media studies, communication studies, and cultural studies.  
 Of particular importance to the present study is the role media plays in our 
everyday lives. Thompson (1995) suggests that although some view the profusion 
of mediated images and messages in people’s daily activities as inducing a 
paralysis that prevents people from organizing this information in any coherent 
way, it is equally plausible to see various forms of media as enabling individuals 
to assimilate information in new and creative ways. He claims that, 
the problem that confronts most people today is a problem of symbolic dislocation: in a 
world where the capacity to experience is no longer linked to the activity of encountering, 
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how can we relate mediated experiences to the practical contexts of our day-to-day lives? 
How can we relate to events which take place in locales that are remote from the contexts 
in which we live our daily lives? And how can we assimilate the experience of distant 
events into a coherent life trajectory that we must construct for ourselves (Thompson, 
1995, p.209)? 
In other words, when we experience mass media, we not only encounter people 
and events far removed from our immediate locale but the encounter itself 
constitutes a new and unique form of practical engagement. Indeed, the 
relationships we forge with others through media represent an increasingly 
technologically laden form of encounter. Before we discuss the role of media in 
political experience, I would like to make several observations regarding the 
relationship between media and practice.  
To say that our encounter with media constitutes a particular practice is to 
say at least two things. First, when we encounter media in its various forms this 
experience is necessarily different from face-to-face interactions. Thompson 
(1995) refers to this new type of encounter as a quasi-interaction. A quasi-
interaction,  
creates a certain kind of social situation in which individuals are linked together in a 
process of communication and symbolic exchange. It is a structured situation in which 
some individuals are engaged primarily in producing symbolic forms for others who are 
not physically present, while others are involved primarily in receiving symbolic forms 
produced by others to whom they cannot respond, but with whom they can form bonds of 
friendship, affection or loyalty (Thompson, 1995, p.84-85, italics mine). 
This form of interaction gives certain segments of the population access to 
powerful tools for providing particular interpretations of reality, interpretations 
that may be disputed or accepted by the masses as they encounter these 
interpretations. 
For Thompson, such interactions are not inherently positive or negative. 
In some circumstances, quasi-interactions enable one to encounter people it 
would be difficult to encounter in any other way. Indeed, with the advent of mass 
media, relationship are no longer bounded by spatial and temporal restrictions. 
People are free to form a relationship with any of a number of figures that they 
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are unlikely to ever encounter in a face-to-face situation. Yet, because these 
relationship are inherently monological, one need put forth only minimal effort 
to maintain a relationship with the people, issues, and messages that we 
encounter through media. 
Since mediated quasi-interaction is non-dialogical, the form of intimacy established 
through it is non-reciprocal in character. That is, it is a form of intimacy which does not 
involve the kind of reciprocity and mutuality characteristic of face-to-face interaction 
(Thompson, 1995, p.219). 
While this may provide individuals with an opportunity to participate in an 
increasing number of relationships, it is not clear what role such relationships 
play in contemporary society. Indeed, quasi-interaction as practice may have a 
number of implications for the way people interpret social reality. 
Our relationship with mediated information can also be viewed as a 
practice since mediated information is often drawn upon as a topic of 
conversation in our daily face-to-face interactions. We often talk to others about 
events that are occurring around the world, from the latest celebrity news to the 
progress of a war in a distant land. Moreover, we evaluate how well events such 
as international conflicts are being conducted based on information gained 
almost exclusively from the media. In other worlds, while our face-to-face 
encounters may be significantly different from mediated, quasi-interactions, it is 
often the case that face-to-face encounters are permeated by information gained 
from such mediated encounters. This is particularly important in the case of 
media portrayals of politicians, issues, and events as the members of a society 
may take up the interpretations provided by the media unreflectively. Indeed, as 
people begin to integrate certain forms of political discourse into their social 
interactions, these discourses may exert a significant influence on the way we 
interpret political reality. 
When asked to describe concrete political situations, participants in the 
present study sometimes discuss the role the media plays in their political 
experiences. Generally speaking, these experiences can be categorized as either 
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focusing on politics as a spectacle or looking at the way the media presents the 
political as a spectrum.  
 
Spectacle 
 The second edition of The Oxford English Dictionary (1989) defines a 
spectacle as: 
(1) A specially prepared or arranged display of a more or less public nature (esp. one on a 
large scale), forming an impressive or interesting show or entertainment for those 
viewing it or (2) a person or thing exhibited to, or set before, the public gaze as an object 
either of curiosity or contempt, or of marvel of admiration (Simpson & Weiner, 1989, 
p.164). 
A spectacle is a public display prepared in advance for a particular audience. 
Moreover, spectacles have the power to elicit contempt or awe depending on the 
way an audience views a particular display. Finally, spectacles can help people see 
things that would otherwise be blurry and distorted. They have the ability to turn 
ambiguity into precision or the strange into the familiar.  
 For some participants, there is a sense that while a political reality does 
exist, the media often present a very specific view of this reality. In other words, 
participants are concerned that people and situations are being presented in ways 
that are geared to elicit specific reactions. As one participant observes,  
… you see this stuff so much more now especially with them trying to court the younger--
the younger voting population. I just--you know this image keeps popping up of me--or 
me seeing Clinton--he was on like the Aresenio Hall Show or something playing the 
saxophone and I don’t even know if I saw that--I’ve seen clips and so maybe, but just that 
kind of stuff. I think--I’m wondering if I was charmed into that sort of stuff and that you 
know because maybe I was--I was certainly uninvolved and uneducated at that point in 
politics and I still feel fairly ignorant in a lot of ways but I wonder if I was sort of charmed 
by--by silly little things like that--like well this guy is cool, but he is--you know he’s 
playing the saxophone, he’s laid back; this guy doesn’t seem like some stiff in a suit who 
doesn’t understand me or know anything about me or sort of--he’s cool.  
Here the participant is questioning why he feels a certain way about a particular 
politician. He understands that politicians may present themselves in certain 
ways that enable them to have a strategic advantage. As a result, he is 
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apprehensive that his affinity for a particular figure may not be genuine. Indeed, 
his concern is that he may have been “charmed” into believing things about a 
candidate that may not be true.  He shares with other participants a concern that 
the political figures he is responding to are merely a media representation 
designed to elicit a strategic response.  
 Further along, the participant explores in greater depth the way politicians 
are portrayed in the media. This leads him to question the authenticity of the 
people he encounters via mass media: 
… and I think--I think in some respects I still hold onto that--that element of being a kid 
where you idolize people you know growing up and like teachers are not normal people 
and you’re like shocked the first time you see your high school or your middle school and 
grade school teacher at the grocery store or something. And it’s the same sort of thing 
when you grow up seeing all these politicians and people on TV; it’s--it’s hard to 
remember if they’re real people. And I think that you know--I think that’s part of the 
problem when I talk about sort of absolutes in voting it’s like these are real people. They 
have the same sort of internal struggles that I have on the issues. I can't possibly believe 
that you’re so resolute on this but--and that makes it feel fake like they’re up there selling 
this idea and then how do you really have faith in the fact that idea is going to stick 
around, that they’re not going to be motivated by all the money and everything that gets 
thrown at them? I don’t know … 
In this case, he draws attention to the experience one has of encountering an 
authority figure in an unusual situation. In most cases, a teacher plays a 
particular role in the classroom. When teachers encounter students in a context, 
such as a grocery store, that does not provide established norms for how the 
interaction should proceed, it can be extremely uncomfortable for both parties. 
Indeed, such an experience can foreground the extent to which our interactions 
are guided by the adoption of a particular social role (Goffman, 1959). For this 
participant, although we rarely encounter politicians in a non-mediated context, 
our awareness of the way people often put forth a particular persona calls into 
question the certainty politicians often exhibit in their political beliefs. This leads 
the participant to reflect on the extent to which the image of the politician is 
“fake” and is only being used to “sell” a particular idea.     
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 Another participant expresses her dismay that media coverage of the 2004 
Presidential Election often seemed closer to a sporting event than a political 
activity. She notes that watching the election coverage,   
… was almost like a sports commentary turned into something a little different. It felt very 
unofficial and more like you know just a sports game--very American(ized), which I know 
it’s an American election, but there’s you know the commentator for one side and the 
commentator for the other and at they’re the--you know the Bush Headquarters and the 
Kerry Headquarters. It seemed really circus-like, so in any event making it more of a 
spectacle and less of something that’s respected. I think the media had a lot to do with 
that.  
Further along she suggests that,   
… spectacle may not--not be the correct word, but I don’t know--something more 
honorable, less planned and scripted and fake and--I mean maybe that’s what you have to 
be to win an election these days but I don’t know; it doesn’t seem like what you learned 
about politics like when you were a kid and you read the--the history books and you read-
-you know you take your--your American politics class and it’s all like splendor and 
majesty and you know these--these shining people that we looked up to and you know 
you’re taught to look up to and then now it’s kind of all right, this is--this is what it’s all 
about? And maybe it’s just perspective from being alive now and--but these are our 
politicians. I mean it could have always been like that; it just seems like there’s a 
discrepancy in what’s going on and what was taught.  
This participant is concerned with the extent to which media coverage of politics 
has become “fake” and “scripted”; more of a “circus” and a “spectacle” than 
something that can be looked up to. She also focuses on the discrepancy between 
what she learned about politics as a child – something filled with “splendor”, 
“majesty”, and “shining people” – and her experience with the 2004 Presidential 
Election.  
Another woman notes that the media often keep a story fresh in the 
public’s mind in order to present a particular view of political reality. Recounting 
the media coverage of a political scandal in a Texas gubernatorial race, she 
suggestes that the media,  
… kept it in front of everybody’s face, absolutely … Because to me politics, I mean it’s a 
strategy right--it’s a chess game. Every single thing you do has a part in it right, so in that 
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moment [Laughs] he made a comment--he moved a pawn, wrong pawn to move; killed 
the game. 
Further along, she claims that,  
… when I think of politics I always think of someone like screwing up because that’s all 
that gets--that gets blown up, to me anyway because I don’t really follow politics closely 
because I’ve just kind of given up on the whole thing. So I hear what the media really 
pounds on and--and so the next thing you think of is Clinton and his you know--was he 
with his Assistant, was he not with his Assistant, blah-blah, you know the blatant lie, I did 
not have sexual relations--I mean do we know that quote? Why do we know that quote; 
because the media repeated it over and over and over again. Did he have a great strategy 
to over come it; yes. Why was that; because of his charisma. He somehow--he was able to 
overcome what could have been really bad. I would love to go back and see what the 
media strategy on that was because I guarantee there was somebody behind the scenes 
making sure that every--every release beyond that was to improve his home situation or 
make his home situation look better… 
Once again, we see that politics is being viewed as a “game” in which the media 
plays an important role. Through repetitive coverage, the media can focus 
attention on a particular issue while politicians can challenge the way the media 
has defined a situation. Other participants also express the sense that media 
coverage involves keeping something in front of everybody’s “face”. Moreover, 
several participants suggest that in the relationship between media and politics, 
certain people and events remain “behind the scenes”. As one participant notes, 
… you see people reacting to all the stuff that’s behind the scenes, the man behind the 
curtain, to me then it’s all emotional.  
Another participant makes an interesting observation regarding media coverage 
of political events: 
Just all--I mean all the crap in--in the media and everything about who did this and who 
said what and--and it--it--you know that’s what’s reported and that’s what we see. I’m 
sure there’s a lot of stuff going on constantly that’s important and is making a difference 
and these are important decisions and people are working and doing a ton of stuff but you 
don’t--you don’t hear about that as much as you hear about all the--you know the stuff 
that’s going on behind the scenes and you know it seems like every other week it’s another 
Senator or--or something like that who’s you know got some sort of case brought against 
him or--or something like that. And it’s like why don’t you talk about something that you 
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know means a little more than this instead of just making some sort of witch hunt trial to 
go on TV all the time. 
Several participants share a similar sentiment regarding the deterioration of 
news coverage of political issues. It was quite common for individuals to express 
dissatisfaction about (a) the type of issues that were being covered (ex. a 
proposed law in Texas to outlaw sexually-suggestive cheerleading) and (b) the 
way these issues were being portrayed in the media. Moreover, participants 
sometimes discuss their sense that the line separating entertainment and politics 
has become increasingly blurred.  
 
Spectrum 
 While participants often discuss the way politics appears to have become a 
spectacle, they also explore the relationship between the media and particular 
political beliefs. In other words, they view media representations of politicians 
and political events as falling along a certain point of the political spectrum.  
 Several participants focus on the issue of media bias. At times, they make 
a distinction between facts which they believe should be the primary focus of 
news organizations and editorial which they feel interferes with “objective” and 
“neutral” reporting of “the news”: 
The media is supposed to report the--it’s supposed to report on politics and--and in 
different, you know not just there’s--you know there’s commentary, you know editorial 
and then there’s stories. I mean they--they report to us; they’re supposed to be you know 
our link of information, too. That being said, not a mouthpiece for [Laughs] … 
In this excerpt, the participant is making a distinction between news reports that 
are geared towards “commentary”, and “editorial” and those that focus on news 
stories. He suggests that while the media should be our “link” to information, it is 
sometimes the case that media coverage of politics becomes a “mouthpiece” for 
certain political positions. Moreover, the participant notes that, 
… when you’re reporting on a situation it is more informational, more--more fact-based, 
okay. Who--the who, the--the where, you know--those--you know kind of fact-based 
information; editorial, yeah there’s--I’m saying this is the feeling I got there. This is you 
know--this is--this is what I think about it--fair enough, you know. But there are certain 
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things that we can all agree on you know.  It’s getting to that; I think there’s a difference 
in that. 
“Reporting” means providing “fact-based information” whereas “editorial” 
conveys something else. Moreover, he says that “there are certain things we can 
all agree on” indicating that it is at least possible to provide an unbiased account 
of political issues. 
 Another participant notes that newspaper articles in a local paper were 
very often “biased” towards a particular candidate during the 2004 Presidential 
Election.    
… even the [local newspaper] is very biased--extremely biased in the articles that they 
publish and without--I mean if--if someone doesn’t read that objectively there 
automatically swayed one way. Ninety-percent of those articles sway you against Bush, 
and it should be--that newspaper should be 50/50 or it should be--they should be under 
Letters to the Editor, and I think a lot of people read that and say oh this is what I should 
believe. This is what people around me believe. This is what I’m going to do. And they 
never make --their own independent decision.  
This participant is suggesting that if someone does not remain “objective” when 
they are reading a local newspaper, they may inadvertently be “swayed” to adopt 
a particular political position. It is not clear if her belief that newspaper coverage 
of an election should be “50/50” refers to the idea that readers should receive 
equal positive/negative stories for a single candidate or if positive/negative 
coverage of one candidate should be balanced by positive/negative coverage of 
another candidate. In any event, this ambiguity is avoided by arguing that 
coverage presenting a candidate in a particular light should be restricted to a 
section of the newspaper called “Letters to the Editor”. If newspapers fail to do 
this, it may prevent readers from making “their own independent decision.” 
The distinction between news and editorial brings issues of media bias 
into the foreground. Many of the participants who discuss the relationship 
between media and politics are concerned that news reports often seemed 
designed to support particular ideological positions. Discussions of media bias 
sometimes focus on the relationship between particular news networks: 
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And I think a lot of us just hear the news--the news is also very biased. I can flip between 
two channels--Fox and Channel 5; there’s no doubt in my mind who they’re supporting 
and I don’t think that’s--I mean I guess you can choose what station to watch but knowing 
as little as I know I could watch one station and be persuaded and I think that’s a fault of 
the media, but at the same time politics.  
Another participant discusses the way ideology influences media coverage of 
political events: 
… I’m a liberal, so I listen to NPR and I think that that’s the right way to look at things 
and I watch Fox News and I think that’s the wrong way to look at things. And I would 
hope that there would be something in the middle that would at least present like just 
issues, and I’m sure that you know that’s an objective of you know like news or--or 
whatever. But even then you know [local] News that comes out of a conservative town’s--
mostly Republicans in office, you know; even the news coverage has shifted. So I think --
that affects how a lot of people think… there wasn’t that much of an option given to be 
purple [Laughs]. 
Both participants are aware of differences in the way news organizations cover 
political issues. The first participant recognizes that people are free to watch any 
channel they like, but she is also concerned that those who are unaware of the 
political affiliation of a particular news organization may mistake ideological 
rhetoric for objective news reporting. 
 The second participant also recognizes differences in media coverage but 
suggests that her political beliefs help her distinguish between a station whose 
reporting is “the right way to look at things” and another station whose reporting 
is “the wrong way to look at things”. Moreover, she is concerned that there are no 
news organizations “in the middle” that are capable of presenting “just issues”, 
what she refers to as “news.” 
 The participant’s comment that there was not “much of an option given to 
be purple” refers to the fact that during the 2004 Presidential Election, news 
organizations identified Republican leaning states as red while those states 
leaning towards Democrats were identified with the color blue. Her concern is 
that media representations of politics contribute to our inability to find any 
middle ground on important issues – a middle ground that would be a mixture of 
red and blue. Indeed, this participant feels that media representations of 
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candidates, whether Fox News or NPR, fail to encourage people to evaluate 
political issues outside of traditional ideological boundaries. Participants are 
sometimes frustrated that media organizations report political conflicts in 
either/or terms – a situation that seems to limit their ability to deal with the 
nuances of a political issue. The same participant who notes that there were no 
options to be “purple” continues to explore the way the election was “portrayed” 
in the media:  
I always think about like how everything has to be red or blue; I mean that was--that was 
really big in this election because it was very polarized, one side or the other, red states, 
blue states, you know the states that weren’t real white. So the way that they really 
portrayed it like you have to be all red or all blue and I think that’s maybe a new 
development in the last little while … 
Further along she suggests that,  
… it was always--one or the other and I think that that’s maybe something that shouldn’t 
happen so much in politics. You should be able to have a combination--
conservative/liberal or liberal/conservative or however you want to say it, but I didn’t see 
any options presented because of the way the--the media portrayed that… it seems like 
they should present every side of the issue and you know all information that they can 
give the public so that they can make some sort of decision based on their values or how 
they see the candidate and not how so and so presents it or so and so else does. 
Once again this participant is concerned with the way political issues have 
become either all red or all blue – that is, one must take the side of either the 
Republicans or the Democrats. It is clear that she does not simply believe that 
this is the way political reality works but instead focuses on the way the “media 
portrayed” politicians and political issues. In this sense, she is saying that the 
political reality of the American two-party system is intimately related to the way 
the media covers politics. 
 She also notes that the media should “present every side of the issue” in 
the form of “information” that they “give the public”. Such reporting will allow 
people to make their own decisions instead of being persuaded to adopt a 
particular view because of the way a news organization “presents” political issues.  
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 Indeed, participants are sometimes concerned with the extent to which 
media organizations are able to shape public opinion. As one participant notes,  
the idea that we can form political opinions about people and issues when we don’t have 
all the facts, like we--like we know now that Bush had bad intelligence about Hussein, you 
know like--but we didn’t know that at the time and--and sometimes you--sometimes you 
hit and sometimes you miss, and I’m not saying that’s okay or that what we’re doing--
whether or not sometimes the name of the game changes when  you’re over there; you 
know what I mean. And I’m not saying that--that didn’t happen but I just think that 
sometimes people are forming opinions just on what the press tells you--just what is not 
public--yeah, public knowledge, like what is allowed to be put out there. 
Another participant discuss the powerlessness she experienced regarding a 
school board election to allocate property tax funds to an impoverished school 
district. For her, the media played a decisive role in influencing the outcome of a 
policy that she feels directly influenced her education. In this case, she perceives 
the media to be complicit in the powerlessness she felt over the whole situation: 
And to me I see politics as this monstrous thing that the media has commentary power on 
and but it’s pretty much untouchable for you, the voter …  
In many cases, participants view the media as exerting an inhibiting influence on 
their political activities. It is to some of those activities that I would now like to 
turn. 
 
Conventional Political Activities 
For those concerned with the future of democracy, it is of paramount 
importance to explore the extent to which members of democratic societies 
participate in political activities. This concern has generated a tremendous 
amount of empirical research in a variety of disciplines including psychology 
(Cohen, Vigoda & Samorly, 2001; Finkel & Ernst, 2005; Morrell, 2005), sociology 
(March, 2005; Merelman & Franz, 2004) and political science (Letki, 2004; 
Pratchett, 2004; Skocpol, 2004). While each of these disciplines focus on 
different aspects of political participation, nearly all share a concern that citizens 
in democratic societies often fail to participate in political activities. As Crotty 
(1991) observes, “political participation or, more accurately, the nonparticipation 
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of significant numbers of its citizens in its political life, is one of the more severe 
and intractable problems the United States faces” (p.viii). Given the importance 
of political participation in the democratic process, it is important to understand 
how social scientists have traditionally conceptualized such activities.  
 While there are a number of ways to define ‘political participation’, we will 
begin with several definitions that provide a foundation for contemporary 
research into the issue. McClosky (1968) defines political participation as 
engaging in, 
those voluntary activities by which members of a society share in the selection of rulers 
and, directly or indirectly, in the formation of public policy… These activities typically 
include voting, seeking information, discussing and proselytizing, attending meetings, 
contributing financially, and communicating with representatives (p.252) 
This definition is similar in many ways to Verba, Nie & Kim’s (1971) view that 
political participation is, 
the means by which the interests, desires, and demands of the ordinary citizen are 
communicated. By political participation we refer to all those activities by private citizens 
that are more or less directly aimed at influencing the selection of government personnel 
and/or the decisions that they make (p.9) 
In both cases, political participation is viewed as a means for allowing the 
members of a society to elect representatives who will carry out their wishes. 
Kaase and Marsh (1979) offer a similar definition of political participation as, “all 
voluntary activities by individual citizens intended to influence either directly or 
indirectly political choices at various levels of the political system” (p.42) while in 
Brady’s (1999) estimation, political participation, “requires action by ordinary 
citizens directed toward influencing some political outcomes. All four elements—
actions, citizens, influence, and political outcomes—are necessary for political 
participation” (p.737). In each of these definitions we see that political 
participation involves a concerted effort by citizens of a democratic society to 
enact change within their representative government. In this sense, political 
participation is dependent on citizens having a means of enacting change within 
their government. 
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Political scientists sometimes distinguish various forms of democracy 
(Parry, Moyser & Day, 1992). Two of these forms are particularly important for 
the present analysis. In the first form, democracy flourishes when a large number 
of individuals are participating in the political process. In what is commonly 
referred to as participatory democracy, the citizens of a democratic nation are 
actively involved in the shaping of policies and laws. The citizen who is a part of a 
participatory democracy not only votes in regular elections but also is involved in 
other activities including signing petitions, communicating with designated 
representatives, attending political demonstrations, and forming groups that 
exert political pressure on these representatives. For Parry, Moyser & Day (1992),  
a modern participatory democracy will be one in which citizens avail themselves of these 
modes of activity to a high degree. An idealized picture of such a polity would portray a 
populace interested in politics, turning out in numbers to vote in national and local 
politics, attending electoral meetings, forming groups to campaign for shared objectives, 
contacting representatives and officials. The interest in politics could be expected to 
ensure that many issues and problems would take on a political dimension and that their 
solution would be sought through political action (p.4). 
In a participatory democracy, citizens are actively involved in decisions that have 
an impact on their lives. While voting is an important part of a participatory 
democracy, citizens also engage in a wide range of other political activities 
designed to influence public policy. Indeed, within a participatory democracy, 
governments are structured to encourage these activities within the populous.  
This encouragement ensures that the government is functioning in such a way as 
to maximize the influence citizens have on the policies that affect their everyday 
lives. 
 While some believe that a participatory democracy represents the ideal 
form of democracy, theorists have been forced to concede that this form of 
democracy is rarely found in actual practice. Indeed, some argue that political 
participation is most effective when it is restricted to the election of political 
representatives. In this “realist” theory of democracy, individuals are not 
expected to actively participate in the affairs of government. Instead, 
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democracy is distinguished by political competition between groups of leaders for the 
support of the population which is expressed at periodic elections. The victorious group, a 
political party, receives authority to govern for a term of years. Between elections, citizens 
have little part to play. They may criticize, but the are not expected to seek to govern… 
The citizens place checks on leaders at elections. They are ‘controllers’ rather than 
‘participants’ (Parry, Moyser & Day, 1992, p.5). 
The “realist” approach to democracy does not view frequent political 
participation as the expression of a flourishing democracy but focuses on the way 
regular elections ensure that citizens have a socially sanctioned means for 
choosing representatives who share their particular interests. Within this view, 
political participation outside of elections is seen as interfering with the smooth 
functioning of government 
 Researchers also explore some of the reasons why people choose to 
participate in political activities. Perhaps the most obvious reason is that people 
feel that political activities provide a means for bringing about certain desirable 
goals. In other words, people become politically active for instrumental reasons 
so that, “participation is intended to promote or defend the goals of the 
participants with the minimum of costs and the maximum of effect” (Parry, 
Moyser & Day, 1992, p.9). Indeed, much of the research on political participation 
focuses on the way political activities enable individuals to control the outcome of 
a particular situation (Barnes & Kaase, 1979; Parry, Moser & Day, 1992; Verba & 
Nie, 1972). 
Another theory of political participation suggests that individuals do not 
always participate in political activities to further their own ends but are instead 
motivated by a sense of identification with a particular community. From a 
communitarian perspective,  
one motive, or justification, for taking part in politics is not an instrumental calculation of 
benefit to oneself, but a concern for the community of which a person is a part. At the 
core of a great deal of participatory democratic theory, at least since the time of 
Rousseau’s Social Contract (published in 1762), is the view that where people are highly 
integrated into the local community, and where they identify strongly with it, 
participation would be greater. In these circumstances, people have a more detailed 
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understanding of local needs and problems and recognize that these needs are often 
shared with their neighbors (Parry, Moser & Day, 1992, p.12-13). 
In other words, political participation draws people together in order for the 
community to achieve concrete political goals. While there is a sense that the 
community is striving to achieve specific aims, the emphasis is on the community 
rather than the individual. Moreover, this sense of community need not be 
restricted to a relationship with people in one’s immediate locale. A sense of 
belonging to a certain trade, class, or religion can motivate people to engage in 
particular political activities. While these activities may be designed to achieve a 
particular goal, communitarian theories of participation emphasize the way these 
activities strengthen the relationship among members of a community.  
 Yet another approach suggests that people become politically active 
because they believe that such activities are an expression of their “political 
identity” (Parry, Moser & Day, 1992). In other words, political participation is a 
symbolic process enabling individuals to explore certain forms of self-expression. 
Within American society, such expression may take the form of reciting the 
pledge of allegiance, saluting the flag, or singing the national anthem (Conway, 
1985; Parry, Moser & Day, 1992). In other cases, people may have a desire to take 
part in events such as a war protest in order to express their solidarity with others 
or out of a desire to participate in an important historical event:  
In these cases, however, the expressive and instrumental elements become more difficult 
to distinguish. If one takes part in a civil right march or in a demonstration over political 
prisoners outside the embassy of a country notoriously impervious to outside pressure, 
one may merely be registering one’s presence, or identify. But there is usually some hope 
of adding one’s tiny voice in order to create a clamour, however unrealistic this is seen 
from some instrumental perspectives (Parry, Moser & Day, 1992). 
While the symbolic aspects of political participation may enable citizens to 
express their political identity, such expression may also further instrumental 
ends. Indeed, the differences among instrumental, communitarian, and 
expressive forms of political participation represent a difference in emphasis 
rather than divisions defined by discrete boundaries. 
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 It is clear from the interviews that participants often describe situations in 
which they participated in some form of conventional political activity.  Two of 
the most salient activities were (1) voting in an election and (2) attending a 
political protest. We will begin by discussing participant’s experience of voting in 
an election. 
 
Voting 
 For many citizens of democratic societies, voting is the primary means for 
ensuring that their views are represented at all levels of government. Nearly every 
year, citizens have the opportunity to choose from a variety of candidates and 
issues and ultimately to cast a vote in a direction of their own choosing. Yet there 
is a real concern that members of democratic societies often choose not to 
participate in local, state, and national elections. Crotty (1991) observes that, “the 
United States has one of the weakest levels of political participation, as measured 
by the vote, of any major industrial democracy” (p.1) while Kornbluh (2000) 
expresses concern that American democracy is increasingly vulnerable to what he 
calls the “demobilization of the mass electorate” (p.xiii). Others point out that 
this dire situation should be dealt with by trying to understand the characteristics 
and experiences of the ever fluctuating mass of “non-voters” (Doppelt & Shearer; 
1999). Clearly, a thorough understanding of the voting experiences of citizens in a 
democracy is in order. 
 For a number of participants, voting in an election gives them an 
opportunity to reflect on their political beliefs and to determine the extent to 
which a political party’s platform is congruent with the way they view a political 
issue. In other words, participants often view an election as a time to pick the 
candidate who shares their political beliefs. One participant discusses the first 
time she voted in a national election: 
Okay, the first time I voted I waited in line for about five hours to vote on campus. It was 
my freshman year; I had never really talked about politics in my house. I knew what my 
beliefs were and what my morals were but I didn’t necessarily know you know who that 
was tied to. So I found out a little bit about you know the candidates and realized that I--I 
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definitely wasn’t a Republican. I really didn’t think I was a Democrat either and so yeah, I 
went Green Party and got yelled at by all my friends, who all voted for Gore. [Laughs] But 
I mean I--that felt like the closest to what I thought at the time and I didn’t really think 
about it in terms of you know being practical and saying okay would I rather you know--
these two people are the people that I have a choice from. Would I rather put in my word 
for one or the other; so that kind of stood out later I guess.  
What stood out to this participant was the fact that voting required her to select a 
candidate from a particular party who shared her beliefs. Despite her friends’ 
misgivings, she ultimately chose to vote for a more marginal political party. She 
did not feel that the choice she made was based on any concern for being 
“practical.” Despite the overwhelming odds against a Green Party candidate 
winning the Presidential Election, she felt compelled to select that party because 
the Green candidate shared more of her beliefs than any of the traditional 
political parties. This event was political for her because, as she notes: 
I was engaged in politics; I mean I was--I was voting and I was with a bunch of other 
people that like me had probably just turned 18. I mean I was in the--in the freshman 
dorm, so I knew at that point that I was in a conservative town but--I mean you can't wear 
anything that has a candidate’s name on it or anything in the place. So you--so you like 
hear a lot of people talking and stuff and I think that the big thing was I--I was alone. My 
friends waited in line with me for a while and then they like [Laughs] just opted out. I 
guess they wanted to go out or whatever and I--I waited alone for like two and half or 
three hours, and I had a book but I was really just like kind of listening to what everybody 
else was saying and--and I realized that I was--I was the only one [Laughs] in that group 
at least that wasn’t voting red or blue; so, I was physically alone and voting alone; so … 
And I knew I was alone voting. [Laughs] I mean my friends waited for a while, but I 
wasn’t a part of the group apparently.  
Here the participant develops an intriguing insight into the nature of her voting 
experience. The friends that ridiculed her for voting for a marginal political party 
ultimately decided not to vote, leaving her alone in line. Moreover, the 
conversations she heard from the strangers around her indicated that she was the 
only one voting for the Green Party candidate. She was alone both in the fact that 
her friends had left her and in her choice to vote for the Green Party.  
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 Another participant reflects on his ambivalence in voting for the Green 
Party in a recent presidential election: 
Yeah; well and I used to feel more empowered. I used to vote green because I--my one 
vote was never going to determine which way the State and Senate’s electoral votes and I 
felt like the Democratic Party was slipping to the right so if I vote green that’s a message 
that they lost--they’re going to count--out of the number of votes that went green and 
they’re going to say we’re losing two percent of our constituency because we’re going too 
far to the right. And that might be a way to bring them back in a very, very small way … 
And I felt--so I could see how my vote would make a difference. But then when I do feel 
like Ralph Nader cost Gore the election in what was it--2000, and I feel bitter about that 
because I respect what Ralph Nader is saying but I think this country was hurt by his 
actions, and so I can't support him anymore. So I’ve just been voting Democrat since then 
and I don’t--and here there’s only 40 percent of the state that voted Democrat so it--I 
guess I added a statistic but it didn’t--I don’t think that it made much difference at all. So 
I did feel pretty disempowered voting. 
Although this participant’s political views are aligned more with the Green Party’s 
platform, he is concerned that voting for the Green Party candidate ultimately 
cost the Democratic candidate the 2000 Presidential Election. He initially viewed 
his vote for the Green Party as a means of steering the platform of the Democratic 
Party though he concedes that this may have backfired. Because of this situation, 
he generally does not feel “empowered” when he votes. Moreover, because he 
lives in a state that traditionally gives its electoral votes to Republican candidates 
in the Presidential election, he does not feel that his vote “made much difference 
at all.” 
 Participants sometimes look at voting as the final stage of the political 
process. As one participant notes: 
… it’s difficult too because when you’ve cast that vote it’s almost like you’re certainly not 
like stoic and decided this is--this is how I feel about this issue. And that’s not going to 
change but when you cast that vote it’s kind of like [Claps] it’s cemented. And it’s like 
okay that’s my political ideology in a fucking hat for--for [Laughs] forever or for the next 
four years when it may shift. I might start to understand things differently or have some 
insight into something new and it’s like I don’t--I didn’t agree with that but what’s done is 
done and that’s--that’s how I felt you know at that moment and so I’m sort of stuck with 
that now. 
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While voting in an election requires people to choose between the platforms of 
various political candidates, the act of voting itself is sometimes experienced as 
“cemented” in so far as it does not make room for shifting opinions and tends to 
simplify many of the nuances in political thought. When one casts a vote, “what’s 
done is done,” so that whatever the outcome of the election, one is “stuck with 
that now.” Further along, the participant describes, 
… that element of apathy of like am I just going Presidential Election to Presidential 
Election you know and it’s like okay I cast my vote. There’s nothing I feel like I can do 
now for the next four years. We’ll just wait until the next one and see what--see what my 
choices are then and it’s kind of--it’s sort of damned if you do and damned if you don’t 
kind of feeling.  
For many participants, voting remains the primary socially sanctioned means for 
participating in politics. Indeed, once one has cast his or her vote, there is a sense 
that the process is complete and the next opportunity to be politically active 
emerges when the election cycle begins again. For this participant, the situation 
encourages “apathy” and a feeling that in these circumstances, you are, “damned 
if you do and damned if you don’t.” Moreover, he suggests that, 
… it’s frustrating in that--in that fact because it’s like I mean my views are changing and 
fluctuating all the time and I learn new things and everything like that and it’s--you’re 
asked in one moment to sort of seal your--your political views into one vote and that 
seems pretty impossible. And you get--I mean I think it would be really interesting to sort 
of go back in and look at like the main points of people’s platforms before elections and--
and then chart the people that got elected and look how much of what they said and what 
they did or how much of what they said turned into something they actually did and how 
much you’re just getting sold on these ideas that--that end up being a whole bunch of 
nothing. I guess that’s a frustrating thing, too is--it’s hard you know I guess I’ve talked 
about this earlier a little bit but it’s just hard to feel like that vote means a lot because you 
don’t know what the hell they’re going to do once they’re in. And the--the political process 
and the way the government functions it seems like it’s just a big mess … 
Here there is a sense that even though voting is the principle way to be involved 
in politics, it is not all together clear how much influence individuals have once 
their vote has been cast. Not only do elections require one to “seal” his or her 
“political views into one vote,” but it is also “hard to feel like that vote means a lot 
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because you don’t know what the hell” a politician is going to do once he or she is 
elected to office.  
 Another participant notes how the 2004 Presidential Election changed the 
way people interacted with one another: 
Like the election was over and [my boyfriend] and I stopped fighting about it; and the 
election was over and a bunch of my theater friends and I stopped fighting about it. Like 
it just--it was the most bizarre thing I--one of the few--most bizarre things I had 
encountered at college, you know at that--up to that point where it was just this 
phenomenon of everyone had an opinion and everyone thought this about this and well 
you read that here? Well I read this here. And--and it wasn’t even--because I think that 
when it’s not Presidential there’s a lot of bickering between Democrats and between 
Republicans, but like I said you get an issue or you get a situation or an event you know 
like electing our President and everyone is a staunch--you’re a Republican or you’re a 
Democrat or you’re liberal or you’re conservative. And so it was just amazing that I knew 
there were people that were on the fence about certain subjects and just all the sudden 
they were on one side or the other. 
Once again, participants see voting as the final stage of the political process. 
Especially during an election, people who may ordinarily possess complex 
political ideas begin to identify and relate to one another in terms of available 
political parties. Indeed, once the election is over, people become less polarized. 
Further along, the participant suggests that, 
… the most odd thing was that it really did just vanish. We had a new President and it was 
over, you know. And it felt very anti-climatic because [Laughs] I don’t know--just like I--I 
guess I saw so much, like I saw so many really heated debates and so many of my friends 
just like so certain that he wouldn’t get reelected and it just felt very like--you know like 
just totally like peak and then it’s gone. Like not even it peaks and plateaus or peaks and 
dips back down; it just peaked and disappeared. Like it was bizarre; I was just like you 
mean there’s no bloodshed, there’s no gun you know shot heard around the world--
nothing? Like it really felt like you could feel the tension, the--the closer you got to 
Election Day. You could feel--every time there was an argument or a debate the stakes got 
higher. You could hear it in their voices that this was more--the argument or the side 
being presented was more desperate because it was so close and what you were saying 
and who you were backing was about to decided if they were going to win or not, and you 
could just feel the energy rising. I don’t know; and to have it just all the sudden--be 
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nothing--not just go--not just dip or drop out or it just disappeared. It was mind-boggling 
… 
Several participants noted that political debate simply “vanished” after the 
election was over. For this participant, there is a sense that tension increased as 
the election approached until it reaches a “peak and then it’s gone.” She makes it 
clear that the tension and frequency of her friend’s political debates did not “peak 
and plateaus or peak and dip back down” but that ultimately it just “peaked and 
disappeared.” For the participant, this experience was “mind-boggling” as one 
felt the “energy rising” only to have it “all the sudden – be nothing.” 
It is also interesting to note that when people did discuss voting in an 
election, it was almost always a national election. The general sense was that local 
politics were of minor importance. While some participant’s did talk about local 
politics, it was more often the case that descriptions of their participation in an 
election were restricted to national politics, especially Presidential Elections. As 
one participant notes: 
… that element of well then I don’t pay attention to the state level stuff or the local--the 
local stuff and I can certainly be involved with that you know during the time period 
between Presidential Elections but that’s blown up so much that--that’s almost when you 
think about voting and politics that’s all you think about or all I think about is the 
national level stuff.  
This participant senses that he may become more politically active if he begins to 
focus on both local and national political activities. At the same time, he notes 
that the fact that he is likely to move after he graduates from school contributes 
to his, 
… being in flux, being in a place where I don’t think I’m going to stay as long, it seems like 
I--maybe that’s part of it, like maybe once I get to a town where I think I’m going to settle 
down and stay for a while I might find that I start paying a lot more attention to local level 
stuff because I could maybe see that affecting me for a much longer period of time. I don’t 
know if that’s part of the reason or if that’s part of the evolution of like I’m sort of a novice 
in--in government and politics and--and you know your--your introduction to that is as a 
kid almost more--you clue in much more on the national level President Elections; that’s 
what you know. And--and as you--you grow older, you get more involved, you get more 
nuanced, maybe local and state level stuff starts to become more a part of the picture. 
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Here the participant hopes that his lack of interest in local politics stems from the 
fact that his current residence is not where he ultimately wants to “settle down.” 
Once he sets up residence in a place where he feels he will live for an extended 
period of time, he may become more interested in local political activities. He 
also notes that his focus on national politics may be a result of socialization. He 
suggests that, as a child, “you clue in much more on the national level 
Presidential Elections” and that as one grows older, “local and state level stuff 
starts to become more a part of the picture.” I will have much more to say about 
the relationship between politics and socialization in a moment.  
 For the most part, participants were not particularly enthusiastic about 
casting a vote in an election. Voting was largely experienced as an obligation 
instead of an exciting part of being a citizen in a democratic society. Those 
participants who talked about voting were often frustrated because they did not 
believe that their vote would have much of an impact on the outcome of elections. 
As I have already noted, descriptions of electoral experiences were almost always 
restricted to national elections. When participants discuss local politics, they 
usually do not describe actually casting a vote in those elections.      
 
Protesting 
For a number of participants, protesting provides either an alternative or a 
compliment to what they view as more conventional forms of political 
participation. Parry, Moyser and Day (1992) suggest that, 
clearly, it is of some significance to understand the prospects of democratic institutions to 
establish how far such ‘unconventional’ forms of participation constitute another distinct 
mode of action performed by a category of protestors … or whether it is indeed the case 
that some forms of protest are really part of the ‘conventional’ political world (p.18). 
While political theorists focus on electoral politics, it may be fruitful to explore 
the relationship between “unconventional” and “conventional” forms of political 
participation. This is all the more important when we begin to reflect on the very 
meaning of being a member of a democracy. For those advocating participatory 
democracy, it is clear that democracy, 
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is dependent upon participation rather than upon the mere existence of a set of 
procedures that facilitate a properly monitored open electoral system. Advocates of 
participatory democracy, therefore, recognize that a democratic system depends upon 
people having the opportunity to engage in social and political activity, in an ongoing 
way, not just at election time (Todd & Taylor, 2004, p.10) 
Within a participatory democracy, elections may be an important part of the 
political process but they are not the only means of political participation. While 
alternative political activities may be viewed by some as a distraction from the 
party politics or elections that enable citizens to exert a significant influence on 
their representatives, “unconventional” forms of political activity may also signal 
a change in the structure of contemporary politics. Indeed, Weinstein (2004) 
argues that, 
the rise in new social movements and direct action politics is often contrasted with the 
decline in political parties. It is clearly the case that the rise in new social movement 
activities has allowed for a different possibility of ‘doing’ politics—one that was widely 
regarded as being far more attractive to young people (Weinstein, 2004, p.185). 
This has led a number of researchers to focus on the way demonstrations and 
political protests operate both within and outside the boundaries of more 
conventional forms of political activity (Jenkins & Klandermans, 1995; Teske, 
1997; Todd & Taylor, 2004). Such research can benefit from understanding how 
people experience these “unconventional” forms of political activity and how 
these activities are distinguished from more conventional forms of political 
participation.  
 A number of participants note the difference between their experience of 
protesting and their experience of voting in an election: 
Voting just felt like a--I don’t really want to say a responsibility but just something that 
was a little more natural and everybody votes and it’s--I mean I guess not everybody 
votes, but it’s organized. It’s--it’s part of the process and I feel like I’m--I’m taking part in 
the process of you know politics, but then when I’m protesting it’s almost like I’m--I’m 
arguing against it. I mean it’s--it’s you know less organized, more raw. And when you’re 
voting nobody knows who you’re voting for; I mean it’s all undercover and secretive and 
oh this is my view but nobody knows. So I felt more--yeah; I felt like I was really doing 
something even though it probably counted less than my measly vote … 
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Here she explores the possibility that protesting is a reaction against 
conventional political activities, such as voting, instead of another type of socially 
sanctioned political activity. For her, voting is “part of the process” while 
protesting is an activity that is “arguing against” conventional political activity. 
While voting is “organized”, protesting is “raw”. Moreover, voting is largely a 
private affair – “undercover and secretive”—so that “nobody knows who you’re 
voting for.” On the other hand, protesting make her feel like she is doing 
something unconventional and public, something in stark contrast to casting a 
vote in an election. Finally, even though she clearly prefers protesting to voting, 
she is concerned that her participation in a protest “probably counted less than 
my measly vote.”  
 Another participant describes the contrast between voting in a national 
election and taking part in a war protest in Washington D.C.:  
Well just--I just remember being so excited to go do this thing, and I--it was like you--you 
look like at the--you know Vietnam era and all the protests and--and it seemed like 
everybody was alive and a part of it and there was a voice and you’re actually heard and it 
was that sort of excitement about like I’m doing something. I’m actually--I’m actually 
going to try to be a part of this and try to--maybe somebody will hear this and I’ll actually 
feel like I did something as opposed to just casting this vote that sort of goes away into 
Neverland that doesn’t really mean--it--it means something and--and you know when it’s 
accumulated, but it--it still feels almost sort of like a meaningless action in a lot of ways--
voting--to me still. But going and actually being a part of it felt like the closest thing I 
could to protest to actually like running for something and trying to actually be a part of 
the--the governmental process as far as being an elected person … 
This participant notes the similarity between his participation in a protest to 
prevent the Iraq War and protesting in the sixties against the war in Vietnam. In 
both cases, people are more “alive” in their struggle to “to be a part” of something 
that can change the course of political events. Many of the participants who 
discussed participating in political protests mentioned this sense of being a part 
of something important. Indeed, many felt that when they protested, they had a 
“voice” in shaping the course of events. The experience of protesting was radically 
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different from voting in an election where one’s vote “goes away into Neverland,” 
a “meaningless action in a lot of ways.”  
Another participant describes her experience of participating in a political 
protest in the town where she attends school: 
I had never really felt connected and overtly political about anything in terms of national 
politics. I mean I--I’ve stated my opinion and I think that people generally know where I 
fall but I had never done anything about it. I never contributed; I never you know--you 
know monetarily or physically or anything. So I guess that was the first time that I had 
really felt like I belonged to one side or another and I felt like I--a unity of people around 
that were you know expressing the same thing and making their voice heard. 
Before protesting, she had “never really felt connected” to political events on the 
national level. Although she had discussed political issues with people in the past, 
she notes a difference between having a political position and doing something 
about that position. Indeed, she suggests that, 
… it was interesting because I had never experienced that before. I mean it was a--a new 
experience for me and I mean it was exciting and I--I felt good about myself for--for 
having you know voiced my opinion especially in a town whose opinions for the most part 
is opposite. So it was nice to hear people honking because I didn’t expect that. And it--it 
did feel like the--there was a real like unity and understanding among the people that 
were there. I mean we all shared the same opinions for the most part even though we may 
come from different backgrounds. That was, you know a concrete example of when I was-
-I felt involved with politics I guess. I haven’t--I mean I haven’t been involved otherwise. I 
voted and I’ve you know made my voice heard but I’ve never contributed or really kept up 
with much more than--it’s just on the surface.  
Many of these participants describe a sense of belonging and a “unity” they do 
not experience in other political activities. Moreover, participants often talk 
about the way protests give them an opportunity to make their “voice heard.” In 
sharp contrast to voting, participants referred to the sense that protesting was 
very much a shared experience. There also seems to be a feeling of commitment 
in protesting that is lacking when participants talk about voting in an election. 
 Returning to a participant who describes his experience of protesting in 
Washington D.C., it is clear that protesting is an extremely powerful experience:   
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I think one of the coolest things for me was just being around so many people that you 
know I’m not so naïve to think that they all have the same views as me or anything like 
that but feeling part of a cause and--and being in that march and sort of walking around 
the buildings and going past the White House and sort of just stopping and standing and 
looking at this thing and it seems, it’s--it really is like this TV world, you know that I just 
see and it’s happening. I’m--I’m watching; I’m not participating and actually being there 
in the flesh and seeing these buildings for real made them so much more real and tangible 
to me and--and it--you know I keep saying alive I think but just being in that place, I 
think--I think that’s that the alluring aspect of--of Washington, DC is--for--is like being 
there and seeing--and seeing these places and being a part of that environment.  
What is especially significant about this excerpt is the role setting plays in the 
entire experience. It is clear that the setting in which this protest took place was 
intimately connected to the experience as a whole. The monuments and buildings 
are particularly salient as the participant marches through the streets. Clearly, he 
is more accustomed to seeing these buildings and monuments through the media, 
so much so that the experience “really is like this TV world.” 
Just walking around and seeing all the monuments and everything and--and the Vietnam 
Wall, you just can't help sort of feeling sort of mesmerized by it and--and walking around 
late at night the first night we got there when it was just really quiet and--and there’s 
nobody out and going up to the Capitol House, you know it’s probably--I don’t know like 
nine--ten of nine and it’s just dark and it’s kind of--kind of chilly and it’s just really quiet 
and sort of just standing there and then the building is lit up and it just felt so--it was just 
so fascinating to actually be there.  
This participant distinguishes the way he encountered these buildings in the 
past—a “watching”—from his present encounter with them in the protest—a 
“participating.” All of this makes it difficult for him to believe that these 
structures are actually “real,” that he is really “there in the flesh.” Indeed, he 
describes his encounter with the Vietnam War Memorial as mesmerizing.  
 Despite the fact that most participants who discussed political protests 
preferred protesting to voting, some express frustration that although they felt 
like they had a “voice” and a sense of “unity,” they still were not sure that these 
protests had any significant impact on political issues.  
But [Sighs] you know this should be the part where I talk about that was what really got 
me interested and--and then I really started getting into these things and trying to--to be 
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involved but it sort of just kind of went away. I don’t know what happened; I don’t know 
what was motivating that and why I wanted to be so involved, but part of it was that they 
went ahead and passed the Bill anyway. And so it was like oh yeah this doesn’t really 
matter. You can do this and you know nothing is really going to come of it. 
Here the participant is referring to a time when he and his classmates organized a 
protest against a bill designed to loosen the restrictions on gun control. His 
frustration stems from the fact that, despite the protest, the legislation ultimately 
passed. Although he explains elsewhere that he enjoys protesting more than 
voting, he is concerned that his failure to make an impact on political issues has 
led to apathy regarding political participation. Indeed, he connects this early 
experience of protesting with his experience of protesting in Washington D.C.:  
… it’s still really frustrating to see that many people do something and feel a part of 
something and then have the exact opposite of what you were hoping to achieve come 
from it.  
Several participants express concern that while protesting enables them to 
express themselves in exciting ways, the activity itself did not seem to bring about 
the desired instrumental outcome. Similarly, participants often discuss the way 
their vote failed to make any lasting contribution to the political process, despite 
the fact that voting is perhaps the most conventional form of political activity.  
Another participant expresses concern that her friends attended a protest 
but failed to participate in an election that she believes could have really made an 
impact: 
Like you know a couple friends of mine that I know didn’t vote went to a demonstration 
in Washington, DC and I’m like you had your chance. What are you doing? Why are you 
marching on the--on the lawn? Who cares; he doesn’t--he’s elected and maybe he 
wouldn’t have been if you--I mean I know [our] county went for Kerry so they were 
probably like well it wouldn’t have made that much of a difference. But I’m just like but 
you’re one of hundreds of thousands that thought that way; my county is going to go this 
way it doesn’t really matter or my state is going to go this way; it doesn’t really matter. 
Maybe it does--maybe it does; if you’re--if you’re one person that feels that way but votes 
anyway maybe there’s other people out there that are like well it doesn’t matter but I’ll 
vote anyway and it totally changes the--I mean it totally changes the outcome.  
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In this case, the participant is frustrated by the fact that some of her politically 
active friends chose to participate in a political demonstration instead of voting. 
She recognizes that people may not vote because the electoral system is set up to 
give the votes of an entire region to a single candidate; yet she is adamant that if 
individuals truly believe that they can make a difference, it may be possible for 
them to do so. Her experience is a combination of frustration that people do not 
participate in activities that may actually change the course of important events 
and optimism that if people were to realize this, things can be changed. Further 
along she suggest that,   
… I think there are very few times that I’ve experienced a defeatist attitude and just seeing 
that before the decision was even made and then now it’s been made and there’s nothing-
-I mean we’re not going to impeach him, we’re not going--I mean the decision has been 
made. You didn’t show up and so now--you’re late …  Where were you last November? 
Where were you? You’re late now; I don’t care. You know and so it just--it didn’t feel 
hypocritical; it felt [Sighs] superfluous. Why are you going? You could have--you could 
have done something about it; you didn’t … I’m really not sure that demonstrations get 
that much accomplished anymore especially if you’re not accompanying that with going 
to the box.  
Once again, she is frustrated by the fact that people will participate in a political 
protest but fail to vote in a presidential election—an activity she believes has the 
power to make a difference. She shares with many participants the feeling that 
voting is the end of the political process where “a decision has been made.” She 
also notes that her friends are not so much “hypocritical” as their actions were 
“superfluous.” Clearly, this participant views voting as the primary means for 
bringing about social change. Indeed, she is disappointed that some of her 
politically active friends attended a protest at the expense of voting in a national 
election. 
  Finally, she reflects on what it means to be “radical” and the way this is 
fused with political activism.  
I don’t know; it’s just--it felt very poser to me, like oh yeah you’ve got all these you know 
really radical ideas and so and so but you’re not turning it into anything, so what’s the 
point of being radical except to maybe be accepted by a demographic in college? Like oh 
your radical; me too. You know like--I mean it just--it felt really silly and I wasn’t like--I 
 156
wasn’t angry. It was just one of those things that you like observe and you’re like that’s 
ridiculous. Like I know for a fact you didn’t vote and I don’t know why you’re showing up 
now. 
She is concerned that the label “radical” has lost its original power and that it is 
now simply a way to identify oneself within the social milieu. Instead of being 
labeled a radical because of the activities you engage in, it is now possible to 
mimic these activities in such a way as to be labeled a radical. In this sense, the 
participant is concerned that people sometimes engage in certain political 
activities to fit in with a certain group rather than for genuine political reasons. 
To be a radical, she feels that you have to take “radical ideas” and turn them into 
concrete activities, such as voting, that can ultimately make a difference within 
the political arena.  
  
Political Socialization 
 Up to this point, we have focused on both mass media and conventional 
political activities as practices that embody an interpretation of political reality. It 
is also clear from the interviews that participants found issues surrounding 
political socialization particularly salient. A few words are in order regarding the 
meaning of this category.  
 While a number of researchers focus on the way individuals become part 
of a political system, a shared definition of political socialization has not always 
been forthcoming. Greenstein (1970) suggests that, 
the confusion about political socialization begins with the very meaning of the phrase … 
and some of the contestation on the general merits of political socialization inquiry 
appears to be of the blind-men-and-the-elephant variety, with the debating parties 
disagreeing on the implicit referents of their terms rather than on empirical grounds 
(p.970). 
For Gimpel, Lay and Schuknecht (2003), “political socialization is the process by 
which new generations are inducted into political culture, learning the 
knowledge, values, and attitudes that contribute to support of the political 
system” (p.13). In this definition, political socialization is viewed as a means for 
bringing people into contact with a particular political culture. Indeed, Tarrant 
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(1989) suggests that ultimately, “to socialize someone is to introduce them to a 
particular way of life” (p.40). Moreover, this process is symbiotic as the political 
socialization of the individual serves to maintain the existence of a specific 
political culture. Greenstein (1970) argues that political socialization is 
sometimes understood as 
the way the prevailing norms of a political system become the norms of the new members 
of that system. Here the usage parallels one of the meanings sociologists give to the more 
general term “socialization.” The political subset of socialization is also sometimes called 
“politicization.” In any event, the focus is on the acquisition of norm-consistent behavior 
(p.971). 
In this case, political socialization is viewed as the transferring of “norm-
consistent behavior” to individuals previously lacking such behaviors. In this 
definition, the focus is on the “norms” of a political system and the individual’s 
internalization and/or application of such norms. 
 Clearly, one of the central concerns for political socialization researchers is 
the relationship between individuals and the political systems of which they are a 
part. Marsh (1971) suggests that, 
the major impetus directing interest towards the field and also the major assumption in 
that field is that the study of the process of political socialization in a nation can help 
explain, in some measure, the operation of that political system. The implication stated 
simply would seem to be that an understanding of the conditions under which attitudes 
change or remain stable will help us to understand and perhaps predict stability and 
change with the political system” (p.454).  
From this perspective, understanding an individual’s political attitudes and 
beliefs is of paramount importance if researchers are to explain the prosperity or 
decline of specific political systems. On the other hand, researchers also focus on 
the way political systems influence the thoughts and behaviors of the individuals 
that make up these systems. In other words, political socialization researchers are 
interested both in how political systems encourage people to think and behave in 
particular ways and how such thoughts and behaviors influence the functioning 
of political systems.  
 158
As we have seen, the movement from epistemology and individual 
consciousness to ontology and practices is intended to critique the traditional 
view of interpretation as exclusively a form of mental activity. In our discussion 
of political socialization, we risk going in the opposite direction such that political 
systems are given priority over individual consciousness. In such a situation, 
political structures delineate the boundaries of human agency and political 
systems determine a subject’s individual experiences.  The point of focusing on 
practice is to insure that these issues are neither reduced to the level of individual 
consciousness nor strictly identified with more macro-level ambitions. It is 
particularly important for our discussion of political socialization to stress that 
the following categories represent practices that emerge at the intersection of the 
agent and the political system.    
 
School 
Many participants discuss political situations that occur within an 
academic context. This is particularly interesting as schools are one of society’s 
earliest and most pervasive institutions for conveying norms and values to its 
newest members. Lea (1982) notes that even as far back as Aristotle,  
education is of fundamental importance in developing the distinctive human abilities of 
reason and speech and in providing the training for various crafts and jobs. But he was 
eminently clear in saying that the most important purpose of education was in creating 
the proper citizenry for a city-state … Individuals have to be trained and have their habits 
formed for their polity. To Aristotle, the constitution and way of living of a people were 
one and the same, involving all the relationships, values, and meanings of a political 
culture” (p.119). 
For Aristotle, schools are integral to producing citizens who will remain active 
within a particular political system. Moreover, the form as well as the content of 
education plays a powerful role in the education of the members of a political 
system. For Gimpel, Lay and Schuknecht (2003), “because all schools are 
organized hierarchically, with clear governing structures, rules, and enforcers of 
those rules, there are ample reasons for believing that a child’s first encounter 
with authority outside the family is in school” (p.145). Miller (2002) goes even 
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further in suggesting that schools, as state institutions, “attempt to construct how 
citizens understand their proper roles in society and how they think of 
themselves” (p.4).  
 A number of participants encountered politically saturated situations in 
high school. Some of their initial encounters with politics involved politically 
oriented student organizations. One participant notes that, 
… politics have never seemed fair to me … I was on the Student Government and the only 
reason--I felt like the only reason I was a representative was because I was well known 
and for whatever reason--freshman year--I was like Student Council--that sounds like fun 
and yet there’s nothing like I hadn't done it in middle school; I had no you know 
experience but I got it because I was well known by people from my middle school. And 
so--and it didn’t strike me as odd then but I look back on it now and I’m like really the 
only reason I ever got started with Student Council is because it sounded like a good time 
and then I was you know well known enough to get elected.  
Here the participant suggests that politics often seems unfair. She connects her 
sense of this with a high school experience where students, including herself, 
were elected to positions of power simply because they were “well known.” 
Although she did not feel uniquely qualified for the position, her popularity and 
interest in the position were sufficient to get her elected to student government.  
 Another participant discusses his difficulty in expressing his reason for 
voting for a particular political candidate. He ultimately compares this 
ambivalence with an experience from high school: 
It’s actually weird; I was just thinking that as I was talking about it. I don’t have--I don’t 
remember like--like examining his platform or something like that and saying okay I--
this--I really agree with his sort of--of points of view and--and the things he talks about 
wanting to do and I think they’re important and I think these are something that’s 
important and I think these can help me out and help people …  now I don’t even know 
why--I know now why I voted for him, but I don’t know then if it was more than just kind 
of like well this guy is liberal. I know he--he’s more like me or he--I think more like him 
than this other person. And so it was fairly--it was a fairly general sort of feeling that this 
is who I want to vote for. And now where I pay attention to what they’re going to do with 
Social Security or something like that and I--and I can maybe understand the 
ramifications of--of what they’re--the way they want to take the government, the direction 
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they’re--they’re hoping to go. So it was more--it almost--it almost has a feeling of like--
like high school like student government, like popularity election kind of shit. 
In this case, the participant has a sense that his preference for a candidate was 
motivated more by his identification with a candidate than by specific political 
issues. He suggests that he voted in a particular direction because he had, “a 
fairly general sort of feeling that this is who I want to vote for.” He contrasts this 
with another experience where it was the specific issues (i.e. social security) that 
led him to focus on a particular candidate. He compares the first experience with 
high school student government, which he aligns with, “popularity election kind 
of shit.” Indeed, he continues by discussing his own experience of participating in 
high school student government: 
I was in the student government in high school and just having the word government it 
seemed--I think that--my--I think when I talked about like sort of being silly and--and 
sort of a popularity contest and the same because you didn’t do anything. I can 
remember--this makes me sound like such a bad person--one of the--the things that I had 
on my platform was Meals on Wheels. I don’t know if you’ve heard of this program; it 
takes food to--to people that can't get out of the house and stuff like that, and that was 
one of the things that I wanted our senior class to be able to fund and--and maybe to get 
students to start doing that. And it seemed like a really cool idea. But you know once you 
got in and elected and like nobody did anything; it was just--you got out of--it was a way 
to get out of class and I [laughs]--I wonder sometimes if it’s just like is that what all these 
folks up in DC are doing? It’s just a way to get--you know they’re elected and they can 
make a lot of money and they--you know when they retire they get a ton of money forever 
and you know all these luxuries; are they just getting out of class for you know an hour? Is 
it that same kind of thing? 
In this passage, the participant explicitly connects his own experience of high 
school student government with his concern regarding the motivations of 
professional politicians in contemporary society. In high school government, 
“once you got in and elected … nobody did anything … it was a way to get out of 
class.” He uses this to reflect on whether politicians are, “just getting out of class 
for you know an hour? It is that same kind of thing?” In other words, his 
experience of participating in high school student government provides a means 
for questioning the motives and behaviors of today’s elected officials. 
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 Other participants focus on concrete political issues that emerge when 
they were in high school. For this participant, the issue of school funding was 
particularly salient: 
I don’t know; I felt like for a while in Texas like school funding was a big issue and we 
would talk about that and like you know should we give--talking about--I don’t even 
remember what it’s called--giving children money that don’t have good public schools to 
go to a private school, like school vouchers. I don’t think that’s what it’s called but along 
those lines. And I really like--I did a project on it and I got really well-versed in it and 
three months later the issue died down. And I was like this is like the one thing I could 
talk about or really know--really knew a lot about because I had to. And then schools 
weren’t the issue anymore and it was--for Houston it was public transportation or it was 
road systems and--and that was just on the State level. Like I attacked a small little thing 
on the State level and then to think of how many issues on the national level you know 
rise and fall and rise and fall.  
Here the participant expresses concern that her dedication to learning the 
intricacies of a single issue ultimately fail to have any lasting impact. Political 
issues come and go and by the time she feels competent to deal with the issue, 
final decisions have already been made. Moreover, she suggests that this issue 
was, “just on the state level” and that the situation must be even more complex 
with issues at the national level that, “rise and fall.” 
 For another participant, her encounter with an unfamiliar historical event 
is a particularly salient political situation. She notes that when,  
… I was in high school and we were learning about how the--the Japanese were interned 
during World War II. I remember reading about that and just being like completely 
confused. I was like this actually happened and interrupted the teacher and he was 
getting--you know talking about it, and I was like wait; this actually happened in 
America? And he was like yes; this actually happened, and then other people in the class 
were almost like astonished that I didn’t know and I was like how could I have you know--
how could I be you know 15 and not have heard about this before? And you hear about 
people who you know don’t believe in the Holocaust and things like that. I wonder like 
where did their--where did their history come from and I--I don’t know. I wonder if I 
even am getting like a liberal point of view because I was learning about it in California 
but I’ve talked to other people in Tennessee after I started school about it and some 
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people still didn’t know that the Japanese had been interned. So I thought that was really 
interesting. 
In this passage, the participant is surprised that she was unaware of what she 
takes to be a pivotal event in American history. She also discusses the way others 
fail to recognize other pivotal events and what this says about the social origins of 
history. Finally, she reflects on the origins of her own knowledge and the way this 
knowledge is shaped by a particular point of view. 
 Another participant suggests that it was in high school that he began to 
reflect on different political points of view. 
I think in high school I began to understand maybe a little bit better what all that kind of 
stuff was about, you know like what--what were the implications in a sense of--of 
different political views, you know what--what that meant about what you think about 
economics and--and social structure and you know class relations all of those sorts of 
things--race relations, religion, all of that kind of stuff.  
In this case, high school serves as a context for a wide range of political issues to 
come into focus. Indeed, this participant feels that in high school he began to see 
important issues in a different light. 
 Sometimes, participants discuss the underlying power dynamics that they 
encountered in high school. One participant notes the resistance she encountered 
while trying to navigate some of the bureaucratic aspects of early graduation: 
I’m thinking I guess how like the school systems works, like I was trying to graduate high 
school early and I had to go through certain people that knew certain other people; so I 
guess more the politics of being connected to the right people … I had to get it approved 
by the County Board; so I had to approve it through my Principal but he wasn’t exactly 
the most in-favor at the time. So I went through the Vice Principal instead because she 
knew so and so and whatever and the whole community kind of ran the same way, like if 
you knew the right person well then you can get things done. And if you didn’t--then you 
couldn’t. 
For this participant, politics involves “being connected to the right people.” In 
order to graduate early from high school, it was necessary to navigate a number 
of bureaucratic hurdles. In this case, she was successful in so far as she knew the 
right people. Indeed, this situation was not restricted to her high school as, “the 
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whole community kind of ran the same way, like if you knew the right person well 
then you can get things done.”  
 Several participants discuss the importance of knowing the right people in 
order to bring about a desirable outcome. In some cases, this insight was gleaned 
from participating in particular high school activities. For one participant, her 
attempt to land a role in a high school play brought these issues into focus.  
I did theater in high school and parents that weren’t on the you know--Parent Theater 
Booster Club--those kids wouldn’t always get the better roles even if they were better 
suited for it. And that always really bothered me. I didn’t come into high school with 
theater connections, so it took me two years as a talented actress to even get on the stage 
and I don’t know--that really bothered me. And I don’t know why there’s this--I have this 
desire for things to be fair. I don’t know if we all feel that but I--I just feel like politics was 
always the one--not always the one but always an element to quickly remind me that the 
world wasn’t fair. 
This participant notes that it was necessary to have connections in order to bring 
about a desirable goal. This realization brings issues of equity into focus. Indeed, 
she expresses concern that things are not always fair and it is politics that 
sometimes brings that to her attention. She notes that ultimately, it is the 
connections that one has that determine whether one is able to “get on the stage” 
at all. 
 For several of the younger participants, the experience of being in high 
school during the September 11th attacks stands-out as a particularly salient 
political situation. As one student notes, 
I was in DC in high school when 9/11 happened. I mean my--so in school like you know 
that day I was actually really, really glad I didn’t come to school you know because like 
chairs were thrown, windows were broken, like people went--like--like some stuff went 
down just because people freaked out so much. I’m from a military town so like 
everyone’s parents worked at the Pentagon and like everyone was like at Andrews Air 
Force Base which is where Air Force One flies out of and they were so afraid it was going 
to get hit there, you know. You know the next day I come back to school and you know--I 
almost feel like the conversations in class--like I feel like I’m being blamed for everything-
-we have a very, very small like Middle Eastern population there. And I was always the 
outwardly like--I’m Lebanese; this is where I come from; I’m very outspoken about my 
politics, so I felt like almost--like I was blamed for like what happened and then you know 
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I mean like my house was vandalized after that, which like I was--we were--I was home 
alone. It was egged and toilet papered and my car was covered in human shit like 
smeared on there, and so it was like the front door and the front window was like--I mean 
there was that. I mean my car was vandalized like in the parking lot that day you know. 
For this participant, the terrorist attacks had a dramatic effect on her relationship 
with her peers and with the community at large. In this sense, her cultural 
heritage becomes figural both for her and for others in the wake of the attacks. 
Another participant shares a similar experience: 
The very first experience that I was thinking of was when--I was like--[Sighs] I guess I 
was like 16 or so when September 11th happened and my brother was in like second grade 
and he came home from school the day after and someone had called him a “towel head” 
and I didn’t even know what that meant but that was my very first like experience with it 
because the teachers didn’t do anything about it and then like my mom had to go into the 
school and have a talk with someone about it, be like you know this is why this is wrong. 
And when they were explaining it to us I found it really--I don’t know; I just--I had never 
really thought about it that like people would be biased against me. I thought--I’ve heard 
about people being biased against like you know racist or sexist but I had never really 
thought about like--like no, I’m an American. Why would anyone have anything against 
me or my siblings; so--? That was really interesting.  
Previously, this participant had reflected on racial and sexual bias but the 
September 11th attacks brought forth an entirely unexpected intolerance – a bias 
against a person’s national origins. It is clear that the participant was completely 
unprepared for the reactions of her teachers and peers. For her, it seems 
incomprehensible that someone would hold anything against her or her family as 
a result of the attacks. For both of these participants, school became a symbol or 
a microcosm of the intolerance surrounding the events of September 11th. Indeed, 
these events brought their cultural heritage into particularly sharp focus.  
 Up to this point, we have focused on high school situations where people 
are particularly aware of politics. For some the participants, their transition from 
high school to college brought forth a number of interesting political situations.  
Several participants discuss how moving away from high school friends and 
encountering a whole new group of people played a decisive role in their college 
experiences. One participant notes that, 
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I don’t think it was until I got to college that other people thought--not--not--didn’t think 
differently from me but thought differently from me because they perceived things 
differently from me--I never saw that.  
Further along, she suggests that, 
it was coming to college the first time that I really was just open to seeing not only other 
people’s point of views but the perspective that it comes from, you know that it’s--they’re 
not all coming from my neighborhood and my family, my high school, my this-that and 
the other thing; that they’re all coming from different places and that they’ve arrived at 
their opinions for different reasons than the reasons I’ve arrived at mine. We haven’t all 
gotten the same information. 
For this participant, the transition from high school to college brought her into 
contact with a host of new people who came from a variety of backgrounds and 
who had, “arrived at their opinions for different reasons than the reasons I’ve 
arrived at mine.” While she cultivated relationships with people in her 
neighborhood, family and high school, her experience of entering college put her 
in the midst of a whole new group of people. Another participant notes that,   
… after high school ended like--like a lot of my friends died. A lot of my friends went to 
college elsewhere so there was a kind of an--an exodus there--like people going just all 
over the place and what happened was that you know I basically didn’t have that group 
anymore--that sort of core group of people that I was trying to align political views with 
or that I felt like had some sort of particular political view and I kind of adopted it and--
and believed it in some senses, you know--maybe not wholesale believed in it, but 
adopted it at least to maintain friendships with those people. And then in college, you 
know you’re pretty much making new friends, and so at that time I think it became more 
important to me or more significant to me to think about what are my views really, you 
know and how did I go from there [Do-Do-Do-Do] to here kind of thing? So that’s--that’s 
the difference there, the kind of--of change that I saw happening, yeah. [3.11.7-3.11.17] 
For a number of participants, the transition from high school to college brought 
them into contact with a variety of new people. In this experience, they not only 
are cultivating new relationships and experiencing new surroundings; they also 
are transforming the nature of their relationships with family and friends – 
people who previously constituted their entire social world. As this participant 
notes he, “didn’t have the group anymore – that sort of core group of people that 
I was trying to align political views with …” In the transition from high school to 
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college, he began to reflect on his own views and the way these views related to 
the people around him. In this sense, it was the movement from the familiar to 
the strange that became an occasion to reflect on political beliefs.  
 Participants sometimes discuss their political experiences with a particular 
emphasis on the new people they encountered while attending college. One 
participant notes that, 
… in college it--it felt more equal and I definitely started hanging out with more liberals. I 
didn’t hang out with the same people in college that I hung out with in high school. All my 
friends in high school you know joined sororities and fraternities and that has never 
interested me. And so I just was--I was exposed to different kinds of people than I was 
exposed to in high school, and so I feel like it was more equal--well now it’s a lot more 
liberal but like I said before, I think I needed drastic change to have seen both sides and 
go well you know these guys seem to understand this or have this viewpoint or this. And I 
would have to say that I’m more middle of the road on a lot of--because I think extreme 
on one side or the other is just ridiculous.  
In this case, the participant discusses the impact of “being exposed to different 
kinds of people than I was exposed to in high school.” Moreover, she sees the 
transition from high school to college as a “drastic change” that enabled her to 
grasp multiple perspectives on an issue and ultimately led her to a political 
position she feels is, “more middle of the road.” 
 For other participants, their interactions with college faculty emerge as 
particularly salient political situations. One participant describes the difference 
between her interactions with faculty as an undergraduate at a private, liberal 
arts school and as a graduate student at a large, state research university. She 
notes that she, 
didn’t really see politics because I went to a private undergrad which you would think 
being--it’s a liberal arts school; you would think kind of liberal academia, but at the same 
time private school we’ve got these rich little preppy kids that are driving SUVs, so there 
was kind of controversy between the professors and the students and that made for 
interesting conversations when you’d see all these Bush stickers. In that case, the 
professors never said anything, but if you went and talked to them they’re actually--they 
were actually very neutral on how they--they would not give--give away which way they 
believed, which is not what I’ve seen at [my current university]. Maybe it’s private versus 
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state--I don’t know; but those professors actually could have a conversation and a debate 
and defend both sides. 
It was the professors’ ability to remain neutral while discussing political issues 
that this participant found particularly impressive. Despite the potential for 
conflict between the personal political views of faculty and students, she felt 
comfortable talking with professors about her own political views. She was 
particularly impressed that her professors, “actually could have a conversation 
and a debate and defend both sides.” Indeed, she describes the experience of such 
an interaction in greater detail: 
I talked to a social psychologist there that was--she was a social psychologist but she was 
a professor and for the life of me I can't tell you what she thinks. But we would sit in her 
office and just debate--we would literally debate different political issues and one day she 
would defend something and the next day she would defend something else. And she 
would--she had every--she could back things up but she never really told me what she was 
thinking, which I think is good because I was her student and it was--it got me to think 
about both sides and encouraged me to be more open-minded compared to the situation I 
told you earlier with the professor that flat out says I’m this and if you don’t believe me 
you’re wrong.  
Clearly, this participant appreciates the style of conversation she experienced 
when particular political views were not forced upon her by an authority figure. 
In being unable to identify the political position of one of her mentors, she felt a 
sense of freedom in the to and fro movement of political debate. She notes that 
the experience, “got me to think about both sides and encouraged me to be more 
open-minded …” This experience is in stark contrast to an interaction she had as 
a graduate student at another university. She notes that this experience, 
…  it’s going to reinforce the belief when someone--when this professor … says well you’re 
wrong, it just reinforced my belief, and gave me negative thoughts about him, which I’ve 
carried over the past year. I--so politics have influenced the relationship that I have with 
this professor. He is not as respected by me; I just think that he has no regard for other 
people’s emotions or feelings or thoughts or opinions and he showed--he showed that in a 
political way you know through politics and other religious issues. He told me it doesn’t 
matter--I mean he doesn’t care what I think at all.  
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In this situation, the participant feels as though the political views of an authority 
figure have simply been imposed on her. Indeed, she feels this imposition has 
structured the way she interacts with this professor. In this case, politics are 
viewed as a topic where individuals can agree and/or disagree on a variety of 
issues. Moreover, politics are also viewed as something that structures the 
relationship between people, in this case, between a faculty member and a 
graduate student.  
 In other cases, participants discuss specific issues and assignments that 
emerged within their college courses. One participant discusses her experience of 
reading a book for a particular class: 
… the biggest thing that I was talking about to you earlier was the World Civilizations 
Class. It’s just interesting because like the first one we read a book--Guns, Germs, and 
Steel by Jarred Diamond and that to me more explained [Sighs] the politics--like politics 
over time that it--it reinforced that life is not fair that the people that got to call the shots 
were the ones with metal, artillery, and germs and disease and the ones that didn’t were 
you know peaceful--but it was also interesting because it--it highlighted how I think I had 
bought into the fact that the other people didn’t make it because they were less civilized--
that’s not true, you know … I mean it also for me parallels like now if you’re born in the 
right family, the right--if you’re born in America you can run for President. You know like 
there are a lot of advantages that people can have and--and sometimes that’s why they get 
to where they needed to be. 
Here a book assignment for a class encourages her to reflect on a range of 
political issues. Moreover, she relates this knowledge to some of her concerns 
regarding the direction of contemporary politics. She ultimately concludes that, 
“there are a lot of advantages that people can have and--and sometimes that’s 
why they get to where they needed to be.” Once again, issues of equity are 
particularly salient. 
 For another participant, a writing assignment for a political science course 
provides him with a context to reflect on his political views.  
… in college I took a political science class with this guy … and he was really good and he 
had us write a paper that basically you know talk about your life--in a sense write like a 
short autobiography and then talk about your views--your political views on some 
particular hot topic these days, you know like abortion or something like that. And then 
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the third part of the paper was--was sort of--well how do you see your life experiences or 
what you chose to talk about autobiographically as perhaps influencing your political 
opinions, you know? And so in doing that paper, I like--I ended up writing like a really 
long autobiographical section and I think after finishing that though, it kind of--it gave 
me a sense of more coherence to my political views. 
This assignment encourages the participant to reflect on the course of his life and 
the relationship between his life’s trajectory and his own political views. It give 
him an opportunity to focus on a particularly controversial political issue and to 
reflect on how his life experiences contribute to the way he understands this 
topic. Moreover, he suggests that this experience, “gave me a sense of more 
coherence to my political views.” Further along, he notes that in doing the writing 
assignment,  
… it seemed like--like it made sense that I believed what I believed in terms of my life 
experiences. Whereas before I hadn't really thought about my life experiences as 
influencing my politics; I thought about it more in terms of my politics in a sense giving 
me a connection to others. And so it was kind of a reversal; it was a different way of using 
politics. Before when I was using politics, I was using politics to connect to other people 
that I wanted to be friends with. Then in college it was suddenly like oh, I’m beginning to 
realize what my political views are and how my life experiences have influenced those; so 
there--it was--it was a different type of--I mean I guess either way you could say it’s 
coherent but there--there is more of a trajectory for me in--in understanding like past life 
experiences leading up to current life political views or current life views about 
whatever—about anything. 
In this case, the participant makes a distinction between his high school 
experience where he used politics to “connect to other people that I wanted to be 
friends with” and his college experience where he began to “realize what my 
political views are and how my life experiences have influenced those.” For this 
participant, politics seems to serve a different purpose in high school than it did 
in college. Clearly, the participant views this assignment as a particularly valuable 
means for exploring his understanding of the political. 
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Family 
 Although modern academic institutions play a pivotal role in political 
socialization, family practices also embody an important interpretation of 
political reality. Zuckerman (2005) notes that Aristotle, “defines the family as the 
nucleus of the polity, a claim that resonates through centuries of Christian 
political thought. Even a cursory look at these literatures finds the family at the 
heart of personal and collective life” (p.xvii). Lea (1982) argues that the family 
experience, “begins the process of establishing political consciousness. Most 
families, to the degree they are an instrumental and ideological part of their 
culture and social system, transmit that culture’s general social view, its operative 
theory of human nature and dominant view of reality and knowledge” (p.74). 
Moreover, she argues that, “there is no doubt that the family continues to be the 
dominant carrier and/or teacher of cultural values” (Lea, 1982, p.78). Finally, 
Jennings, Allerbeck and Rosenmayr (1979), suggest that, “to understand fully the 
nature of how change and continuity are occurring in advanced industrial 
societies we need to look at what is going on within the crucible of the family” 
(p.450). All agree that the family plays a central role in the process of political 
socialization.  
 We have already discussed several instances where participants identify 
the September 11th attacks as a salient political situation. Those participants note 
that these attacks occurred as they were attending high school and they are 
particularly aware of the way people at school dealt with this tragedy. At the same 
time, participants also explore the meaning of these attacks in the context of their 
family and their shared cultural heritage. One participant notes that, 
… the first time that politics stood out to me was September 11th. I guess I--I thought 
about topics I guess in the role of politics before but never really thought about like our 
government. Like when I was younger my parents talked a lot about it because I’m half 
Palestinian and they talked a lot about Arabs and politics that you know--associated with 
that, but I didn’t really get it until the attacks happened. Right away there was like this big 
animosity towards Arabs like in the country; so it was the first time that like my brother 
went to school and people like made fun of him and I actually was thinking about like our 
government and their reaction to people in the Middle East … 
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In this case, the terrorist attacks brought her cultural heritage into sharper focus. 
While her parents shared with her some of their ideas regarding culture, race, 
and politics, she, “didn’t really get it until the attacks happened.” In the wake of 
the attacks, her cultural heritage and her relationship to her family come into 
focus. 
 For another participant, the story of her parent’s immigration to the 
United States is a particularly salient political situation. She notes that,  
… growing up I grew up in a--well both of my parents are Lebanese and I was born there 
and we came here. I guess we came here with like $30,000 in our pocket and that’s it. 
Like that’s how we were going to survive in America. So like I hear my parents tell their 
story of how we got here. You know my father was held at gunpoint at the Syrian Border 
because we were trying to get out of Lebanon because we could fly out of there because 
the Civil War was happening. You know like we--my dad almost didn’t make it out of 
Lebanon and then we got here and we--we were living with my grandparents for a long 
time just because we couldn’t-- we couldn’t afford rent or whatever and ended up finding 
a place and like now my parents--I mean both of them were college graduates when they 
came here. My mom had a Master’s Degree and like that just wasn’t enough; like no one 
would hire them because you know--like my mom was an English Major. It’s not even like 
there was a barrier or anything. There was--I mean my dad on the other hand, he didn’t 
speak a word--but like I mean I guess just their--their struggle of like--they were 
revolutionaries like back in Lebanon and they--they were very, very involved in 
everything that was happening and they --they needed to leave because they just needed 
to not be involved anymore you know with a daughter.  
Clearly, this is much more than a story of how her family came to reside within 
the United States. In this story, she discusses issues of racism, poverty, injustice, 
war, and revolution. She sees her family’s struggle as thoroughly infused with 
politics. She is not just the daughter of Lebanese immigrants but also part of a 
family that has had to endure a host of trials and tribulations. Their struggle did 
not end when they finally arrived in the United States. Even within this new 
context, her family’s cultural heritage remained an obstacle to settling into an 
American way of life. 
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 A number of participants explore the extent to which their family 
discussed political issues as they were growing-up. One participant notes that his 
family didn’t seem particularly interested in political issues: 
My--my parents weren’t-- [Sighs]--they may have--may have been interested in politics 
but I didn’t see it; they didn’t talk about it. It wasn’t like we discussed what was 
happening in the government or anything like that. I was pretty much raised in a home 
where it wasn’t discussed; at least nobody seemed interested in it. And so it wasn’t a 
particularly important thing to me at all. I feel like that was sort of a wasted opportunity 
as far as learning about politics. But I didn’t really care then. 
In this case, the participant discusses his family’s lack of interest in political 
issues. Moreover, he sees this as a, “wasted opportunity.” Further along, he 
explores the contrast between his families general disregard for political issues 
and his experience of spending time with his friends and their families. 
Well I was just trying to think--like my--my family, it’s really weird because I think--like I 
had--I had friends in high school that were much more interested in politics and then 
we’d go to their house and their parents would be talking about stuff that was going on 
and they were involved in things, and my--you know my family was pretty--pretty much 
un--uninvolved in--in that sort of stuff or they didn’t--they didn’t discuss it with us. It 
wasn’t something we were brought up thinking about it and it’s something I wish would 
have been different. And a lot of my family is fairly conservative, and so it was always--it 
was like if I wanted to start talking about something or I disagreed with something, I 
knew that a lot of people wouldn’t agree with me. So it was--there--there wasn’t open 
discussion; I wish there had been more because I think--I think it would have gotten me 
interested in stuff a lot sooner.  
This passage contains a number of interesting insights into the role of politics in 
everyday family life. To begin with, he notes the discrepancy between his family’s 
lack of interest in politics and the political discussions he encountered when he 
was around his friend’s family. Moreover, when politics were discussed in his 
family, people often took fairly conservative positions on particular issues; he 
therefore felt unable to express his views on these issues. Indeed, it was the 
absence of “open discussion” that he believes contributed to his initial lack of 
interest in politics.  
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 For other participants, it was their parent’s participation in political 
activities that made a lasting impression. One participant notes that his, 
… mom became part of the Ross Perot campaign which was kind of funny. And so she was 
going around like--like putting these Ross Perot pamphlets and all of this stuff together 
and putting signs in people’s yards … that was like one of the first times in my life I had 
ever seen my mom like get that--just intense about politics, about any sort of political 
anything, because in a sense we weren’t really you know all that political of a family. I 
mean there were--you know there were--there were some things. You know we were--we 
tended to be rather liberal, you know. My grandmother loves Jimmy Carter, you know--
just absolutely thinks Jimmy Carter is like the best ever. But otherwise, you know we 
weren’t extremely political. We weren’t like--like donating money to campaigns or--or 
campaigning for anyone.  
Here the participant notes that while he was not raised in a particularly political 
family, his mother’s participation in a political campaign was a particularly 
salient political situation.  Indeed, it is the contrast between being raised in a 
family that was not politically active and his mother’s interest in campaigning for 
a particular political candidate that is figural in this experience. Furthermore, he 
notes that his mom is, 
… really into this you know stuffing envelopes and--and all this, you know and Ross 
Perot--that little pipsqueak, ah. And so I found that kind of interesting, you know. Here’s 
my mom doing something that--that at the time could be considered kind of outside of 
the mainstream even though it wasn’t really. But it was outside of that traditional 
dichotomy between the--the Republicans and the Democrats you know or what’s 
perceived to be a dichotomy anyway. And so just the amount of energy and the amount of 
time that she put into that really impressed me, you know. I thought that was--that was a 
really neat thing. And so in seeing her do that, that also got me thinking about you know 
where do I fit in--in this political spectrum …  
The fact that his mother is campaigning for a candidate outside the traditional 
two-part political system makes a significant impression on this participant. 
Although he has reservations about referring to his mother’s activities as, 
“outside the mainstream,” he is still impressed with the amount of effort she 
expends campaigning for this particular candidate. In other words, the 
participant is impressed that his mother’s political views are, to some extent, 
outside the political mainstream and that her activities demonstrate a dedication 
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to those political views. Indeed, the participant notes that, “in seeing her do that, 
that also got me thinking about you know where do I fit in--in this political 
spectrum.” Once again, we see participants viewing political positions as falling 
along a political “spectrum.” In this case, his mother’s participation in politics 
outside the two-party system gives him an occasion to reflect on his own political 
beliefs. Further along, he says that 
… it was just that--that she went from not being political at all--I’m not even sure if my 
mom voted in that Reagan/Mondale election you know or--or the one--what was it--the 
one in ’88 you know. I’m not even sure if she--if she--if she voted in those elections but 
then all of a sudden, you know here comes Perot and my mom is like just all about Perot. 
And what impressed me was--was the dedication or the amount of energy that--that she 
put into that. It wasn’t necessarily the--the views, you know; it wasn’t necessarily the--the 
complexity of the views or--or you know what--what she had hoped to accomplish by 
those things, but it was--it was really the--the focus that she had there--the--the energy 
that she had that impressed me most of all--that something motivated her like that I 
found--I found really neat, you know.  
Here is seems that the participant is impressed more by the form of his mother’s 
political participation than by its actual content. In other words, regardless of his 
mother’s specific political views, “it was really the--the focus that she had there--
the--the energy that she had that impressed me most of all--that something 
motivated her like that…” Clearly, the participant was impressed with his 
mother’s dedication to a particular presidential candidate.  
 Another participant describes her experience of watching her mother 
participate in a political event: 
… the way I say politics has touched my life is that whenever I was--I remember when I 
was younger, my mom was part of the Republican Women’s Convention and she brought 
us to election events where we tried to get news coverage and--and things like that. It’s 
pretty interesting; I mean you’d have--you’d rent out a hotel room or a hotel convention 
area and you’d bring the--the nominee in there and you’d have him speak and you’d 
hope--you’d invite the news coverage and you’d hope they’d show up and then at the 
same time you have posters and everyone is standing there and even if the room is a 
quarter full you make sure the camera looks like it’s all--all the way full … 
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For this participant, watching her mother participate in a political event is an 
occasion for her to learn more about the political process in general. She 
discusses the steps one takes in organizing a political event including inviting 
political supporters and the news media, renting a room, and ensuring that the 
event is portrayed in such a fashion as to be maximally beneficial to a candidate. 
 Several participants discuss the way some of the interactions between 
members of their family seem political in nature. For the following participant, 
the politics she encounters in her place of work are similar to experiences she had 
interacting with her own family. 
… well I’m on--I’m standing on the outside observing a lot of these situations. Like I said, 
I’m trying to not get caught up in it because I just want to do my job and I really just want 
everybody to get along and then in a lot of ways it’s interesting because that’s how I felt in 
our family growing up--always in the middle, between mom and dad when they would 
argue about stuff and I would always be trying to figure out who is right; who needs to do 
something to fix this? What do they need to do kind of thing?  
Here the participant draws a parallel between a politically charged situation at 
work and her own efforts as part of a family to sooth the tensions between her 
parents. For her, it is especially important for, “everybody to get along,” and 
when she does find herself in the middle of a political situation, her primary 
concern becomes figuring out a way to “fix” what she experiences as broken. 
 For another participant, family conflicts also emerge as salient political 
situations. In her case, the focus is on the way political discussions can be 
disruptive when family members do not share the same political beliefs. She 
notes that, 
… the first instance that comes to mind is family conflict as--my parents have one view 
and one of my mom’s sisters has a complete different view. And Thanksgiving dinners, 
Christmas dinners--it comes into a very heated debate, which I think is part of the reason 
why I think what I think--and I followed my dad’s beliefs. 
A number of participants note that events that bring family members together 
such as holidays, reunions, or even daily interactions at the dinner table often 
became politically salient situations. In this case, the participant describes the 
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way certain family members interact when conversations turn to political 
matters:  
It starts with my dad, a Republican, joking and not being--joking about both parties--just 
kind of joking about politics in general and my aunt who is a very, very strong Democrat 
and works with that--for that party up in Maryland takes personal offense. And so it’s one 
person who kind of jokes about it and doesn’t really take personal offense versus someone 
who it’s 98 percent of her life and can't have a neutral conversation, can't discuss and 
debate without it becoming emotional … 
In political conversations, the participant notes a distinction between someone 
who can joke about political issues and maintain his or her composure and an 
“emotional” person who fails to recognize the levity surrounding a person’s 
offhanded remark. Moreover, the participant refers to her aunt’s inability to have 
a “neutral” conversation. For her, a neutral conversation is thwarted when 
participants in an interaction become excessively “emotional.” In other words, 
she is concerned that her aunt’s emotions prevent her from being able to 
participate in a “neutral” political conversation. She explores this experience 
further: 
The first time I saw it--it was just kind of interesting, kind of--it was like watching a ping 
pong game, you know just kind of interesting to watch it go back and forth and then as I 
learned more and became more educated I started forming what I thought was right 
which is leaning more towards my dad’s views just because I’ve heard those more and so I 
would join into the conversation as--and joined as the debate was interesting to me--
debating back and forth was interesting however she couldn’t be--she couldn’t state her 
opinion and state her belief without getting emotional. 
In this case, the participant views political debates within her family as similar to 
a “ping pong game” where people take up political issues and “go back and forth.” 
She also notes that as she learned more about politics, she began to develop her 
own views, though these views tend to coincide with her father’s political views.  
She is particularly aware of the fact that while she enjoys “debating back and 
forth,” she feels as though emotions sometimes interfere with the free exchange 
of ideas.  
 A number of participants note the conflict they experience within their 
family when they express divergent political views. Indeed, this situation is so 
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pronounced at times that explicit rules are invoked to prevent family members 
from engaging in heated political debates. One participant notes that, 
It happens a lot with my dad and this particular sister. And mom has five sisters and all 
the other ones--she’s kind of like the black chicken, completely different, but any time 
they get--it’s now become a rule that politics can't come up when the two of them are in 
the same room, and that--that gives me a negative connotation on politics because even 
though it’s his sister-in-law, they can't get along and he’ll say things about her when she’s 
not there--I mean condescending things due to this political belief. So to me it’s caused--
not that it’s really disrupted the family but it’s caused some sort of barrier; like the two of 
them will never be able to be in a room without having some sort of argument I don’t 
think. And I--I blame that on politics.  
In this situation, the participant experiences politics as a “barrier” that prevents 
two members of her family from being able to discuss political issues. She notes 
that, “it’s now become a rule that politics can't come up when the two of them are 
in the same room, and that--that gives me a negative connotation on politics …” 
Here, political issues seem to interfere with the relationship between two family 
members. Indeed, the desire to introduce some measure of harmony within the 
situation leads the family to introduce explicit prohibitions against discussing 
certain political topics. The same is true for another participant who notes that, 
… I have been banned from talking politics at the table, you know. I--I felt like--I’ve had 
my mom tell me before this last election, don’t, don’t--just don’t bring up politics at the 
house [Laughs] you know when I come home for Thanksgiving. That’s bullshit; that’s 
bull-shit, huh--never again. 
Once again, an explicit prohibition is invoked in order to prevent family members 
for engaging in political arguments that disrupt the harmony of the family 
structure. Further along the participant suggests that  
… we just you know--we disagree on certain things; we disagree on certain things. They 
trust George Bush. George Bush is their guy, you know and--and not even so much as that 
but they still voted for him; they’re voting for him, you know. It’s like … if you vote for 
him; I really don’t understand that--I really don’t. So--yeah; I don’t know--banned from 
talking politics. 
What is interesting about these cases is that within the structure of the family, 
members are not simply discouraged from discussing divergent political views 
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but explicit rules are actually created to inhibit such interactions. In these cases, 
politics are not a means for uniting people under a common cause but instead are 
an obstacle to maintaining harmony within the family structure.  
 Clearly, the way family members relate to one another is a potent source of 
salient political situations. Time and again, participants focus on both the form 
family interactions take and the specific content of these interactions. In both 
cases, participants recognize a variety of political issues. Moreover, participants 
sometimes focus specifically on the role parents play in shaping their children’s 
political attitudes and beliefs. As one participant notes,  
… I think that’s why our parents probably play a huge part at least in setting the stage for 
how we experience politics, because you’re--as--as a child you just sort of take in this is 
what it is and you don’t really--I mean it’s that sort of--just the cognitive process of 
realizing that there’s a different way to look at things and finally getting sort of advanced 
enough in your own thinking to--to say oh I can go--I can go ahead and feel differently 
now about this and there’s no problem with that.  
Here the participant discusses the impact of being a member of a particular 
family. He notes that, “as a child you just sort of take in this is what it is …” In 
other words, the reality one is born into is taken for granted as simply given – as 
simply the way the world works. Yet, the participant notes that as one gets older, 
he or she may begin to recognize that “there’s a different way to look at things,” 
that what was once indubitable can now be viewed as flexible or contingent. 
Indeed, he compares this experience with another salient aspect of his family 
experience: 
But it’s sort of similar to religion, you know. Like I grew up going to a Lutheran church 
and kind of you know there is a God and these are things that--that I felt to the core just 
because that’s what I knew and--and that--it--it almost didn’t allow room for any new 
ideas or different ideas and you know in some respects you know obviously your 
developmental levels and everything like that and moving away to college, you’re starting 
to think more abstractly and analytically and things like that. And so new ideas and 
opportunities open up but I think getting out of that structure of that family does some of 
that, too. And--and I certainly know that I’ll--I’ll be much more open and--and frank 
when I disagree with things with my parents and--and they’re fairly liberal in a lot of 
ways. It’s not like I grew up with really conservative--in a really conservative family or 
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anything like that. They’re very--very liberal in a lot of ways but you know disagreeing 
openly with them and--and trying to have a discussion is sort of like a newer thing and it’s 
kind of interesting. But yeah that just sort of--you’re--you’re in that environment and 
that’s all you know 
Here the participant relates his experience of growing-up in a family with certain 
political views and his experience of being raised in the context of a particular 
religion. In fact, it is quite common for participants to draw parallels between 
politics and religion. In this case, the participant’s early views were shaped by, 
“what I knew” and this knowledge left no room for alternative ideas. Moreover, 
he sites “moving away to college” as a pivotal event in the formation of his own 
beliefs. He notes the importance of “getting out of that structure of that family” 
and how this experience enables him to interact with his family in a novel way. 
Finally, he relates this experience to his experience of being a citizen of a 
particular country: 
And it’s almost the same thing like being American; you’re just raised and you go get your 
fast food and do this and do that and go play baseball and that’s what you’re going to do 
and then you realize there’s this--you know a slew of other places to live that--that 
function, that have managed to survive just as long as we have and--yeah, I don’t know; 
it’s just interesting sort of how--how it just sort of kind of has crept into my mind kind of 
the same way. 
Clearly, the participant recognizes a similarity that connects politics, religion, and 
citizenship. He notes that as an American, you are raised in the context of similar 
activities – you, “go get your fast food and do this and do that and go play 
baseball and that’s what you’re going to do…” Ultimately, the participant 
recognizes that people living in other places participate in different activities and 
that these activities may be no better or worse than the activities in which he 
participates. Indeed, it is once again a sense of flexibility and contingency that 
permeates his experience. 
 
Friends 
 Beyond the way politics operates within the structure of the family, 
participants also discuss salient political situations involving friends and peers. 
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Some participants note that the relationships they maintain with their friends 
gives them a sense of connection such that they feel included within a particular 
group. Sometimes this inclusion is experienced as political. One participant, 
recalling his childhood friends, suggests that, 
… it was a sense of connection to other people who ostensibly had the same kinds of 
beliefs that I was adopting at the time. So you know you have all these anarchic little kids 
banding together you know. Most of them are pretty affluent white you know kids but at 
the same time they’re like buying the line of the--of the--you know the--the British punk 
guy on the dole kind of thing and partly because it’s cool and partly because it--it gives 
them a sense of connection with each other. And so that’s kind of what I was aware of--
was--was the friends I was making, the--the kinds of senses--sense of connection that I--
that I was getting from participating in that kind of--of social environment--that kind of 
social group.  
This participant feels a sense of connection with others whom he believes shares 
common beliefs and goals. Elsewhere, he discusses the way this connection is 
expressed through similar tastes in music, clothes, and other culturally relevant 
symbols. Moreover, he discusses the way his inclusion within a particular group 
became salient when divergent groups came into contact with one another: 
And so the animosities there while there were sort of racial groupings of people, it was 
mainly white cowboys, you know. And--and so I mean there were some fights. There were 
some kind of things that would go on between them and the punks and them and the--the 
Asian kids and them and the--you know and it’s just--and then the jocks and the--and 
then there was all of that kind of stuff going on like subdivided categories. And so it was 
during high school that I think I began to align myself even more so with a kind of--of 
punk rock [Laughs] kind of--kind of political view, you know. Not necessarily anarchic 
but I would say more libertarian in a sense, which at the time I hadn't even thought about 
like how fucking Republican libertarians tend to be, you know at least economically and 
stuff like that.  
In a sense, the divisiveness of certain groupings encourages the participant to 
select one group to identify with at the expense of others. He notes that some 
groups are united by race (white, Asian) while others align themselves according 
to specific activities (jocks). In this case, he identifies with a, “punk rock … kind of 
political view.” Further along, he suggests that,  
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… I started to align myself more and more with--with that kind of--of idea, and a lot of it 
was you know very much being like my friends. You know sort of adopting similar views 
as my friends, and you know we have a band at the time and stuff like that. So it--you 
know I’d write these songs for the band that were all like Fuck War, Fuck This, Fuck That, 
you know--that kind of thing. And so yeah, I’m--I’m basically articulating this political 
view, which is basically copying the stuff that--that I’m getting from--from listening to 
like punk rock records and hanging out with the punk rock kids and all that kind of thing 
and I started to realize though that--that can kind of get really oppressive like I--I was--I 
got into that because I wanted to be in a sense free; I wanted something to rebel against 
and in rebelling against it, feeling a sense of freedom.  
Clearly political ideas and social relations are intimately related at this point in 
the participant’s life. Emulating his friends entails sharing similar political views 
which are expressed, in this case, in the form of music. Here music and political 
ideas fuse to create an identity distinct from other groups but still connected to a 
select group of people. At the same time, he begins to realize that this 
identification with a particular group also has some “oppressive” aspects. Indeed, 
although the political view he was espousing represents an affront to dominant 
systems of power, he begins to realize that group membership also has certain 
restrictive aspects as well. He notes that, 
… I just remember in high school like progressively realizing that--that there is a very 
conformist kind of attitude there at times, like--like even in that group of--of people that 
consider themselves rebels or consider themselves sort of the--the--the marginal people 
or the peripheral people. There’s--there’s very much a conformist attitude within that 
group. I mean even to the point as--as to--to what you wear and how you do your hair 
and--and all of this kind of stuff, which is just like what you’d get in mainstream America-
-it’s just a different kind of thing, you know. Piercing one’s nose is kind of a thing these 
days, you know or--or all the different body piercing(s) and stuff like that, but it’s still--it 
reflects a kind of conformist attitude and I--I wanted to escape that. You know I didn’t 
want to deal with that. And I wanted to find a place where I could just kind of be me 
without having to fucking do that kind of thing.  
In this case, he recognizes both the enabling and restrictive aspects of group 
membership. In identifying with a particular group, he came to recognize, “a very 
conformist kind of attitude” even though the original impetus for group inclusion 
revolved around issues of freedom. Ultimately, it was this conformist attitude 
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that he wished to “escape” so he could, “find a place where I could just kind of be 
me.”  
 Several participants share his concern that group membership can 
deteriorate into a form of unreflective conformity. One participant discusses his 
experience of driving his car to a particular group activity: 
… at a meditation retreat--two cars--we had a nice little station wagon and then an old 
sports car that pollutes like mad. And my station wagon was broke down so I drove my 
sports car to the meditation retreat and left it in the parking lot and that is--it’s really not 
a good progressive Buddhist earth-first car because it pollutes like mad and it’s all flashy 
and it’s--it just--it’s part of something else. So I was just aware of--like that; a lot of 
people looked at it. Somebody even asked me is that your car? So people on the retreat 
were trying to figure out who didn’t conform; who drove that and didn’t conform?  
Here the participant recognizes an incongruity between his own “progressive” 
beliefs and the environmental implications of driving a particular type of car. 
Perhaps more importantly, his peers recognize the incongruity, so much so, that 
he is asked to own up to the fact that it is indeed his car. He recognizes this 
experience as an instance where members of a group seek to maintain a 
definition of what makes the group distinct from others, in this case, via 
conformity. Further along, the participant describes a similar experience:  
Another time I was at a Grateful Dead concert and I happened to be dressed in like slacks 
and a button-up--button-up shirt, I forget why, and--and I thought I’d kind of idealize the 
hippies. Oh they thought--they like everybody; they’re totally accepting and I got so many 
glares just like if I had dreadlocks at a rodeo.  
This experience is very similar to the previous participant who noted that his 
affiliation with an “anarchist” group at times seemed paradoxical given some of 
the specific practices he engaged in to maintain group membership. In this 
participant’s concert experience, he recognizes that people often view “hippies” as 
stereotypically “accepting” yet his attire drew glares from people as if he had 
“dreadlocks at a rodeo.” Clearly, group membership becomes problematic when 
those groups espouse characteristics such as “freedom” and “acceptance” while 
simultaneously requiring compliance in ways that make group membership 
salient to the individual’s involved. Moreover, he suggests that, 
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…  you identify with your political in-group and you feel like oh I’m safe there; these are 
people I like. I like they; they like me; they accept each other and we--we all accept each 
other and it’s like this--this sense of unity. And then if you--if I break one of those norms 
that I don’t necessarily care about like how I dress or which car I drive, at that time I feel 
that no, it’s not that simple and that I’m accepted because I conformed. It’s not just 
fundamental acceptance; it’s easy for me to think that my in-group is just better and they 
just are fundamentally accepting people … 
For this participant, being a member of a group includes a feeling of safety 
and unity. Indeed, to be in a group is to be accepted by others who share your 
beliefs on a variety of issues. Yet he also recognizes that his acceptance by a group 
is conditional and that ultimately, “I’m accepted because I conformed.” This is in 
contrast to what he calls a “fundamental acceptance” where one’s acceptance 
within a group is unconditional. This insight leads him to question the extent to 
which, “it’s easy for me to think that my in-group is just better and they just are 
fundamentally accepting people …”   
 Another participant discusses an instance when his desire to interact with 
a particular group came into conflict with his political views. 
There are certain things that I enjoy and one of them being Starbucks Coffee or coffee in 
general but--but Starbucks is everywhere. So and--and--and I know that Starbucks is a 
shitty company. I know that they rip people off--that they rip off the coffee farmers. I 
know all these things but yet I still buy their coffee; I still and go hang out at that 
particular Starbucks at the corner there at the Kroger because it’s there and I like the 
people there and I know the people--I know some of the people that work there. So--so 
there’s kind of--there’s a sense of affiliation that I have with the people that work there 
you know. I have some current student like …  and then you know former students that 
work there and stuff like that. Now you know I know people that go there [Laughs] and so 
it--it’s kind of like I feel a sense of connectedness to people and the product happens to be 
Starbucks and I know the company is shitty. So I feel like I compromised myself in that 
way. You know I feel like--like it’s a self-indulgent kind of compromise that I make and 
it’s perhaps not a right one. It’s one that--that in the ideal I don’t believe is right; so I’m in 
a situation in my life where I actually live in a somewhat different way than I politically 
believe is right and--and sometimes that’s weird. Sometimes that--that’s a weird kind of 
contradiction that happens.  
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On the one hand, this participant holds some reservations regarding the 
questionable business practices of a national retail coffee business. On the other 
hand, he shares a certain affinity with the employees and customers that frequent 
this establishment. In this case, his feelings for his friends usurp his devotion to a 
particular political view. Moreover, he experiences some discomfort in making 
this choice such that, “I feel like--like it’s a self-indulgent kind of compromise 
that I make and it’s perhaps not a right one.” 
Participants also note difficulties they had in accepting all the beliefs of a 
particular group. They often feel as if their support of one issue requires them to 
adopt a wide range of other beliefs. Indeed, it can become a major point of 
contention when participants feel forced to identify with a particular political 
party. In these cases, they find themselves defending a variety of issues related to 
a particular political platform – issues they had not originally intended to defend. 
For example, while a person may feel that abortion is wrong, he or she may not 
adopt other political beliefs associated with such a position. In this sense, 
participants find themselves defending beliefs that are associated with a 
particular political platform (Republican, Democrat, Green, etc.). These 
difficulties sometimes spill over into their relationships with family and friends. 
As one participant notes, 
It’s very stereotyped groups, you know you’re automatically giving somebody a label and 
even though I give my family a particular--the Republican label there are still views that 
they don’t agree with, so it’s kind of a gray area, but you’re not allowed to have that gray 
area and--and if you don’t claim independence, you’re not allowed to have--you know 
you’re one or the other and I think that’s another reason why it becomes heated 
arguments. 
For this participant, political disagreements sometimes occur because people 
taking a particular stance are often called on to defend a host of other issues that 
have become associated with a single issue. Indeed, she sees political debate as 
lacking a “gray area”, a phrase often repeated by participants in this study. 
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Other Cultures 
 While it may seem out of place at this point to discuss participant’s 
experiences of another culture, it is clear that these experience often brought 
many background practices they took for granted into sharper focus. In many 
cases, the experience of encountering another culture enables participants to 
reflect on the contingency and flexibility of the way they view the world. 
 Participants often discuss the way visiting another country or another 
culture brought aspects of their own culture into focus that had previously 
remained in the background. For the following participant, a visit to the Middle 
East serves as a particularly potent reminder of the differences she experiences in 
the two cultures: 
… when I was in the West Bank, politics--like American politics, I guess mostly traveling a 
lot--people were very biased towards Americans and I hadn't really thought about that 
before and their reaction to our country … you’re thinking from a very central opinion of 
like this is you know my government, but then when you’re somewhere else you’re 
thinking about like America kind of from a second perspective.  
In this case, traveling to a foreign country became an occasion to reflect on what 
it means to be an American citizen. In encountering a bias towards Americans, 
the participant notes that she, “hadn’t really thought about that before…” Indeed, 
she suggests that, “when you’re somewhere else you’re thinking about like 
America kind of from a second perspective.” In other words, her visit to another 
culture brought her own national origin, something that usually remains in the 
background, into sharper focus. Further along, she suggests that,  
… I guess it definitely was a--a--very surprising I guess that I didn’t realize--I thought 
America was like you know this--supposed to be the big, greatest ever and we used to do 
everything right but in reality we’re not and other countries are doing things better than 
us, and I--I hadn't really realized that when I was little; but as I grew up like I’m realizing 
all the different things that are good--like bad points and good points about the country. 
Once again, we see a contrast between what one understands as a child being 
raised in a certain culture and the insights one develops as he or she ventures into 
other cultures. The participant singles out an experience that is particularly 
salient in this regard: 
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I was walking around--my family was in the City of Jenin, so I was walking around in 
there and there were people walking around with like giant guns and I was thinking about 
it and I mean for American politics I’m--I’m very like anti-guns, but I was thinking about 
it and I--I never really thought about like why or why that they--you know that civilians 
would need guns in a different country but it’s to protect themselves from their own 
government, which I thought was really interesting. So I thought about it definitely then 
and I guess the whole setup of the country and how—I didn’t really think about how much 
our government protects us and in other countries they don’t get that same protection; so 
that was interesting. 
Here the contrast between her experience in America and her experience in the 
Middle East is particularly salient. In encountering people openly carrying 
weapons in the city of Jenin, she reflects on her own views on guns and how these 
might be different given certain circumstances. This leads her to think about “the 
whole setup of the country,” and ultimately, how much the American 
government, “protects us and in other countries they don’t get that same 
protection.” She also discusses her experience of passing through security 
checkpoints in the Middle East: 
When I got to Checkpoints our license plate was colored for--for Palestinians, like they 
get different license plates than Israelis do, so we were held there but it was kind of 
interesting because our--your passport is kind of like your Green Card to--to get around 
the country. It’s like your--it’s like your credit card to get through to any place--was I 
don’t know; in America you really don’t think about it as much like how lucky you are, but 
I mean compared to the other Palestinians who were going to get held for like an hour at 
the Border, you know the Border Patrol, we showed our American passports and they 
were like oh, they’re American; so it gave us like an--an added--an advantage on everyone 
else which I hadn't really appreciated before.  
In this case, she reflects on the way people are treated differently as they pass 
through a security checkpoint. She also notes that in contrast to traveling within 
the borders of America, she was required to produce specific documentation in 
order to pass from one area to another in the Middle East. Moreover, she comes 
to recognize her American citizenship as an asset in passing through security 
checkpoints, something that she, “hadn’t really appreciated before.”  
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 For another participant, traveling outside the United States and 
interacting with people in another country also brings certain aspects of her own 
culture into sharper focus.  
And I don’t know; what’s amazing is like I was telling someone this the other day--I’ve 
only traveled out of the country once and like you leave and you just realize like what a 
crazy American perspective it can be sometimes. Like, our perspective of the world is--can 
just be crazy … 
She continues by focusing on a specific situation: 
… I had befriended this guy in Costa Rica and he and I were talking one day… and I don’t 
know--I was--I was curious because you always--not you always hear, but I’ve heard that 
European men whatever--you know foreign to us--American--men find American women 
very attractive. My inter--you know interpersonal relationship side of my head just 
started worrying like why? You know like just--it just enthralled me. I was just like okay; 
so I was like okay I’m intrigued. Like what--what is it about American women because he 
and I had kind of joked about America--like oh your American, you know da-da-da. And I 
was like okay why?  
While visiting another culture, she encounters an opportunity to investigate the 
origins of a generalization about non-American being especially attracted to 
American women.  She notes that her foreign companion responds to her queries 
by discussing, 
… the air of confidence that we have. Like he goes everyone I’ve ever met thinks she’s the 
most beautiful thing ever. And I don’t perceive myself that way but he was like you know I 
can see it in you and I can see it in--in just about everyone I’ve ever met. And so I was just 
like do our women lack like [Laughs] an element of not modesty but yeah--like humility? 
Do we not--but it’s so--and I’m not saying that other countries aren’t competitive but 
we’re so competitive like we have to have that bravado of just like I’m the shit. Right; I 
mean you’ve got to believe it you know and like it was just amazing that he could even 
pick up--like he goes I can't--even the women that come here that look Central American 
you can tell when they’re American. And it just--I mean it just boggled me that it’s so 
prevalent that someone could just look at you and go you’re an American, you know. 
In this case, she is surprised that her behavior as an America may express 
something salient to the members of another culture. Indeed, she notes that, “it 
just boggled me that it’s so prevalent that someone could just look at you and go 
you’re an American …” Here, it is the experience of interacting with another 
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culture that enables her to develop an insight into the behavior of people within 
her own culture.  
 Another participant discusses his ambivalence regarding whether he 
should move to another country:  
Yeah; and--and one of the biggest things I’m trying to deal with in trying to decide 
whether to live here or in Portugal is do I--on the one hand I could put it like this; do I 
stay and fight for what I believe is right or do I leave and give up and say fuck it? But 
another way to look at it is do I live in a country where I feel alienated from the values 
around me and sickened by it and--and also feel those values creeping up on me and feel 
myself internalizing these values that I don’t like or do I go and choose to live someplace 
among people with values that I feel like I resonate with more--that I’m more comfortable 
with where I don’t have to be on-guard for these values that I think are sick creeping into 
the very way I see the world and feel about things?  
This participant views the decision to remain in the United States or move to 
Portugal as a choice to either, “stay and fight for what I believe is right,” or give 
up and move overseas. He is particularly concerned with this decision because in 
his current position, he feels, “alienated from the values around me and sickened 
by it and--and also feel those values creeping up on me and feel myself 
internalizing these values.” In other words, he feels as if he has to decide whether 
to try and change cultural values that he experiences as encroaching on his 
personal beliefs or move to a culture whose values are more congruent with his 
own. Indeed, he discusses the fact that at present he notices,  
… materialism in myself, like homophobia in myself, racism in myself and in some ways I 
don’t feel responsible for all that. I mean I know that I am, but I feel that the more I live 
in an environment where that is the way the world is seen, the more I will take those in. 
Just like when I was in India there were different religious beliefs and I--that started to 
help me change my religious beliefs just being around people that look at the world in a 
different way. It helped to loosen up my religious beliefs; likewise, when I’m surrounded 
by people who feel like--they might not say it but who really feel like one of my primary 
motivations is to make a whole lot of money it’s easier for me for that motivation to creep 
into me. 
What is particularly important about this passage is the way experiencing another 
culture enables this participant to “loosen up” his own beliefs. In other words, the 
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contingency or flexibility of his own beliefs come into focus as he recognizes other 
possibilities, other ways of “being-in-the-world.” Another participant also took 
note of this apparent flexibility when he reflects on the possibility that a close 
friend may be moving out of the country.  
It was really weird talking to--talking to--to my buddy about you know he may potentially 
move … and it’s just weird to think of--of moving out of this type of government and you 
know and into a different--a different country. I’m trying to figure out where I’m going 
with this. I don’t know if this--I guess this is sort of like nationalism and stuff like that--
like I think growing up I never thought about the idea of--you know you live in America 
and you’re raised in America, you’re always going to be an American. You’re an American. 
And the idea that I can go somewhere else if I’m not happy with the way things are run … 
In this case, the participant comes to realize that his inclusion in a particular 
group, in this case as an American citizen, is something much more flexible than 
he previously imagined. As a child, “you live in America and you’re raised in 
America, you’re always going to be an American.” Yet recognizing that a close 
friend may leave the country to reside elsewhere brings the contingency of his 
own American citizenship into focus. Moreover, he relates this experience with 
other flexible practices: 
… it’s almost--it almost feels in the same way kind of the experience of--of growing up in a 
religious family and then--and then sort of moving you know away and sort of starting to 
develop these ideas that oh there’s a whole different way to look at these things and 
understand these things,. 
As before, he recognizes a similarity between living in a particular country and 
participating in a particular religion. Furthermore, he talks about the experience 
of, “sort of starting to develop these ideas that oh there’s a whole different way to 
look at these things.” He continues by discussing his experience of nationalism: 
… it’s almost a similar experience with nationalism and like--oh there’s you know some 
200-odd, 300-odd other countries that are very different from this that--that I could go to 
and--and find a whole different process. And it’s--it’s kind of exciting and--and different 
and it’s--it’s just I don’t know; it’s something that lately I--I find this sort of floating 
around in my head and I don’t really know what to make of it or do with it, but it seems 
kind of interesting that there’s so much out there. And I don’t think that was sort of on 
my radar as far as like what can you do if you don’t--you don’t like the way things are now 
and you feel like you aren’t a part of this? Would--would a different form of government 
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or--or you know just anything like that--would that give me an opportunity to feel 
differently or do something differently? 
Both participants seem to recognize the contingency of any one way of 
approaching reality. There is a tension between the beliefs of their culture and 
what they take to be their own beliefs on a variety of political issues. Indeed, the 
insight they develop revolves around their choice to remain in their country of 
origin or to move to a culture whose norms and values are more congruent with 
their own beliefs.  
 For the participant trying to decide whether he wants to move out of the 
country, an experience of traveling around Europe is particularly salient: 
Well one thing was walking around Europe right after--I think it was after 9/11 and before 
the War on Iraq and seeing all of the anti-American graffiti and just realizing because 
Bush was elected and because of the way our foreign policy has been people throughout 
the world and the countries that I am in hate my country and personally have a reaction 
to me--have a reaction to me as a person. And maybe I can get them over that, but that’s--
that’s my starting point of where they think of me and our--my personal relationship with 
them is affected by what my country is doing. 
By interacting with people from another culture, the participant begins to reflect 
on his relationship with his own country, and the way that relationship influences 
his interactions with people from another culture. He notes that, “people 
throughout the world and the countries that I am in hate my country and 
personally have a reaction to me--have a reaction to me as a person.” Here the 
tension between being a member of a country and being an individual is 
particularly salient. 
Another participant discusses his experience of participating in a student 
exchange program in the early 90’s. In this case, he had an opportunity to spend 
time in the Ukraine in the midst of its split from the Soviet Union.  
And the family I lived with both of them were nuclear physicists and there was a big 
nuclear site there in the town, and I think the Soviet Union had broken up maybe not 
quite a year before that and it was a program that where they worked was funded by--by 
Moscow. And so when they broke up all that funding stopped. And so the family I was 
living with, these two nuclear physicists, clearly very intelligent, the mom was out of work 
and the dad had started fixing cars in a--like a--what would be--it was a garage but it 
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would essentially be like when you’d go to the storage facilities in town you know and 
you’ve got the roll up sort of doors and that’s what he was doing. That’s what they had 
been doing; that was the only income they had because they had no funding coming in.  
Here the participant has an opportunity to witness first-hand the changes 
occurring in a country as it goes through a time of tremendous social, economic, 
and political transition. Because of these changes, two highly educated 
individuals are forced to switch occupations to fit the emerging needs of the 
community. He continues by noting that, 
… you had an entire community that was without money and--and so sort of--sort of 
seeing that nuance of okay, yeah; you know thinking that oh communism is bad in the 
Soviet Union and you know how they’re sort of controlling all these other countries, you 
know out of Russia--that’s bad. But then you see, well there’s nuances and maybe these 
people didn’t want that to happen because that’s their livelihood and so your political 
views and your desire to keep living sort of clash and how do you deal with that?  
In this case, the participant recognizes a tension between his understanding of 
another culture’s economic system and the concrete impact the upheaval of this 
system has for people with whom he is personally involved. Thus, while it may be 
easy from a distance to overlook some of the “nuances” of a particular situation, 
directly witnessing these events brings a number of issues into focus. He 
continues by noting that, 
… just seeing all those people struggling, it was--it was very eye opening. And then going 
the last--I think for the last three days of the trip we--we went up to Moscow and the--the 
White House there was still black and tanks and stuff like that and standing in the middle 
of the Red Square in the Kremlin it was--it was just so--so amazing because you hear 
about you know this--this terrible country, you know. It’s all the propaganda we get, you 
know Russia and everything like that and standing in the middle of that was just--it was a 
lot like--it was--it was a lot like being at the mall in DC except it was sort of the opposite. 
It was like--in DC I felt like okay I’m in it; this is--this is part of my identity. I’m in the--
I’m in the seat of--of the government of America and--and there it was like wow; I’m in 
the sort of foreign--I’m in the middle of their government area, but it was just a very--it 
was a similar feeling but very different.  
Here he recalls his experience of standing in the Red Square in Moscow. He 
notices the buildings surrounding him and the history with which they are 
imbued. He discusses what he refers to as the “propaganda” surrounding what he 
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was taught about the Soviet Union in the West. Moreover, he compares his 
experience of being in the Red Square with his experience of being in the Mall in 
Washington D.C. Interestingly, he notes that these experiences were both similar 
and opposite. Being among the monuments in Washington D.C., his identity 
emerges in such a way as to bring his affiliation with America into sharper focus 
while his identity emerges within the context of the Red Square in such a way as 
to highlight his sense of being foreign to his surroundings. He suggests that,  
… the  thing I mainly came out of that was sort of you know you get all the propaganda 
here that--it’s wonderful that they broke up and--and in a lot of ways it was a lot of good 
that came out of that but seen on the--on the local level, you know just talking about how 
those massive changes affect everybody in very different ways, you know--people maybe 
in Western Ukraine who weren’t being funded through Moscow, you know--it may not 
have been a very great thing for them and maybe it will eventually end up being a really 
good thing but you know pretty much most of the countries that came out of the Soviet 
block are bankrupt and people are struggling… 
While the West’s reception of the fall of communism was overwhelmingly 
positive, the participant notes that actually being in the Ukraine and witnessing 
these changes first-hand had a profound affect on the way he views his own 
countries understanding of political issues. Indeed, he suggests that events “on 
the local level” may seem very different from what people understand when they 
approach something from a more distant perspective. 
Indeed, another participant notes a profound change in her perspective 
when she read a book that challenged her understanding of American foreign 
policy. 
…  I took a World Civilization class last semester and we read Blow Back by Chalmers 
Johnson and it talks about--all I had ever heard is basically like our bases in other 
countries are helping them--that it’s like this is giving them--it’s helping their economy 
basically and that--and that’s it--that’s the only--that’s the only real solid like pro-having 
bases in Okinawa and all those other places--that’s the only side I’ve ever really heard that 
I was like okay yeah I can see that. And we read this book and it just talked about how--I 
mean how--how many incidents of crime that they’ve having because of the soldiers, like 
they’re raping Okinawan women; they’re--they’ve killed people with the--with the trucks 
or the Hummers or what--you know what I mean like hit and runs and--and they’re not 
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tried in the country; they’re taken back to America and given a slap on the wrist and sent 
back somewhere else to maybe commit the same crime all over again.  
In this case, the participant notes that reading this book gave her a novel insight 
into the role America plays within the international community. She suggests 
that before reading this book, she only understood one “side” of the issue and she 
now feels as if she has a better grasp of the situation as a whole. She continues by 
noting that the book 
… talked about how in the school like there are so many thousand hundred planes landing 
and taking off out of Okinawa every day and these are jets. I mean these are really loud 
and how--that it disturbs the community, it disturbs the people that live there, like that 
there was--that there was a day like a landing or a flying hiatus one day so that these 
Okinawan students could take their entrance exams to universities. That’s how much of 
an issue it is that it’s obviously disturbing them so they’d at least acknowledge it enough 
to go okay we’ll hold off on them for a day so you can take your tests. You know like--so 
clearly that’s a problem and so reading this stuff it was just all the sudden … 
Here she notes that American military presence in a foreign country may not 
always be entirely altruistic. Indeed, she begins to recognize that this presence 
may sometimes disrupt other communities and that her previous understanding 
of America’s role in the international community may need to be revised. Further 
along, she attempts to express the depth of this insight:   
Reading this all the sudden it was just like oh my gosh there really are two sides of this 
coin. You could really argue it either way and I--and reading it I felt myself--because the 
argument, the ultimate argument was that we’re empire--empire and we just don’t say it--
America is an empire and we just don’t say it. Why are we still in these countries? They’re 
not really threatened by Communism, but if we left they would be. You know like it was 
just--and I understand that it’s a really radical, really extreme, liberal point of view, but I 
think I needed it to be that extreme to trump my upbringing … 
For this participant, encountering the perspective of another culture enables her 
to see that there really are, “two sides of this coin.” Even though she gains this 
insight from a book rather than traveling to Japan and experiencing the issues 
directly, she still feels that a specific clash between two cultures enables her to see 
something that she was unable to see before. Moreover, she suggests that while 
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this perspective may be a, “really radical, really extreme, liberal point of view,” it 
may have, “needed it to be that extreme to trump my upbringing…” 
 
Reflections 
While I have made a number of observations throughout this analysis, I 
would now like to focus on several aspects of the interviews that relate to the 
practice orientation I outlined at the beginning of this project. In other words, I 
would like to make a few general observations regarding the intersection of 
phenomenology, politics, and practice. These observations are not an attempt to 
identify an essential structure that connects each of the interviews to one 
another. Instead, the focus on political practice is meant to foreground the 
intersubjective foundations of political experience. I will have much more to say 
about this in a moment. 
 We may recall that I presented each participant with the following 
research question: Can you tell me about some times when politics stood out to 
you? This question enables participants to talk about the political situations that 
they find particularly salient. After reading all of the transcripts, I organized 
relevant passages into three general categories: (1) media (2) conventional 
political activities and (3) political socialization. Within each of these categories, I 
tried to give the reader a sense of the variety and breadth of these experiences. 
Moreover, I tried to demonstrate that participants’ salient political situations can 
be understood as a collection of practices that coalesce into an interpretation of 
political reality. This interpretation does not reside within the minds of individual 
knowers but is instead embodied in the political practices that reproduce and 
transform collective activity. Furthermore, the preceding analysis enables readers 
to reflect on the extent to which these political practices are congruent with his or 
her own. Several observations may facilitate this process. 
 Clearly much of the political information we encounter comes from 
various forms of media populating our world. Indeed, one would be hard pressed 
to draw attention to a contemporary political issue that was not initially 
encountered in some form of media. Whether participants view media 
representations of politicians or political issues as far removed from their 
everyday reality or as presenting a specific definition of a situation, they are 
certainly concerned that the media do not necessarily present an accurate picture 
of reality. In fact, participants often discuss the way they experience their 
encounter with these images as somehow unreal. In other words, there is a sense 
that while the media provide images that are purported to be representations of 
reality, there is something suspicious about these representations – something 
that gives participants the sense that what they are encountering is to some 
extent distorted. While this may be relatively unimportant when relying on the 
media for entertainment, it becomes more disconcerting when information 
crucial for making political decisions is presented in a similar fashion. Moreover, 
participants often view these distortions less as accidental omissions and more as 
systematic distortions. That is, they often see the media as not simply being in 
error but instead as furnishing specific definitions of politicians and political 
situations. 
It should therefore be of some concern that media representations are 
often the primary source for making important decisions on a number of political 
issues. Increasingly, technological innovations are enabling politicians to define 
political situations in very specific ways. With the mediated encounter becoming 
one of the fundamental points of “contact” between political figures and citizens, 
it is important to understand the role media plays in contemporary democracy. 
Yet the content of media images and messages should not be the only concern of 
social scientists. It is also important to understand how the intersection of media 
and politics provides a unique understanding of the political process. Thus, it is 
not simply the content but the practice of “interacting” with these mediated 
images and messages that should be a further topic of investigation.   
 It is also important to understand the various ways people experience 
conventional political activities. For the participants in the present project, voting 
and protesting were particularly salient political situations. Yet it is also clear that 
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voting and protesting were experienced in significantly different ways. While 
voting seems to amplify a sense of fragmentation, protesting engenders a sense of 
being a part of a collective activity. Indeed, the tensions between individual and 
collective activity are especially acute at the intersection of these two practices. A 
few words may help clarify this situation. 
 It is clear that many participants see voting in an election as the primary 
means for participating in the political process. In this practice, each individual 
makes his or her own choice with the aggregate of choices deciding who will be 
elected to public office. For Taylor (1983), voting, 
carries with it certain standards, of valid and invalid voting, and valid and invalid results, 
without which it would not be the practice that it is. For instance, it is understood that 
each participant makes an independent decision. If one can dictate to the others how to 
vote, we all understand that this practice is not being carried out. The point of it is to 
concatenate a social decision out of individual decisions. So only certain kinds of 
interaction are legitimate. This norm of individual independence is, one might say, 
constitutive of the practice (p.62-63; italics mine). 
In this sense, the practice of voting already presupposes a specific relationship 
between the individual and the group. It is the individual in an election that 
ultimately must choose a particular candidate. This ensures that all the citizens of 
a democracy are able to make a decision ostensibly free from coercion or force. In 
an election, groups emerge as a political force only to the extent that they are 
viewed as an aggregate of individuals who share the same beliefs, attitudes, and 
desires. Yet it is also clear that the practice of voting already embodies an 
interpretation of social reality. Within contemporary society, voting is a symbol of 
the freedom enjoyed by every citizen of a democratic nation. But if this is the 
case, why do the vast majority of participants have such a negative appraisal of 
voting? Moreover, why did participants have such a positive view of protesting, 
an activity that many of them acknowledged as having little direct influence on 
the political process? One possibility is that voting and protesting highlight the 
difference between individual and collective political activity. Indeed, this 
experience may call into question the legitimacy of viewing collective political 
activity as the aggregate of individual activity. As an alternative to the “atomist 
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theory” of political participation, Taylor (1983) recommends a “republican 
model” of political participation: 
From this standpoint the atomist theory is ignoring one of the most crucial dimensions of 
social life, viz., the degree to which the society constitutes a political community, that is, 
the kind and degree of common meanings. A society in which all goals were really those of 
individuals, as they are portrayed in the atomist scheme, would be an extreme case, and a 
degenerate one. It would be a society so fragmented that it was capable of very little 
common action, and was constantly on the point of stasis or stalemate (p.71). 
Focusing on a community bound by shared practices rather than on an aggregate 
of individuals has profound implications for the way we view social and political 
reality. Social reality is not a collection of solitary information-processors but 
represents a community that provides a background of shared practices against 
which certain forms of subjectivity emerge. Moreover, the fact that these 
participants overwhelmingly prefer protesting to voting suggests that protesting 
enables participants to do more than achieve instrumental ends. Protesting 
focuses attention on the group or community such that it inherently challenges 
the atomizing of society into individual subjects. As such, protesting may be 
viewed as a challenge to the fragmentation citizen’s experience when they 
perceive voting as their primary means of political expression. Yet to move from 
the individual to the community requires a radically different way of 
understanding the political process. For Taylor (1995),  
the very definition of a republican regime as classically understood requires an ontology 
different from atomism, falling outside atomism-infected common sense. It requires that 
we probe the relations of identity and community, and distinguish the different 
possibilities, in particular the possible place of we-identities as against merely convergent 
I-identities, and the consequent role of common as against convergent goods (p.192). 
Indeed, it is here that the theoretical task outlined in the first chapter directly 
intersects with the analysis of the practices that embody an interpretation of 
political reality. Much as the movement from consciousness to practice requires a 
radically different conception of social reality, understanding citizens as 
primordially embedded within a political community requires us to reflect on the 
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utility of considering the individual as the foundation of research into the 
political process.  
 Clearly, participants often embrace opportunities to participate in political 
activities that bring them into contact with others. This has important 
implications for the way we understand the functioning of a democracy. Indeed, 
Todd and Taylor (2004) argue that it would, 
be wrong to attribute the crisis of representative democracy solely to a lack of interest in 
political matters. Active citizens are also turning against traditional political institutions 
and are finding new ways to express themselves. This can be traced, in part, to mistrust in 
the existing system, to the lack of choice between the main parties and to the changing 
needs of the citizen body (p.7) 
Thus, a protest may not only enable citizens to voice their opinion on a particular 
political issue – as a practice it represents a challenge to more conventional forms 
of political activity. Protesting allows citizens to emphasize issues that may have 
been neglected by traditional forms of democratic participation. When combined 
with media coverage, protesting allows a community to promote an alternative 
definition of a political situation. 
 The distinction between voting and protesting enables us to understand 
the difference between practices that focus on the individual or on the 
community. Conventional political activities express more than the desire to 
achieve concrete political goals. Political protests become sites for challenging 
what constitutes conventional political activity and the role of the individual in 
the political process. The analysis of political socialization indicates that political 
subjects always emerge against the background of concrete political practices – 
from attending school to participating in a family and community. In political 
socialization and education, it is not an individual who develops only a technical 
understanding of the political process but a tradition that involves a community 
in the reproduction and transformation of a way of being. Indeed, Oakeshott 
(1962) notes that, 
political education is not merely a matter of coming to understand a tradition, it is 
learning how to participate in a conversation: it is at once initiation into an inheritance in 
which we have a life interest, and the exploration of its intimations … long before we are 
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of an age to take interest in a book about our politics we are acquiring that complex and 
intricate knowledge of our political tradition without which we could not make sense of a 
book when we come to open it. And the projects we entertain are the creatures of our 
tradition. The greater part, then – perhaps the most important part – of our political 
education we acquire haphazard in finding our way about the natural-artificial world into 
which we are born, and there is no other way of acquiring it (p.129).  
To acquire a political tradition is to participate in the practices embodying that 
tradition. These practices cannot be reduced to the functioning of individual 
consciousness but reside at the intersection of a community oscillating between 
the reproduction and transformation of a particular form of life.  
 It is also clear that times of transition were particularly salient when it 
came to discussing concrete political situations. These times gave participants an 
opportunity to reflect on the different practices that they encounter as they made 
the transition from one community to another. Indeed, participants often talk 
about the move from one school to another, the transition from their hometown 
to college life, and the differences and similarities they encounter among their 
family, friends, teachers, students and coworkers. These transitions sometimes 
enable participants to understand the political in novel ways.  
 For some participants, the boundaries of the political were drawn around 
their transformation from being a child in a particular community to being a 
citizen able to vote in that community. In fact, the time when a citizen is allowed 
to vote in an election corresponds with a host of other changes, the most 
important of which for these participants is moving away from home to attend 
college. In this experience, participants left the familiarity of the community in 
which they were raised and encountered a host of other people who were in the 
same situation. In a sense, they formed a new community and in many ways 
became different people. In doing so, the practices that they had previously taken 
for granted came into view.   
 This foregrounding of practices also emerges when participants travel to a 
foreign country. In these situations, the practices that make participants part of a 
particular tradition come into focus as they encounter the practices of an alien 
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culture. For many participants, visiting another country and being immersed in 
the activities and customs of an ‘other’ shed light on the contingency of their own 
way of being-in-the-world. Activities that they had taken for granted were now 
seen in a new light. Indeed, Oakeshott (1962) argues that, “to investigate the 
concrete manner in which another people goes about the business of attending to 
its arrangements may reveal significant passages in our own tradition which 
might otherwise remain hidden” (p.132). Thus, the movement from the familiar 
to the strange encourages critical reflection on ordinary activities and practices. 
This may be the most crucial insight to be gleaned from the present project. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
 This project began by critiquing the view that interpretation is a mental 
process capable of being made fully explicit in terms of discrete rules and 
procedures. I offered the concept of practice as an alternative to the 
epistemological focus on consciousness and individual minds. Moreover, I 
suggested that Heidegger’s critique of transcendental phenomenology calls into 
question psychology’s adherence to subjectivity as the basic unit of analysis. 
While the theoretical portion of this project argues that a phenomenology 
focusing on shared practices rather than subjectivity has a number of 
implications for political research, it is also clear that practice and politics share 
something that deserves further attention. I would like to conclude this project by 
exploring this relationship in greater detail.  
 The movement towards practice, especially in the twentieth century, has 
had a tremendous impact on the way social scientists view the relationship 
between the individual and the group. Various scholars have focused on the 
practices that lie at the intersection of human agency and structure or lifeworld 
and system. Indeed, Taylor (1985) notes that theorists such as Heidegger, 
Merleau-Ponty, and Wittgenstein, “see the agent not primarily as the locus of 
representations, but as engaged in practices, as a being who acts in and on a 
world” (p.169-170). For these theorists, practices provide a background against 
which anything like a subject can emerge; it is therefore impossible to see such 
practices as the possession of an individual consciousness. 
As we have seen, the contemporary focus on disinterested knowledge 
already embodies a particular interpretation of social reality – an insight that has 
gained momentum through Heidegger’s emphasis on comportment rather than 
intentionality:  
The tremendous contribution of Heidegger, like that of Kant, consists in having focused 
the issue properly. Once this is done, we can’t deny the picture that emerges. Even in our 
theoretical stance to the world, we are agents. Even to find out about the world and 
formulate disinterested pictures, we have to come to grips with it, experiment, set 
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ourselves to observe, control conditions. But in all this, which forms the indispensable 
basis of theory, we are engaged as agents coping with things. It is clear that we couldn’t 
form disinterested representations any other way (Taylor, 1995, p.11). 
Thus, it is not a disinterested stance that grants us access to the nature of reality 
but our practical dealings that provide a foundation for all claims to knowledge. 
Indeed, this observation has been made time and again by theorists such as 
Heidegger, Wittgenstein, Merleau-Ponty, Dewey, Ryle, Rorty, Taylor, Dallmayr, 
and Oakeshott. In their own way, each theorist calls into question epistemology’s 
separation of subject and object. Moreover, we have seen that many of these 
theorists are especially critical of the representational theory of knowledge that 
underlies much of contemporary psychological research. For Taylor (1995),  
we can draw a neat line between my picture of an object and that object, but not between 
my dealing with the object and that object. It may make sense to ask us to focus on what 
we believe about something, say a football, even in the absence of that thing, but when it 
comes to playing football, the corresponding suggestion would be absurd. The actions 
involved in the game can’t be done without the object; they include the object. Take it 
away and we have something quite different – people miming a game on the stage, 
perhaps. The notion that our understanding of the world is grounded in our dealings with 
it is equivalent to the thesis that this understanding is not ultimately based on 
representations at all, in the sense of depictions that are separately identifiable from what 
they are of (p.12).  
The movement towards practice encourages us to reflect on the origins of the 
separation of subject and object. It suggests that such a separation is itself 
grounded in the activities of a community – activities that cannot be reduced to 
the thoughts or behaviors of individuals. At this point, it is clear that the focus on 
practice is not simply an insight one applies to political phenomena. Instead, 
political activities are fundamentally practical activities, that is, activities that 
cannot be reduced to the cognitive processes of individual minds. As such, it is 
important to understand the role intersubjectivity plays in the way we navigate 
political reality. 
 By focusing on the practices that embody an interpretation of political 
reality, I want to draw attention to the intersubjective foundations of political 
action. Such action should not be understood simply as the result of a prior 
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mental activity. Emphasizing the intersubjective foundations of political activity, 
Taylor (1995) suggest that, 
these actions are constituted as such by a shared understanding among those who make 
up the common agent. Integration into a common rhythm can be one form this shared 
understanding takes. But it can also come to be outside the situation of face-to-face 
encounter. In a different form it can also constitute a political or religious movement, 
whose members may be widely scattered, but who are animated together by a sense of 
common purpose (p.172). 
Indeed, participants repeatedly referred to political activities as embedded within 
particular groups, from the political protest to their parents and peers. In these 
cases, the focus is largely on community and collective action. For Taylor (1995),  
the background understanding we share, interwoven with our practices and ways of 
relating, isn’t necessarily something we partake in as individuals. That is, it can be part of 
the background understanding of a certain practice or meaning that is not mine but ours; 
and it can indeed be “ours” in a number of ways: as something intensely shared, which 
binds a community; or as something quite impersonal, where we act just as “anyone” 
does. Bringing in the background allows us to articulate the ways in which our form of 
agency is nonmonological, in which the seat of certain practices and understandings is 
precisely not the individual but one of the common spaces between (p.77). 
Focusing on the practices that embody an interpretation of political reality 
highlights the communal and intersubjective foundations of political action. It 
suggests, as Arendt (1958) notes that, “no human life, not even the life of the 
hermit in nature’s wilderness, is possible without a world which directly or 
indirectly testifies to the presence of other human beings” (p.22). Indeed, the 
intersubjective foundation of political action calls into question a focus on 
individual mental activity and cognitive processes: 
It is not just that the people in our society all or mostly have a given set of ideas in their 
heads and subscribe to a given set of goals. The meanings and norms implicit in these 
practices are not just in the minds of actors but are out there in the practices themselves, 
practices which cannot be conceived as a set of individual actions, but which are 
essentially modes of social relation, of mutual action (Taylor, 1977, p.119) 
Thus, political activity should not be understood as the convergence of 
individuals who share similar goals – as an aggregate of individual minds – but 
as a concrete activity grounded in the practices of a particular community.  
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 To highlight the intersubjective foundations of political action, Taylor 
explores the way understanding functions in political negotiations. He suggests 
that negotiations draw attention to the way an individual’s beliefs and attitudes 
are embedded in the intersubjective understanding of a collective:  
The actors may have all sorts of beliefs and attitudes which may be rightly thought of as 
their individual beliefs and attitudes, even if others share them; they may subscribe to 
certain policy goals or certain forms of theory about the polity, or feel resentment at 
certain things, and so on. They bring these with them into their negotiations, and strive to 
satisfy them. But what they do not bring into the negotiations is the set of ideas and 
norms constitutive of negotiations themselves. These must be the common property of 
the society before there can be any question of anyone entering into negotiation or not. 
Hence they are not subjective meanings, the property of one or some individuals, but 
rather intersubjective meanings, which are constitutive of the social matrix in which 
individuals find themselves and act (Taylor, 1977, p.119; italics mine) 
While it may be possible to translate individual beliefs and attitudes into explicit 
rules, as social cognition would seem to suggest, it is clear that such rules are 
intelligible only against the background of a tradition in which such a rule-
discourse resides. In other words, subjective beliefs and attitudes are predicated 
on the intersubjective understanding of a community. For Taylor (1977), 
convergence of belief or attitude or its absence presupposes a common language in which 
these beliefs can be formulated, and in which these foundations can be opposed. Much of 
this common language in any society is rooted in its institutions and practices; it is 
constitutive of these institutions and practices. It is part of the intersubjective meanings. 
To put the point another way, apart from the question of how much people’s beliefs 
converge is the question of how much they have a common language of social and 
political reality in which these beliefs are expressed. This second question cannot be 
reduced to the first; intersubjective meaning is not a matter of converging beliefs or 
values. When we speak of consensus we speak of beliefs and values which could be the 
property of a single person, or many, or all; but intersubjective meanings could not be the 
property of a single person because they are rooted in social practice (p.120). 
A political activity such as a negotiation is not simply the end result of 
deliberation but is itself a practice that enables something like deliberation to 
occur in the first place. Once again, the aim of the present project is to draw 
attention to the political practices that are not the end result of a mental activity 
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known as interpretation but instead embody an interpretation of political reality. 
This has a number of implications for the way we understand social reality. 
 As we have seen, there is a tendency within contemporary psychology to 
view intersubjectivity as the collective activity of a group of individuals. Thus, a 
phenomenon such as culture is conceptualized as a possession of individual 
minds, another variable capable of explaining particular interpretations of social 
reality. Yet our focus on practice would seem to call into question the way 
psychology has heretofore integrated culture into its explanatory matrix. Indeed, 
the present analysis suggests that culture is not something we possess – a 
collection of mental representations that govern our interpretations of social 
situations. Culture is something that we are and it is through our practical 
activities that we reproduce and transform who we are. In this way, the focus on 
practice and intersubjectivity should encourage psychologists to explore how 
their interpretation of culture is embodied in the practices of a scientific 
community that treats individual cognitive processes as their basic unit of 
analysis.  
 The present project also has implications for the way we view the concept 
of ideology. As we have seen, social cognition would have to view ideology as a 
collection of mental representations that govern particular interpretations of 
political reality. In this sense, an ideology is a cognitive bias – a lens that colors 
the world in one way for a conservative and in another way for a liberal. 
Moreover, this view of ideology is implicit in the methods psychology relies on to 
investigate its subject matter. Such methods are designed to methodologically 
distance the researcher from what he or she is investigating. This ensures that 
subjective biases do not prevent the research community from understanding 
social reality as it really is. In this sense, methods ensure that scientific research 
will not succumb to the ideological convictions of an individual or community. 
 Yet the discussion of practice has important implications for such a view. 
If interpretation is no longer seen exclusively as a mental activity, where are we to 
locate ideology? The shift to practice suggests that the activities of a community 
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already embody an interpretation of social reality. Thus, ideology may reside 
within the practices of a particular community. This calls into question the 
division of science and ideology. Indeed, it suggests that methodological 
procedures do not simply extirpate ideology from scientific investigation but that 
the latter may represent a pervasive ideological practice – one that fails to 
recognize its own ideological commitments.  
 Because practices embody who we are as a community, it is often difficult 
to bring them into focus. In other words, the very familiarity of these practices 
prevents us from becoming aware of the role they play in our experience. The 
present project is an attempt to draw attention to the practices that embody an 
interpretation of political reality. To do so, I have tried to make our familiar 
practices strange. The German playwright Bertolt Brecht refers to this process as 
“estrangement” or Verfremdung – a process whereby the contingency of our 
ordinary thoughts, beliefs, and activities comes into view. Indeed, Jameson 
(1998) notes that in Brecht’s method of “estrangement” (Verfremdung), 
the familiar or habitual is reidentified as the ‘natural’, and its estrangement unveils that 
appearance, which suggests the changeless and the eternal as well, and shows the object 
to be instead ‘historical’, to which may be added, as a political corollary, made or 
constructed by human beings, and thus able to be changed by them as well, or replaced 
altogether (p.40). 
What I have tried to demonstrate in this investigation is that 
phenomenology, far from serving as a foundation for social cognition research, 
may in fact call into question some of psychology’s most cherished notions 
regarding the nature of social reality. By viewing phenomenology ontologically, 
the intersubjective foundations of psychological and political understanding can 
be brought into view. In doing so, the familiar aspects of our experience can be 
seen in a unique way.    
Among other things, the present project is an attempt to draw out the 
implications of a practice orientation for phenomenological research. By focusing 
on shared practices, I hope to draw attention to the intersubjective foundations of 
political phenomena. It is therefore important to understand the role psychology 
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can play in such an investigation. Since the move towards practice unsettles both 
the individual as the basic unit of analysis and the primacy accorded to such an 
individual as a knower, it could seem that the movement towards practice is 
entirely destructive. In other words, psychology cannot afford to reflect on the 
“practice turn” lest it undermine the premises vital to its legitimacy. Yet it is also 
possible to see the movement to practice as beckoning for a new psychology that 
recognizes itself as a form of social practice contributing to a wide array of 
interesting debates. 
 The philosopher Richard Rorty (1979) once wrote that a critique of the 
epistemological view of interpretation is an attempt, “to prevent education from 
being reduced to instruction in the results of normal inquiry. More broadly, it is 
the attempt to prevent abnormal inquiry from being viewed as suspicious solely 
because of its abnormality” (p.363). While the present project may seem strange 
to those accustomed to viewing interpretation strictly as a mental activity, I 
believe it is important to treat this strangeness not as a hindrance to this 
investigation but as a sign of epistemology’s grip. The transition to a practice 
orientation represents a radically different way of understanding social reality. 
For Gadamer (1981),  
practice is conducting oneself and acting in solidarity. Solidarity, however, is the decisive 
condition and basis of all social reason. There is a saying of Heraclitus, the “weeping” 
philosopher: The logos is common to all, but people behave as if each had a private 
reason. Does this have to remain this way (p.87)? 
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